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SOVEREIGNTY UNDER SIEGE:
CORPORATE CHALLENGES TO DOMESTIC
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DECISIONS
Cynthia M. Hot

ABSTRACT
Countries face a new threat that strikes at their ability to balance protection of
intellectual property rights against other priorities, such as public health. They may have to
pay substantial compensation to companies that dislike domestic intellectual property laws.
This threat is much more significant than the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"), a landmark international agreement concluded
twenty years ago, that for the first time required all countries to provide "minimum" levels
of intellectual property rights; before that time, countries were not obligated to provide any
such rights at all. Since the conclusion of TRIPS, policymakers and scholars have strived to
preserve local flexibilities to consider domestic policies, such as public health. However,
those flexibilities may quickly evaporate if companies can bring claims against countries for
compromising private investments under so-called "investor-state arbitration" claims.
This is not a theoretical problem-Eli Lilly is currently seeking $500 million in
compensation from Canada because Canadian courts invalidated two of its patents under
prevailing law. In addition, there are unique issues raised by Eli Lily's claim that transcend
broader concerns raised by scholars and commentators concerning investor-state disputes.
In particular, if Eli Lilly's claim succeeds, it will disrupt internationally accepted norms that
permit countries to have different standards of protection. This Article provides a detailed
analysis of Eli Lilly's case of first impression. In so doing, the Article both explains why an
arbitration tribunal should reject Eli Lilly's claims, and predicts the likely impending threats
to domestic regulation of public health that intersect with the interests of pharmaceutical
companies. This Article ultimately proposes specific language to incorporate in pending
agreements to forestall such predicted harms.
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INTRODUCTION

Is a company entitled to compensation from a country that declines to
provide that company an intellectual property right? Eli Lilly thinks so. Eli
Lilly is seeking $500 million from Canada pursuant to an international
agreement that permits foreign-but not domestic-investors to bring
cinvestor-state arbitration" claims before a panel of private arbitrators against
countries that interfere with its "investments."' This is the first time a
company has initiated an investor-state arbitration to challenge a domestic
patent law that arguably complies with international agreements governing
patents. In particular, Eli Lilly claims that two of its patents were
1. Alternatively, these are referred to as investor-state dispute settlements ("ISDS").
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investments, and that Canada unduly interfered with these investments when
the country's courts invalidated the patents for failing to meet a Canadian
patentability requirement.
Eli Lilly's demand for substantial financial compensation discourages
countries from fine-tuning their patent laws, even when domestic laws would
comply with separate international agreements concerning intellectual
property. International agreements that require protection of patents permit
some domestic flexibility to promote social policies other than innovation,
such as access to lower-cost medicine. However, when viewed in the broader
historical context, the flexibility is in fact significantly limited and further
underscores why investor-state disputes pose a particularly significant threat
to sovereign rights to protect traditional domestic goals, such as public
health. To understand the chilling effect, a brief background of the most
important international agreement governing intellectual property and its
significance follows. In 1994, over one hundred and twenty countries agreed
for the first time to provide "minimum" standards of patent protection
pursuant to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPS").3 This was a major change for many countries. Before
TRIPS, some countries were reluctant to grant patents on drugs because such
patents would inevitably result in higher costs and less access to affordable
medicine.4 For example, some only permitted inventors to patent methods of

2. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Notice of Arbitration (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib.
Sept. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration].
3. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]; The 128 Counroies That Had Signed GATT by 1994,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem e.htm.
However, WTO member countries that the UN designates Least Developed Countries do
not need to provide patent protection on drugs until at least 2016. Decision of the Council
for TRIPS of June 27 2002, Extension of the Transition Period Under Article 77.1 of the Agreement
for Least Developed Countu Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to PharmaceuticalProducts,
para. 1, IP/C/25 (uly 1, 2002). However, there are pending proposals for the WTO to
further extend this timeline. E.g., Request for an Extension of the Transitional Period under
Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least Developed Country Members With Respect
to Pharmaceutical Products and for Waivers from the Obligation of Articles 70.8 and 70.9 of
the TRIPS Agreement, Communcationfrom Bangladesh on behalf of the LDC Group, IP/C/W/605
(Feb. 23, 2015).
4. E.g., SUDIP CHAUDHURI, THE WTO AND INDIA'S PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRY:
PATENT PROTECTION, TRIPS, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 59 (2005). Indeed,
Switzerland, home to major multinational pharmaceutical companies such as Novartis, only
patented drug products in the late 1970s. PATENTVERORDNUNG [PatV], Patent Regulation
[PatV] Oct. 19, 1977, SR 232.141 (Switz.). The Swiss Constitution originally barred any
patents on drugs and only later were patents permitted on chemical processes. See, e.g.,
MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 216 (2008).
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making drugs, and not the drugs themselves, to ensure that drugs would not
be subject to a patent premium. 5 After centuries of limited patent protection
of drugs, most countries must now provide patents on drugs pursuant to
TRIPS. However, TRIPS notably only requires minimum, but not uniform,
standards of protection, such that countries still have some flexibility to tailor
patent standards to their respective interests.6 Since the conclusion of TRIPS,
scholars and policymakers have recommended that developing countries with
limited resources embrace TRIPS flexibilities to ensure that citizens in these
countries are not unduly harmed by the inevitably higher cost of patented
drugs. 7 Although some developing countries recently considered modifying
their laws to take advantage of these flexibilities, they may now have second
thoughts-especially if the arbitration tribunal finds in Eli Lilly's favor.8
Eli Lilly's challenge impacts countries at a critical juncture. For more than
a decade, the pharmaceutical industry has suffered from an innovation crisis
in conjunction with the expiration of patents on highly profitable drugs,
resulting in a struggle to sustain revenue.9 In response, the industry has
increasingly patented drugs that are merely minor variations of existing drugs
5. After all, if only one company could make a drug, that company would likely charge
high prices. On the other hand, if multiple companies can make the same drug, albeit with
different methods, that should cause competition that reduces drug costs.
6. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 1; see also infra Subsection II.B.1 (discussing flexibility
under TRIPS).

7. See infranotes 150, 157.
8. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text (discussing Brazil and South Africa).
9. E.g., PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON Sci. & TECH., REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT ON PROPELLING INNOVATION IN DRUG DISCOVERY, DEVELOPMENT, AND
EVALUATION 9-10 (2012); Fabio Pammolli et al., The Productivity Crisis in PharmaceuticalR&D,

10 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 428, 429 (2011); Charlotte Harrison, The Patent Clij

Steepens, 10 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 12, 12-13 (2011); Katie Thomas, U.S. Drug
Costs Dropped in 2012, but Rises Loom, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2013, at Al. Although some have
contested that there is no innovation crisis, they are outliers. See, e.g., Donald W. Light & Joel
R. Lexchin, PharmaceuticalResearch and Development: What Do We Getfor All That Money?, BRIT.
MED. J., Aug. 7, 2012, at 1 (claiming the innovation crisis is a myth used as a ploy to get
government benefit, but nonetheless arguing that there is a crisis with respect to an
inadequate number of new drugs that represent a true therapeutic advance); Bernard Munos,
Lessonsfrom 60 Years of PharmaceuticalInnovation, 8 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 959,
959-60 (2009) (concluding no decline in productivity, using an unduly restrictive data set).
Indeed, many have noted that innovation has been stagnant for years. E.g., Jeff Hewitt et al.,
Beyond the Shadow of a Drought: The Needfor a New Mindset in Pharma R&D, OLIVER WYMAN 1,
3-4 (2011), http://www.oliverwyman.com/insights/publications/2011/nov/beyond-theshadow-of-a-drought--the-need- for-a-new-mindset-in-ph.html#.VEP2e nF90A; Measuring
the Return From Innovation: Is R&D Earning its Investment?, DELOITTE 1, 9 (2011),
https://www.deloitte.com/assets/DcomPoland/Local%20As sets /Documents /Raporty,%20badania,%20rankingi/pl raport chemic
zny 2011.pdf.
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and that offer no significant improvement in treatment. 10 Even though these
newer drugs may not be a substantial improvement over older drugs, patent
protection permits companies to charge a premium." In one extreme
example, Sanofi introduced a new cancer drug at $11,000 a month--over2
twice the cost of existing drugs--even though it was not more effective.'
Given the financial constraints many nations face, providing patents on drugs
of minimal therapeutic value seems especially questionable.
Although there is generally no market for expensive new products that
are not a significant improvement, the pharmaceutical market is unique.
Consumers generally lack expertise to assess whether new products are
better, such that advertising can be particularly influential. In addition,
although most patented drugs are drugs prescribed by doctors with expertise
to understand the value of these drugs, their ability to effectively determine
whether a new drug is worthwhile is still compromised. Doctors generally
make decisions based on data by self-interested drug companies since no
independent data concerning the value of a new drug generally exists. At
times, the company data concerning an "improvement" is later discovered to
be unsubstantiated. 3 In addition, doctors are also influenced by

10. See, e.g., EUR. COMM'N DIR.-GEN. FOR COMPETITION, PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR
INQUIRY: FINAL REPORT 33, 351-65 (2009) [hereinafter EC PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR
INQUIRY]; JOHN R. THOMAS, PATENT EVERGREENING:
COMPETITION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

ISSUES IN INNOVATION AND

(2009);

CHAN PARK ET AL., USING
LAW TO ACCELERATE TREATMENT ACCESS IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS OF PATENT,

42
(2013). Although incremental innovation is common in all industries, what happens in the
pharmaceutical industry is likely unique. The practice of patenting follow-on drugs is done in
combination with substantial and usually successful marketing to consumers and doctors to
'switch' to a newly patented drug immediately before expiration of the patent for the first
drug. E.g., EC PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY, Supra note 10, at 351-52. Although
manufacturers of other new products, such as consumer electronics, may also market new
products heavily, consumers generally cannot effectively evaluate whether a new drug is
worthwhile; in addition, doctors often decide on drugs, yet are vulnerable to advertising even
though they may not be conscious of this.
11. Not only can patent holders charge a premium, but they can increase the premium
at any ime during the patent term. This seems to be more of a problem in recent years. E.g.,
COMPETITION AND MEDICINES LAW, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

Robert Langreth, Big Pharma'sFavorite Prescnrotion:HigherPrices, BLOOMBERG

BUSINESSWEEK,

May 8, 2014.
12. E.g., Peter B. Bach et al., In Cancer Care, Cost Matters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2012, at
A25; see also Stephen S. Hall, The Cost of Living, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 20, 2013),
http://nymag.com/news /features /cancer-drugs -2013-10/.
13. E.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Drugged Out: How Cognitive Bias Hurts Drug Innovation, 51 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 419, 502-05 (2014).
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pharmaceutical marketing. 14 Given these issues, permitting minimally
improved drugs to be patentable is problematic. Accordingly, countries
should have the ability to tailor their patent laws to avoid expending
resources on drugs of questionable value. Though they technically retain the
right to modify domestic patent laws consistent with TRIPS, countries may
consider the threat of investor-state litigation pursuant to investor-state
arbitration agreements to essentially eliminate this option.
Although Eli Lilly's claim is one of first impression, it actually contributes
to a broader trend. Companies are increasingly challenging domestic
decisions pursuant to bilateral and multilateral agreements that provide
protection to foreign investors and permit them to bring investor-state
disputes. For example, investors filed only one dispute in 1982, over fifty
new cases in 2012, and today there are currently five hundred claims pending
in over fifty countries. 5 Many have noted that such provisions threaten the
ability of nations to regulate in areas of traditional domestic competence such
as environmental law and public health 6 because the financial stakes are
often substantial-there are currently over one hundred pending actions
worth more than $1 billion each.' 7 Against this backdrop, Eli Lilly's suit is
arguably the latest expansion of investor claims that challenge domestic laws.
Moreover, many more suits challenging domestic intellectual property
decisions may follow. 8 Even before Eli Lilly brought suit, the multinational
law firm Jones Day published a report proclaiming that investment treaty
protection was "a new way forward" for multinational pharmaceutical
14. Although physicians recognize this problem, they seem to always assume that this
is only a problem for other physicians, but that they themselves are immune from this
phenomenon. E.g., id. at 503-04.
15. U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute
Settlement (ISDS): Updated for the Multilateral Dialogue on Investment, at 2-3, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2013/3/REV (May 28-29, 2013) [hereinafter UNCTAD,
Recent Developments].
16. See, e.g., Stephen J. Byrnes, Balancing Investor Rights and Environmental Protection in
Investor-State Dispute Settlement Under CAFTA: Lessons from the NAFTA Leginiag Croisis, 8 U.C.
DAVIS Bus. L.J. 102, 109-112 (2007); Samrat Ganguly, Note, The Investor-State Dispute
Mechanism (SDM) and a Sovereign's Power to Protect Public Health, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
113, 116, 123-26 (1999); Jane Kelsey & Lori Wallach, 'Investor-State" Disut in Trade Pact
Threaten Fundamental Princiles of National Judicial Sstems, PUB. CITIZEN 3 (Apr. 2012),
http: //www.citizen.org/ documents /is ds -domes tic-legal-proces s-b ackground-brief.pdf.
17. Arbtraion Scorecard 2013, AM. LAW. (June 24, 2013), http://www.americanlawyer.
com/id=1202608198051/Arbitration-Scorecard-2013; see also Shawn Donnan, Disputes Clause
Heaps Pressure on Trade Deal, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Mar. 11, 2014 (noting that use has
soared in recent years).
18. E.g., Brian King & Viren Mascarenhas, Investment Treao Protection for IP Rights,
PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY, Aug. 5, 2013; Sherman Kahn, Will Patents be
the Next Wave in Investor-State Arbitration?,7 N.Y. DISp. RESOL. LAW. 53 (2014).
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companies to address an "assault" against their patents in the developing
world. 9

The increase in investor-state disputes and expansive claims has attracted
increased attention and criticism. Although scholars have criticized such
actions for years, the popular press and policymakers are now also
highlighting such challenges as problematic for interfering with traditional
government regulation.20 Moreover, critics of investor-state disputes include
developed as well as developing countries-Germany recently expressed
concern even though it is a party to one hundred existing agreements that
provide this remedy.2 ' Commentators also have expressed concern about
including such investment provisions in pending agreements. Even the Cato

A

19. BAIJU S. VASANI ET AL.,JONES DAY, TREATY PROTECTION FOR GLOBAL PATENTS:
RESPONSE TO A GROWING PROBLEM FOR MULTINATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL

COMPANIES 1-2 (2012) [hereinafter JONES DAY].

20. E.g., Barrie McKenna, Canada Must Learn From NAFTA Legal Battles, GLOBE &
MAIL (Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/economy/
canada-must-leam-from-nafta-legal-battles /article15579209/; Elizabeth Olson, Growth in
Global Disputes Brngs Big PachecksforLaw Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2013, at B1; Sabrina
Tavernise, Tobacco Firms' Strategy Limits Poorer Nations' Smoking Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
2013, at Al; James Traub, Trading Up: Why a Massive Trade Deal is the Ke to the Asia Pivot-and
to America's Future, FOREIGN POLICY (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2014/02/21/tradingup/; Elizabeth Warren & Rosa De Lauro, Who is Wring the
TPP?' BOSTON GLOBE (May 11, 2015), http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/
2015/05/11 /elizabeth-warren-and-rosa-delauro-who-writing-tpp/2FQZAV6uz9GGQI6pe3
cdOK/story.html; see also infra notes 71-72, 75-86 and accompanying text (describing
criticisms by scholars and policymakers).
21. E.g., Peter Clark, Germany Throws Down Gauntlet in CETA Investor-State Negotiations,
IPOLITICS (July 27, 2014), http://www.ipolitics.ca/2014/07/27/germany-throws-downgauntlet-in-ceta-investor-state-negotiations/. In addition, Australia took the bold position in
2011 that it would not include such provisions in future trade agreements. DEP'T OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, AUSTL. GOV'T, GILLARD GOVERNMENT TRADE POLICY
STATEMENT: TRADING OUR WAY TO MORE JOBS AND PROSPERITY (2011); see also Australia

to Reject Investor-State Dispute Resolution in TPPA, INV. TREATY NEWS (Apr. 13, 2012),

http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/news-in-brief-7/. Its current position is that it will
consider such provisions on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Mike Seccombe, Big Tobacco's Plan
to Stub Out Plain Packaging, SATURDAY PAPER (Mar. 8, 2014), https://www.thesaturdaypaper
.com.au/opinion/topic/2014/03/08/big-tobaccos-plan-stub-out-plain-packaging/
1394197200/. However, academics suggest that Australia should not include such
provisions. E.g., MATTHEW RIMMER, TROJAN HORSE CLAUSES: INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT
(2014),
available at http://works.bepress.com/matthew rimmer/178

(submission to the Australian Parliament). Also, some countries, such as South Africa and
Indonesia, have terminated or failed to renew agreements with such provisions. E.g., U.N.
Conference on Trade & Dev., InternationalInvestment Polijmaking in Transition: Challenges and
Opportunities of Treay Renewal, at 2-3, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2013/9
(June 2013); Ben Bland & Shawn Donnan, Indonesia to Terminate More than 60 Bilateral
Investment Treaties, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3755clb2b4e2-11e3-af92-00144feabdcO.htnl.
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Institute, which usually promotes corporate interests, has suggested that a
current U.S. trade initiative involving a dozen countries, the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership, should not include an investment chapter
not only because of concerns about domestic sovereignty, but also because
investment chapters are "ripe for exploitation by creative lawyers."2 2 Strong
public criticism has stalled-or threatens to stall-discussions of the TransPacific Partnership, as well as two bilateral agreements involving the
European Union.2 ' Although both the United States and the European
Union at one point defended investment chapters against critics, in the past
year, the European Union has stopped doing so. 2 4 The European Union is
now engaging in public consultations as well as proposing modified language
25
with the hope of minimizing concern.
Eli Lilly's suit brings to light the problems with permitting an expansive
interpretation of investment chapters to cover intellectual property "rights"
that have been denied or cancelled under domestic law and are consistent
with international law, such as TRIPS.2 6 In particular, Eli Lilly's suit highlights
22. Daniel J. Ikenson, A Compromise to Adva,e the Trade Agenda: Purge Negotiations of
Investor-State Dipute Settlement, CATO INST. (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.cato.org/
publications /free-trade-bulletin/compromise-advance-trade-agenda-purge-negotiations-

investor-state;

see

also

Investor-State Arbitration

System

Needs

'Complete

Overhaul,'

BILATERALS.ORG (May 12, 2014), http://www.bilaterals.org/?investor-state-arbitrationsystem (a prominent international lawyer who has himself served as counsel in several cases
also suggested a problem with the system in delivering the keynote address to the annual
Investment Treaty Arbitration Counsel).
23. E.g., Clark, supra note 21; Shawn Donnan & James Politi, Official Warns EU-US
Trade Deal at
Risk
over Investor Cases,
FIN.
TIMES
(Mar.
27,
2014),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/58ee2daO-b5dc-11e3-b40e-00144feabdcO.html;
Matthew

Schewel, EU,CanadaFail to Close CETA: Stuck Over Issue Related to Eli Lilly Case, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, May 8, 2014; George Monbiot, Comment, This US Trade Deal is a Full-FrontalAssault
on Democracy, GUARDIAN, Nov. 5, 2013; Brent Patterson, Fast-Track authord stalls the TransPacific Partnership, RABBLE (May 25, 2015), http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/brentpatterson/2015/ 05/ fast-track-authority-stalls -trans -pacific-partnership/ 3.
24. Eg., EUR. COMM'N, INCORRECT CLAIMS ABOUT INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE

SETTLEMENT (2013); The Facts on Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Safeguarding the Public Interest
an~d Prtecg Investors, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Mar. 27, 2014),
http: //www.ustr.gov /about-us press-office/blog/ 2014 /March/Facts-Investor- State % 2 0
Dispute-Settlement-Safeguarding-Public-Interest-Protecting-Investors;
Investor-State Dispute
Settlemet (ISDS), Fact Sheet, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Mar. 2015),
https: //ustr.gov /about-us/policy- offices /press-office /fact-sheets/ 2015 /march /investorstate-dispute-settlement-isds/.
25. E.g., Press Release, European Comm'n, Commission to Consult European Public
on Provisions in EU-US Trade Deal on Investment and Investor-State Dispute Settlement

(Jan. 21, 2014).
26. This article intentionally focuses on intellectual property rights that are denied or
canceled, rather than any case where intellectual property rights are at issue. Although there
are pending disputes concerning whether existing trademarks that have lost value due to
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an important, yet unresolved tension: a country could be vulnerable to an
investor-state dispute even if it complies with a separate international law
concerning intellectual property rights. This Article aims to not only evaluate
the merits of and the policy problems raised by Eli Lilly's specific suit, but
also demonstrate other ways that domestic attempts to balance interests of
multinational drug companies with public health might be compromised.2
Eli Lilly's suit may prompt other companies to challenge not only
patentability standards they disagree with, but also exceptions to patent
rights, even where these exceptions are permissible under TRIPS. This would
threaten recent and proposed patent laws that commentators have hailed as
promoting a better balance of patent rights and access to medicine.
Moreover, the threat extends beyond the patent arena: pharmaceutical
companies may also use investor-state disputes to challenge domestic
regulatory laws that negatively impact their ability to sell even patented drugs.
Domestic laws governing clinical data associated with approval of new drugs
are likely an issue. Typically, nations require companies to provide clinical
data to establish that a new drug is safe and effective before approving the
drug for sale.28 However, companies that seek to sell a new drug are the ones
that create the data and often overstate benefits. 2 9 To address this problem,
the European Union has an important new law that aims to ensure that
doctors and patients have full information about underlying data of approved
drugs, such that they are less likely to be susceptible to overstated marketing
their inability to be used pursuant to plain packaging laws for tobacco, these raise additional
issues beyond the scope of a single article. In addition, this is an important issue that has
thus far been overlooked by scholars, even though some scholars have previously discussed
the pending trademark cases, how compulsory licenses could be challenged as
expropriations, and whether intellectual property rights in general constitute investments.
E.g., Christopher S. Gibson, Latent Grounds in Investor-State Arbitration: Do International
Investmen. Agreements Provide New Means to Enforce Intellectual Propero Rghts?, in YEARBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2009-2010, at 397 (Karl P. Sauvant ed.,

2010); Bryan Mercurio, Awakening the Sleeping Giant: Intellectual Propery Rghts in International
InvestmentAgreements, 15 J. INT'L ECON. L. 871 (2012).
27. This article focuses on issues that have not received much academic attention and
also seem currently ignored in negotiations. However, there are other public health issues
that have been raised as concerns. E.g., Shawn Donnan, EU Pledges to Protect NHS in US
Trade Talks, FIN. TIMES (July 10, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/eble1102-085e11e4-9380-00144feab7de.html (asserting that decisions of the National Health Service and
other European public health programmes will be exempt from investor-state challenges);
Press Release, HAI Europe et al., Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement' in EU-US Trade
Deal
Risks
Access
to
Affordable
Medicines
(July 14,
2014),
available at
http: //haieurope.org/wp-content/ uploads/ 2014 07/ress-release-Joint-response-ISDS-inTTIP.pdf.
28. See infra note 316 and accompanying text.
29. See infra Subsection III.B.2.b); Subsection IV.A.3.b).
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claims.30 Although many commentators heralded this law as important, it is
vulnerable to challenge by companies, as later explained.3'
This Article argues that it is unprincipled to permit companies to use
investor-state arbitration to challenge domestic decisions when they have no
valid intellectual property rights. Eli Lilly, for example, is asserting that it is
entitled to compensation because two of its initially issued patent were later
invalidated for failing to satisfy mandatory patent law requirements.
However, its invalidated patents amount to rights that never existed in the
first place. It would be more analogous to a void contract, which purports to
give rights but was never enforceable. Moreover, unlike most other types of
property, the very existence of intellectual property is only justified if it
promotes desired policy. Most recognize a utilitarian justification for
intellectual property-to promote innovation while at the same time
recognizing and balancing competing policy considerations, such as access
for researchers, users, and consumers.32 Although some believe that
intellectual property rights are inherently beneficial in promoting innovation
and attracting foreign direct investment, data does not clearly support this
claim.33 Since such rights inherently reduce access and increase costs,
countries should view the policy justification for providing such rights
skeptically. In addition, although there are international agreements that
require countries to provide equal treatment to domestic and foreign
intellectual property right holders, all such agreements assume that each
country has some discretion to decide how to balance intellectual property
rights against other interests.
This Article also argues that permitting companies to challenge domestic
decisions regarding intellectual property through investor-state disputes is
problematic because they disrupt internationally agreed norms under TRIPS,
and also because the historical justifications for protecting foreign investors
do not apply. TRIPS permits member countries discretion in shaping
intellectual property rights to advance policy goals other than promoting
30. See infra Subsection IV.A.3.b).
31. See, e.g., HAI EUROPE, PROTECTING CITIZENS' HEALTH: TRANSPARENCY OF
CLINICAL TRIAL DATA ON MEDICINES IN THE EU (2013).
32. Of course, there are competing views on whether inventors and artists have a
"natural" right to intellectual property, as well as whether these rights are protected as
human rights instruments, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 15.1(b), U.N. Doc. A/RES/21/2200 (Dec. 16, 1966). This Article
agrees with the majority of commentators who reject this view. Historical and policy
justifications of intellectual property rights support the majority view-patents have always
served to further the societal goals of promoting and disseminating technological innovation.
33. See infra Subsection III.A.2.c).
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innovation, including public health.34 A country that arguably complies with
TRIPS should not be subject to an investor-state challenge that could disrupt
TRIPS norms, as well as result in a judgment inconsistent with a decision
from the World Trade Organization ("WTO")-the international body that
handles TRIPS disputes. Moreover, permitting such challenges would not
further the historical justification of protecting investments in international
investment agreements-to promote investment from foreign companies.
Unlike most other types of investments where increased protection induces
foreign investment, companies do not invest in countries solely, or even
primarily due to the strength of intellectual property protection; in addition,
whether or not a company decides to seek more patent protection is unlikely
to benefit the host country unlike the typical scenario where stronger
protection for foreign companies results in direct benefit to the host country.
Eli Lilly's case uniquely threatens a country's freedom to legislate under a
separate international agreement. In contrast, prior instances of investor-state
disputes that arguably relate to another international agreement have not
resulted in a clear conflict pursuant to which resolution of the investor's
claim would violate the integrity of a separate international agreement. Often
this is because the other international agreement only is aspirational.35
This Article also provides a detailed analysis of Eli Lilly's central claimsthat Canada "expropriated" Eli Lilly's investment in its patents, and that
Canada failed to provide "fair and equitable treatment" to Eli Lilly's
investments." The Article seeks to show why Eli Lilly should not recover on

34. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 1.1; World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of
14 November 2001, WT/MIN01/DEC/2,
4-5 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Public Health
Declaration]; see also infra Subsection II.B.1 (discussing flexibility under TRIPS).
35. See infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text (discussing nonbinding WHO
framework convention as well as ambiguous human rights norms).
36. Although Eli Lilly originally asserted that Canada violated the nondiscrimination
agreement, that provision will not be addressed because it lacks any merit; indeed, Eli Lilly's
notice of arbitration dropped this ground. In particular, national treatment simply requires a
country to treat foreign investors "no less favorabl[y]" than its domestic investors. North
American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch. 11, art. 1102, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
605, 639 [hereinafter NAFTA]. Eli Lilly made two claims that seem unmoored to this
standard. Eli Lilly claimed that Canadian law disadvantages foreign nationals with
requirements "not required by the foreign applicants' own national jurisdictions." Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter
Eleven, 106 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Nov. 7, 2012). However, nondiscrimination
does not guarantee an investor laws identical to its home state. In addition, Eli Lilly claimed
that it is treated less favorably than domestic generic competitors that can benefit from
making the now invalidated patented drugs. Id. 107. However, nondiscrimination is only
about comparing similarly situated entities, and generic pharmaceutical companies are not
similar-they have an entirely different business model, such that this claim is illogical.
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any of its claims, but nonetheless explains which issues are most vulnerable
for Canada. As the final Part of this Article highlights, recognizing potential
problems that may arise from the decision in Eli Lilly's case is important to
understanding how to properly cabin such claims in future cases.
This Article proceeds in three parts: Part II provides a background of
relevant domestic and international law and policy, as well as an overview of
Eli Lilly's claims to contextualize Eli Lilly's investor-state dispute. Part III
then turns to the specifics of Eli Lilly's claims against Canada and explains
why an arbitration tribunal should reject Eli Lilly's claims. Part IV goes
beyond the specifics of Eli Lilly's claims to explain other TRIPS-consistent
domestic laws that are in danger of subsequent investor-state disputes. This
Part concludes with specific proposals for preserving countries' existing
policy space under TRIPS in pending and future agreements concerning
investor protection.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

DOMESTIC PATENT LAW AND POLICY

To understand Eli Lilly's claims against Canada, some background on
patent law is important. A patent is a legal document granted by a country to
the creator of an invention that provides the commercially valuable ability to
exclude others from making or selling the patented invention within the
boundaries of the patent-granting country.3 A patent is fundamentally a lever
to promote social policy, offering a reward to induce inventors to disclose
information to society so that others can learn from and build upon that
innovation. 38 Because most inventions build upon prior inventions,
encouraging inventors to share their knowledge is socially valuable, even if
there is a temporary cost of higher prices during the period of patent
protection. A patented drug is generally expensive because the patent owner
can exclude all others from making the identical drug during the patent term;
therefore the patent owner can and generally does charge a substantial
premium.
The social harm of higher prices on patented goods is mediated by a
limited term of patent protection, as well as patentability requirements.
Patents generally award inventors a term of protection of no more than
twenty years to minimize the period during which consumers must pay

37. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012); TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 28.
38. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974); Bonito Boats, Inc.
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 164-65 (1989).
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patent-inflated prices.39 In addition, the patentability standards aim to ensure
that patents are only granted on more socially valuable inventions so that the
price premium only applies where deserved.
There are two basic types of requirements that patent applications must
satisfy. First, the invention must meet certain patentability requirements,
typically that it is: patentable subject matter, useful (or that it has "utility"),
new, and not obvious. 40 For example, an invention that has no use at all, or

only a "throw away" use, such as being used as a paperweight, would not
deserve a patent. However, nations differ on the appropriate standard for
utility. The United States, for example, has one of the broadest
interpretations of usefulness; an invention qualifies as useful by providing
simple entertainment, rather than a commercial use, and may also be useful
even if its use promotes deceptive or even illegal activity in some
circumstances. 41 Most European countries, on the other hand, bar patents on
inventions that violate morality. 42 Second, the application itself must meet

certain disclosure requirements-it must fully describe the invention and
43
enable others to properly make and use the disclosed invention.
A patent application must satisfy these patentability requirements at
the time of filing to foster fundamental patent policy goals. In particular,
patentability requirements prevent applicants from filing claims for
inventions that they have not fully developed to avoid unduly rewarding
speculative claims, which could bar research and impose costs on the public.
Notably, although Canada has a unique interpretation of the utility
requirement under the "promise doctrine," its interpretation in fact supports
this fundamental patent policy. In cases where an application promises a
certain use (but not if there is no such promise), an invention is only
considered useful if it provides an adequate disclosure for that promise. The
Canadian Supreme Court has recognized costs of patent protection to be
particularly important in the area of pharmaceuticals, noting that

39. E.g., 35 U.S.C. 154(a)(2) (2012); TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 33.
40. E.g., 35 U.S.C.
101-103 (2012); TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 27(1).
41. E.g., juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
In addition, there are patents on inventions that may be illegal such as radar detectors and
gambling devices.
42. Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 53(a), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065
U.N.T.S. 199 (barring patents on inventions "the publication or exploitation of which would
be contrary to 'ordre public' or morality") [hereinafter European Patent Convention]; see also
Cynthia M. Ho, Splidng Moralf and Patent Law: Issues Asing from Miing Mice and Men, 2
WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 247 (2000) (explaining cases interpreting this doctrine).
43. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 29.
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[w]ere the law to be otherwise, major pharmaceutical companies
could ... patent whole stables of chemical compounds for all sorts
of desirable but unrealized purposes in a shot-gun approach hoping
that, as in a lottery, a certain percentage of compounds will
serendipitously turn out to be useful for the purposes claimed.44
Although Canada's interpretation of what is useful is different than the
interpretations of other countries, countries widely recognize the purpose
espoused by the Canadian Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court has
similarly stated that a patent is not a "hunting license" in interpreting the
utility requirement to bar a patent on a new method of making a known
steroid when the inventors had no idea what function the steroid served,
other than as a tool for further research.45
Like all types of intellectual property, patents are granted by individual
nations and are territorially limited. Because a global patent does not exist, an
inventor must seek patent protection in individual countries. For example, a
U.S. patent gives its owner rights against others in the U.S., but does not
provide any protection in other countries. To obtain protection in other
countries, the inventor would have to apply for and obtain patent protection
in the desired countries. However, an identical patent application filed in
different countries will not result in identical patent rights, or even
patentability. This is because each country has its own patentability standards.
Contrary to Eli Lilly's suggestions, courts in different countries can and often
do apply different domestic standards to determine whether the same
invention is patentable; courts often note that other nations' decisions
regarding similar, or even identical patent applications are not relevant to a
46
domestic court's evaluation of patentability.
B.

THE INTERNATIONAL LANDSCAPE: IP AND FOREIGN INVESTMENTS

Before addressing the specifics of Eli Lilly's claims, it may help to
provide a broader context of the international landscape. As noted in the
introduction, Eli Lilly's case lies at the unique intersection of separate
44. Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation, Ltd., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 153, para. 80 (Can.).
45. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535-36 (1966).
46. E.g., Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Amazon.com, Inc., [2011] F.C.A. 328, para. 16 (Can.)
("[I]t would not be helpful ... to explain the results of Amazon's patent applications in
other jurisdictions. . . . [Eivery jurisdiction has its own patent laws and administrative
practices, and they are inconsistent with one another in important respects."); Conor
Medsystems Inc. v. Angiotech Pharm. Inc., [2008] UKHL 49,
3 (stating that "it is
inevitable that [different courts] will occasionally give inconsistent decisions about the same
patent"); Apotex, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 153, para. 40 (Can.) ("[G]iven the differences in our
respective patent laws, the outcome of the U.S. litigation on this patent is of limited interest
here.").
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international agreements that govern intellectual property and foreign
investments.4 To better understand Eli Lilly's case, this Section first
considers the traditional territorial scope of intellectual property rights, as
well as how such rights are treated under international intellectual property
agreements such as TRIPS. Finally, this Part provides an overview of bilateral
and multilateral agreements that protect foreign direct investment.

/. IntellectualPropery: Tertitorialiy and Treaties
There is a long history of recognizing national boundaries of patents in
the global arena. The Paris Convention was one of the earliest international
agreements relating to patents (established in 1883), yet it did not require any
member countries to grant patents-this was considered a domestic choice.48
The agreement only provided rules to ensure fairness to domestic and
foreign applicants, and facilitate the process of obtaining patents in multiple
countries.49 Indeed, a provision on the independence of patents specifically
clarified that the grant or denial of a patent on an invention in one country
does not impact the decision of another country.0 This rule inherently
recognized and reinforced that patents are tools of domestic discretion and
that patent rights, if any, are restricted to the territory of the patent-granting
nation. Accordingly, countries not only differed on whether or not to
completely ban patents, but also on the grounds for granting patents; nations
could decide to grant patents only on processes, or only in some fields of
technology.
The second significant international agreement relating to patents is the
Patent Cooperation Treaty ("PCT"). This agreement, concluded in 1970,
provided a mechanism for inventors to more easily obtain patents in multiple
countries with a uniform PCT application that could be examined in
individual member states. Importantly, the PCT still firmly recognized
territorial limits and domestic sovereignty. It simply made the process of
filing for patents in multiple countries easier with a single application. For
example, a PCT application establishes a priority filing date in all member
47. In some situations, including Eli Lilly's, there is an international agreement that
simultaneously governs both intellectual property and foreign investments in separate
chapters of the agreement. However, the issues are the same as if there were independent
agreements.
48. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last
revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S.
305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
49. For example, a nation that provided patents could not treat patent applications of
its own nationals better than those of foreign applicants. Paris Convention, supra note 48,
arts. 2-3 (national treatment).
50. Paris Convention, supra note 48, art. 4bs.
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countries, but each country where the applicant ultimately files evaluates the
patent according to its own patent standards.5'
Today, most nations of the world are members of the WTO and, as such,
must provide patent and other intellectual property rights pursuant to TRIPS.
This landmark agreement, concluded in 1994, has dramatically changed the
ability of nations to exercise full control over the decision to grant patent
rights. Member countries are required to grant patents to all "inventions,"
that meet certain standards of patentability.
Even though TRIPS now requires many countries to provide patents,
because the agreement sets minimum, rather than uniform standards, it
explicitly contemplates diversity in domestic laws.52 Although TRIPS notably
requires some nations to provide patents for the first time, it gives states
substantial flexibility in how to do so. For example, although TRIPS requires
nations to grant patents on "inventions" that meet patentability standards, it
does not define what constitutes an invention.53 Accordingly, nations can
properly exclude software, for example, from patentability if they do not
consider software to be an invention.5 4 Similarly, although TRIPS requires
nations to provide patents on inventions that are useful, new, and
nonobvious, it does not define any of these terms.55 Before TRIPS, member
states had different laws about some of these terms. The lack of inclusion of
any specific definitions permits nations to provide their own definitions.56 A
failed attempt to create a new patent law treaty with uniform patent
standards after TRIPS underscores that nations understood TRIPS not to

51. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231

[hereinafter Patent Cooperation Treaty].
52. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 1(1).

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at art. 27.
Id.
Id.
E.g., Carlos M. Correa, Patent

ghts, in

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

AND

INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 189, 198-200 (2d ed. 1998); PARK, SuPra
note 10, at 39; WORLD HEALTH ORG. ET AL., PROMOTING ACCESS TO MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES

AND

INNOVATION:

INTERSECTIONS

BETWEEN

PUBLIC

HEALTH,

57 (2012); Michael N. Meller, Princtles of Patentabili
and Some Other Basicsfor a Global PatentSstem, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 359, 359
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADE

(2001); E. Richard Gold & Michael Shortt, The Promise of the Patent in Canada and Around the
World, 30

CANADIAN INTELL. PROP. REV.

35, 58-59 (2014); Jerome H. Reichman &

Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a
Substantive Patent Law Treav, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 89 (2007); Expert Report of Daniel Gervais
Accompanying Counter Memorial of Canada,
22-54.
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impose such uniformity.5 7 The attempt to create uniform standards shows
that countries recognized that there were no uniform standards of
patentability under existing agreements, such as TRIPS.
Accordingly, although member countries must provide some protection
to drug patents, they can define TRIPS patentability criteria to minimize
harm to social policies beyond innovation. For example, a country could
consider a newly discovered use of a known compound to neither be an
"invention" nor "new" because TRIPS does not define these key terms.
Although the use itself may be new, arguably that was inherent in the
existence of the compound, such that society does not benefit from granting
a patent on this new use. Countries might also consider such a use as simply
falling below the threshold inventiveness. In fact, India's recent patent
amendments take this approach in barring from patentability new uses of
known compounds.58
Countries may also decide how to satisfy the TRIPS patentability
requirement that an invention be "useful." 59 TRIPS article 27 actually states
that countries must provide patents on inventions that are "capable of
industrial application," but clarifies in a footnote that this term is meant to be
synonymous with "useful." These terms refer to somewhat similar, but
slightly different patentability requirements that existed in the laws of
countries at the time TRIPS was negotiated. As noted by one scholar, "the
deliberate inclusion of these two alternatives precludes any inference that the
draftsmen of TRIPS intended to incorporate by reference or implication any
60
single existing standard of patentability."
Indeed, these differences have always been permissible. Prior to the
conclusion of TRIPS in 1994, the Paris Convention simply focused on
ensuring fairness to domestic and foreign applicants if a country decided to
provide patents and the PCT similarly facilitated the process of obtaining

57. Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 56, at 89-90. This effort was abandoned in 2006.
See Draft Substantive Patent Law Treav, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/patent-law/en/draft_
splt.htm (last visited May 9, 2015).
58.

The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, § 3(d), Acts of Parliament, 2005

(India).
59. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 27(1).
60. Christopher Wadlow, Utifzi and Industrial Applicabzliy, in PATENT LAW AND
THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 355, 356 (Toshiko Takenaka, ed.,
2008).
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patents in multiple countries.6 These agreements remain in force today, and
the principle of territoriality remains valid.6
2. Internationa!AgreementsGoverning Foreign Direct Investments and
ProvidingInvestor-State Disputes
There are over 3000 international agreements that provide foreign
investors substantive rights to protect their investment, as well as a
mechanism to protect those rights outside of domestic courts. 3 These
agreements are either bilateral investment agreements, or free trade
agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"), with an investor chapter aimed at promoting foreign
investment. 4 Although a free trade agreement may include a chapter on both
intellectual property rights and foreign investor rights, these chapters operate
independently of each other.
Most agreements protecting foreign investors provide a similar set of
substantive rights. These rights build upon prior international rights and
provide more clarity than prior principles of customary international law.
Typically, they provide investors a guarantee of compensation for any
expropriation of investments, freedom from unreasonable or discriminatory
measures, fair and equitable treatment, and guarantee foreign investors that
they will not be treated less favorably than domestic ones. All of these rights
61. Paris Convention, supra note 48, arts. 2-3; PCT, supra note 51 (streamlining process
to file patents in multiple countries).
62. In addition, TRIPS clarifies that it is consistent with the Paris Convention. TRIPS,
supra note 3, art. 2.
63. E.g., UNCTAD, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: PREVENTION AND ALTERNATIVES
TO ARBITRATION 3-4 (2010), available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia2009llen.pdf;
INT'L INST. FOR ENVIRON. & DEV. (IIED), INVESTMENT TREATIES AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 1 (2014), available at http://pubs.iied.org/

pdfs/1724111ED.pdf.
64. Although scholars have questioned whether any of these agreements in fact impact
decisions to invest, that is nonetheless the goal. E.g., JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES 121 (2009) (noting conflicting studies); Todd Allee & Clint

Peinhardt, Delegating Differences: BilateralInvestment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution
Provisions, 54 INT'L STUD. Q. 1 (2010); Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment
Treav Arbitration, and the Rule of Law, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 337
(2007); jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Realy Work?: An Evaluation of
BilateralInvestment Treaties and Their GrandBagain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 75-79 (2005); Tom
Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and
Governance, 25 INT'L. REV. L. & ECON. 107, 108 (2005). But see Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt,
Contingent Credibiliy: The Impact of Investment Treay Violations on Foregn Direct Investment, 65
INT'L ORG. 401 (2011); Jennifer L. Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, When BITs Have Some
Bite: The Political-EconomicEnvironment for Bilateral Investment Treaties, 6 REV. INT'L ORGS. 1
(2011).
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help to ensure that host governments will not subject foreign investors to
inappropriate risks, and consequently induce them to invest.
Investor-state arbitrations developed simultaneously with bilateral
investment treaties as a means to promote and protect investment from
foreign companies. These largely began after World War II when newly
independent nations wanted to encourage foreign investment and assistance
with developing natural resources, as well as to generally encourage foreign
investment. 5 The investor-state arbitration remedy provided an important
avenue for relief to investors. Although foreign investors previously might
have attempted to sue the state in its own courts, those courts could be
biased; alternatively, the state might be able to claim sovereign immunity.
Sometimes the investor could not even directly pursue an action. In the
worst-case scenario, home states used, or at least threatened to use, military
force. 6 All of these options provided the investor with limited avenues of
recourse, either because no suit could be brought or because a judgment was
not enforceable.6
Investor-state arbitrations address this problem through a unique
process. Investors bring claims not before a domestic or international court,
but a tribunal of private arbitrators, who are generally lawyers. The state is
considered to have consented to this by agreeing to the treaty provision. The
ability of foreign investors to arbitrate their disputes against states obviates
prior hurdles to protecting investments when domestic courts either did not

65. Germany and Pakistan signed the first such agreement in 1959. United Nations
Commission on Trade and Development, Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid 1990s,
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, Sales No. E. 98.II.D.8, 8-10 (1998). International agreements to
promote investments date back as far as the late 1700s, but mostly focused on expropriation
and also did not have the same type of arbitration-based remedies as current agreements.
E.g.

RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH
INVESTMENT LAW 6-8 (2d ed. 2012).

SCHREUER,

PRINCIPLES

OF

INTERNATIONAL

66. E.g., Susan Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treao Arbitration, 50 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 435, 442 (2009) (noting gunboat diplomacy and war); KENNETHJ. VANDEVELDE,
UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY AND PRACTICE 7 (1992) (describing use of

military force); Ray C. Jones, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor o-Stae Dispue Resolution: A Shield to

be Embraced or a Sword to be Feared?, 2002 BYU L. REV. 527, 529 (describing gun boat
diplomacy).
67. For example, even if the ICJ ruled in favor of a company, a nation might decide not
to pay the investor. The only remedy in such a case was passing a UN Security Council
resolution. E.g., Susan D. Franck, The Legitimay Ciiis in Investment Treao Arbitration: Privatizrjg
Public InternationalLaw Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1537 (2005).
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recognize any claims, or refused to enforce domestic judgments in favor of
8
6

foreign investors.

Although the global community initially praised this process as a way to
promote investment flows during a more stable global economic era, more
recently, scholars, countries, and citizens have criticized multiple aspects of
investor-state arbitrations. 9 Some of the criticisms build on popular anti
trade or anti-corporate sentiment. 70 However, countries as well as scholars
have also expressed reservation and criticism. 71 A major issue is that the suits

appear to improperly encroach on domestic authority and even have a
chilling effect on legitimate state regulatory functions due to substantial
awards, as well as legal costs of defending such cases. One example of a
substantial award occurred in July 2014 against Russia for over $50 billion. 73
Although a recent study noted that states win in sixty percent of the cases,

68. Eg., id. at 1537; Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treav Arbitraton:A Hbrid
Theou of Interdependent Rights and Shared Inteipreive Authoo, 55 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 15-17
(2014) (discussing gunboat diplomacy as well as broader historical context).
69. For a discussion of early praise, see David P. Riesenberg, Note, Fee Shfting in
Investor-State Arbitration: Doctrine and Policy Jusifying Application of the English Rule, 60 DUKE L.J.
977, 985 (2011).
70. Citizens may not only object, but publicly protest. For example, in South Korea,
there were physical fights and tear gas use. E.g., South Korea Passes U.S. Free-Trade Agreement,
Lawmaker Sets Off Tear Gas Canister in Protest, Fox NEWS (Nov. 22, 2011),
http: //www.foxnews.com/ world/ 2011/11/ 22/ south-korea-passes-us-free-trade-agreementlawmaker-s ets-o ff-tear-gas -canister/.
71. E.g., Joseph Stiglitz, Letter to Congress, May 18, 20015, available at http://www.
scribd.com/doc/265770405/Letter-to-Congress-Stiglitz-on-Trade-Deal.; Letter to Congress,
April 30, 2015, available at http://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ISDS-Letter3.11.pdf; GUS VAN HARTEN ET AL., PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT REGIME 8 (Aug. 31, 2010) (statement by some academics suggesting that the
process is "not a fair, independent and balanced method for the resolution of investment
disputes"); supra note 21 and accompanying text (noting concern by countries); but see Hon.
Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, Whats in a Meme? The Truth About Investor-State
Arbitration: Wh It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed b States, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 689 (2014).
72. E.g., EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT (ISDS): STATE OF PLAY AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM 5 (2014). The average
cost of attorney fees alone has been estimated at $5 million U.S. dollars with a mean tribunal
cost of approximately $1 million. E.g., Susan D. Franck, Using Investor-State Mediation Rules to
Promote Conflict Management:An Introductou Guide, 29 ICSID REv. 66, 77-78 (2014).
73. The Russian award is the largest award to date. See Glyn Moody, Coporate Sovereigno
Tribunal Makes $50 Billion Award Against Russia, TECHDIRT (Aug. 5, 2014, 12:37 AM),
https: //www.techdirt.com/ articles/ 20140801/05242228082/ corporate-sovereignty-tribunalmakes -50-billion-award- against-russia.shtml; Kavaljit Singh, The Era of Mega-Arbitration:
International Court Rules Against Russia in $50 Billion Decision, MADHYAM ouly 30, 2014),
http://www.madhyam.org.in/the-era-of-mega-arbitration-tribunal-awards- 50-billion-againstrussia-in-yukos-case/.

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:1

the average award-$16.6 million-is nonetheless significant. 74 Although
there is a huge diversity in awards, even a lower award would still be
substantial for any developing country, such that a potential award, even if
statistically unlikely, could have a substantial impact on domestic decisions.
A major complaint is that the system results in inconsistent decisions
because there is no binding precedent, 75 tribunals interpret provisions
broadly, 76 and there is no appeal system. 77 Although tribunals often rely on
prior decisions and awards, and counsel for parties regularly cite prior
decisions, the lack of hierarchy among tribunals as compared to traditional
court systems, as well as the lack of an appellate system, may result in
unpredictability. 79 Some also contend that arbitrators lack the independence
and impartiality of typical domestic or international tribunals. 0 Although
arbitrators are clearly private parties, rather than judges, some suggest that
the presumption that arbitrators will rule in favor of corporations is
overstated.8 ' A related issue is that the proceedings and decisions may lack
the same level of transparency as most judicial decisions. The rules for most
proceedings do not permit interested parties to participate and do not require
74. E.g., Susan D. Franck, Using Investor-State Mediation Rules to Promote Conflict
Management: An Introductory Guide, Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2014-13, page
14, available at http: //papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=2389763.
75. This is true of international law in general. E.g., Statute of the International Court
of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1179; MOHAMED
SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT (1996); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler,
Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessify or Excuse?, 23 ARB. INT'L 357, 362-65 (2007); see also
NAFTA, supra note 36, art. 1136(1) ("An award made by a Tribunal shall have no binding
force except between the disputing parties and in respect of the particular case.").
76. E.g., Elizabeth Olson, Growth in Global Disputes Brings Big Paychecks for Law Firms,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/26/growth-in-globaldisputes -brings -big-p aychecks -for-law-firms/.
77.

AUSTL. GOV'T PRODUCTIVITY

COMM'N,

BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE

273 (2010); UNCTAD,
Recent Developments, supra note 1515, at 26.
78. Christoph Schreuer & Matthew Weiniger, A Doctrine of Precedent?, in THE OXFORD
AGREEMENTS: PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION RESEARCH REPORT

HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1196 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds.,

2008) (considering there to be a de facto practice of precedent, even if not required).
79. See Schreuer & Weiniger, supora note 78, at 1191-95; Jeswald W. Salacuse, The
Emerging Global Regimefor Investment, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 427, 460-61 (2010).
80. E.g., PIA EBERHARDT & CECILIA OLIVET, PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: How LAW
FIRMS, ARBITRATORS AND FINANCIERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION

BOOM 9 (2012); Olson, sup ra note 76; Gus Van Harten, Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical
Adjudication: An Empincal Study of Investment Treay Arbitration, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 211,
216 (2012).
81. Gus Van Harten, Perceived Bias in Investment Treaoy Arbitration, in THE BACKLASH
AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 433 (Michael Waibel et

al. eds., 2010).

2015]

SOVEREIGNTY UNDER SIEGE

final decisions to be made public. Although there are recent rules that
increase transparency, these rules only apply prospectively to new
agreements, rather than to the many that already exist.82 These disputes are

admittedly more transparent than general commercial arbitration, but there is
a major distinction in that investor-state disputes involve actions against
sovereign nations. Even though nations consent to this process in a manner
analogous to private parties, the consent is for a broad range of claims
whereas commercial arbitration generally involves claims arising from a
contractual clause limited to a specific situation.
To combat these shortcomings there have been many proposals to
reform the current system for investor-state disputes.83 Many have suggested
some type of appellate body to address the problem of inconsistent as well as
expansive interpretations of identical provisions.8 4 Alternatively, some
suggest replacing private arbiters with an international investment court to
promote impartiality and independence.8 5 Other proposals do not involve
drastic changes to the dispute resolution process but nonetheless aim to
cabin problematic decisions. For example, some suggest requiring that
claimants first exhaust domestic remedies; limiting the scope of claims; or
82. UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration art.
1 (2014), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-ontransparency/ Rules -on-Transparency-E.pdf (mandatory application only for disputes under
treaties concluded on or after 2014).
83. An alternative approach is to renegotiate or withdraw from such agreements
entirely. E.g., Ben Bland & Shawn Donnan, Indonesia to Terminate More than 60 Bilateral
Investment Treaties, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2014; Andrew Newcombe, A Bref Comment on the
"Public Statement on the InternationalInvestment Regime," KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Sept. 3, 2010),
http: //kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/ 2010 09/3 /ublic-statement-on-the-international-

investment-regime/; see also Gus Van Harten et al., Public Statement on the InternationalInvestment
Regime, BILATERALS.ORG (Aug. 30, 2010), http://bilaterals.org/?public-statement-on-the
(statement from academics asserting that "[t]here is a strong moral as well as policy case for
governments to withdraw from investment treaties and to oppose investor-state arbitration,
including by refusal to pay arbitration awards").
84. E.g., APPEALS MECHANISMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES (Karl P.
Sauvant ed., 2009); Asif H. Qureshi, An Appellate System in InternationalInvestment Arbitration?,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1154 (Peter
Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008); Mark Kantor, ICSID SECRETARIAT, PoOSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS
OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR ICSID ARBITRATIoN, TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT
(2004), http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=307 (suggesting
consideration of an appeals facility at ICSID). But see Schreuer & Weiniger, supra note 78, at
1203-05 (suggesting that appeals may not be the best way to provide consistent
interpretation and instead suggesting preliminary rulings on questions of law instead).
85. E.g., Gus Van Harten, Commentay: A Casefor an InternationalInvestment Court, INV.
TREATY NEwS, Aug. 7, 2008; U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Reform of Investor-State
Disute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2013/4
(June 26, 2013).
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requiring arbitrators to consider other areas of international law, such as
86
human rights and environmental obligations.
C.

ELI LILLY'S CASE

Eli Lilly has filed a notice of arbitration against Canada, alleging
violations of NAFTA's investment chapter. Eli Lilly claims that Canadian
courts improperly invalidated its patents for failing the utility requirement
and challenges the Canadian "promise doctrine"-a common law
interpretation of utility that applies when a patent sets forth, or is perceived
to set forth, a "promise." The promise doctrine dates back to early patent law
in the UK, as well as older Canadian decisions; however, Canadian courts
only recently invalidated patents under this doctrine.8 Since 2005, Canadian
courts have invalidated roughly a dozen patents for failing to satisfy this
doctrine. 88 Pursuant to this doctrine, a patent that promises something is only
useful if it does what it "promises." If the patent does not make a promise, a
scintilla of utility can establish usefulness. 89 For patents and patent
applications that make a promise, whether the promise is fulfilled can either

86. E.g., THOMAS MCDONAGH, UNFAIR, UNSUSTAINABLE, AND UNDER THE RADAR:
How CORPORATIONS USE GLOBAL INVESTMENT RULES TO UNDERMINE A SUSTAINABLE

7,

(2013);

A
(2013); Stephan W. Schill,
Enhancing International Investment Law's Legiimagy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a
FUTURE

15

JONAS PARELLO-PLESNER & ELENA ORTIZ DE SOLORZANO,

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT PROTECTION 2

New Public Law Approach, 52 VA.J.

INT'L L.

57, 69 (2011).

87. The promise doctrine has its origins in British law prior to 1977 (after that date
utility was eliminated as a requirement and the requirement of "industrial application" was
substituted). E.g., Gold & Shortt, supra note 56, at 50. The promise doctrine in Canadian law
can arguably be found as early as the 1960s. E.g., New Process Screw Corp. v. P.L.
Robertson Mfg Co. Ltd. (1961), 39 C.P.R. 31 (Can. Ex. Ct.) (patent promising a process of
making screws of many sizes depending on certain pitch angles in fact failed to create the
types of screws promised); see also Consolboard Inc. v. MacMillan Bloedel (Sask.) Ltd., [1981]
1 S.C.R. 504 (Can.) (stating that an invention is not useful either if it will not operate at all or
if "it will not do what the specification promises that it will do"); see also Gold & Shortt, supra
note 56, at 38. But see Norman Siebrasse, The False Doctrine of False Promise, CANADIAN INTELL.
PROP. REV. 3, 8-9 (2012).
88. Siebrasse, supra note 87, 36-37. For the purpose of analyzing Eli Lilly's investment
claims, this article assumes that Eli Lilly is correct in asserting that the promise doctrine
modifies Canadian patent law to consider the legal and policy implications; however, if
Canada's laws have not changed at all, Eli Lilly's claims are weaker. Although it is currently
unknown how the tribunal will decide, Canada as well as some scholars dispute that
Canada's law has changed. E.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Statement of Defense,
12,
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. June 30, 2014) [hereinafter Canada, Statement of
Defense]; Gold & Shortt, supra note 56, at 53-57, 61-77 (arguing that the promise doctrine
is not new to Canada and that other countries also require similar evidence, even if they do
so under other patent law requirements).
89. E.g., Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., [2012] 1 F.C.R. 349, para. 76 (Can.).
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be demonstrated in the patent or "soundly predicted." In the many cases
where the promise relies on a sound prediction, there are three components
to satisfy. First, there must a be factual basis for the prediction. Tested
compounds can supply this. Second, the inventor must have a sound basis
from which the desired result can be inferred from the factual basis as of the
date of the application. Third, there must be proper disclosure
in the patent
90
application to justify the quid pro quo of a patent monopoly.
An important issue is where a court (or the patent office) should look to
find a promise in the patent or in the patent application. Some courts and
commentators argue that only promises found entirely or mostly in the
claims are relevant, but not those found in the specification. 91 The majority
of cases do not restrict promises to those found in patent claims.92 This is
consistent with claim drafting; patent prosecutors generally do not restrict
claims by stating the claims' utility. Rather, prosecutors draft claims to simply
cover the structural elements of the invention. More typically, a patent or
patent application will state in its specification the invention's intended
purpose, as well as how the invention is an improvement over prior
inventions, thus leading to a promise. Courts have not found promises based
solely on abstract tables of data or drawings and instead generally look to an
actual statement in the specification. 93 However, even focusing on statements
in the specification can lead to different results, with some recent decisions
since Eli Lilly filed its notice of arbitration seeming to take a more restrained
view of what constitutes a promise. 94

90. Id. at para. 70.
91. E.g., Fournier Pharma Inc. v. Canada (Health), 2012 FC 740, para. 126 (Can.); Teva
Canada Ltd. v. Novartis AG, 2013 FC 141, paras. 76-77 (Can.); Fiona E. Legere, The Pi4/alls
of "the Promise of the Patent," 29 CANADIAN INTELL. PROP. REv. 57, 60-61 (2013). However,
some courts assert that claims control but actually look at the specification. E.g., Bauer
Hockey Corp. v. Eaton Sports Canada Inc., 2010 FC 361, para. 289 (Can.).
92. See Gold & Shortt, supra note 56, at 44. Some Canadian cases decided after Eli
Lilly's notice of arbitration have taken a more restrained view of the promise doctrine. E.g.,
Sanofi-Aventis v. Apotex Inc., 2013 FCA 186, para. 49 (Can.) (finding that there should only
be a promise if "the inventor makes an explicit promise of a specific result" in a case
involving the drug sold as Plavix).
93. E.g., Apotex Inc. v. H Lundbeck A/S, 2013 FC 192, paras. 244-53 (Can.) (rejecting
promise based simply on table of data); Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Canada (Health), [2009] 1
F.C.R. 253, paras. 54-55 (Can. Fed. Ct. App.) (reversing trial court finding of promise based
solely on data in a table); Gold v. Serratus Mountain Prods. Ltd., 2004 FC 815, para. 53
(Can.) (drawings alone inadequate).
94. E.g., Sanofi-Aventis v. Apotex Inc., 2013 FCA 186 (Can.) (concluding that the
lower court had erred in finding a promise for use in humans based on inferences regarding
the drug sold as Plavix); Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. ULC, 2014 FC 38, para. 60
(Can.) (finding the patent relating to the drug marketed as Celebrex did not promise reduced
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Eli Lilly and other companies criticize the promise doctrine as
discriminatory since courts have mostly invalidated pharmaceutical patents
under it.95 However, the doctrine is technically not limited to
pharmaceuticals. The Canadian Manual for Patent Practice in fact has a nonpharmaceutical example involving a golf club. In addition, a court has
recently applied the doctrine to a mechanical invention.96 Even though the
promise doctrine applies to all areas, it may be harder to satisfy a promise of
an improved medical treatment than an improved mechanical deviceespecially if the patent promises that the invention is superior for long-term
treatment, since proving that claim involves clinical data. However, this does
not necessarily support Eli Lilly's claim of discrimination since a number of
neutrally worded patent standards are more difficult to meet for certain areas
of technology, yet are not considered discriminatory.
Some also criticize the promise doctrine as being unpredictable. For
example, in Apotex Inc. v. Ifzer Canada Inc., the court found the patent
application promised to treat glaucoma with minimal side effects; because the
court determined that glaucoma was a chronic disease, it invalidated the
patent for lacking any long-term data on treatment, even though the patent
claims did not refer to a chronic condition or long-term treatment. This
decision also conflicted with an earlier court decision holding the same
patent valid. 98 Although these different decisions may seem to indict the
doctrine, courts have come to different conclusions concerning the same

side effects in humans); Apotex Inc. v Pfizer Canada Inc., 2014 FCA 250, paras. 60-70
(Can.) (rejecting the suggestion that there was a promise of utility in treating inflammation or
a promise of reduced side effects in a patent covering the drug marketed as Celebrex in
contrast to an earlier decision by a different drug concerning the same patent); Pfizer Canada
Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2014 FC 314 (Can.). But see Alcon Canada Inc. v. Cobalt Pharm. Co.,
2014 FC 149 (Can.) (finding implied promise of enhanced physical stability of solution). Of
course, it could also be that some promises alleged to exist by a company desiring to
invalidate the patent were farfetched. For example, in one case, the defendant claimed a
passage suggested that a patent promised rapid absorption of the drug in vivo based on
language that simply noted that this was a possible mechanism, such that the court rejected
this argument. Bayer Inc. v. Cobalt Pharm. Co., 2013 FC 1061 (Can.). Nonetheless, the court
stated that "[c]ourts should not strive to defeat otherwise valid patents," which could be seen
as an intent to take a more restrained view of applying the promise doctrine. Id. at para. 93.
95. E.g., PHRMA, SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION 2014 76-77 (2014); see also OFFICE OF THE
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2013 SPECIAL 301
REPORT 46 (2013) (noting "serious concerns about the impact of the heightened utility

requirements for patents").
96. Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limit6e v. Eurocopter, 2013 FCA 219 (Can.).
97. 2011 FCA 236 (Can.).
98. Pharmascience Inc. v. Pfizer Canada Inc., 2011 FCA 102 (Can.).
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patent in applying other patentability standards. In fact, for some issues, such
as claim construction, reversals are quite common.
Although commentators have criticized the promise doctrine for being
without basis, the Canadian Supreme Court has provided a firm foundation
for the doctrine in public policy. The court explained that it "balances the
public interest in early disclosure of new and useful inventions, even before
their utility has been verified by tests .. .and the public interest in avoiding

monopoly rights in exchange for misinformation."99 Noting that
patent monopolies are associated with higher prices, the court stated that the
"public should not be expected to pay an elevated price in exchange for
speculation." 100
In the case of Eli Lilly's patents on the drugs sold as Strattera and
Zyprexa, courts found the patents on both drugs promised certain
treatments, yet failed to soundly predict them, such that the patents were
invalid for lack of utility. Moreover, in both cases, Eli Lilly appeared to be
attempting to obtain additional patent protection beyond the term of its
original patents. In other words, Eli Lilly was engaging in the common
practice of "evergreening" by pharmaceutical companies; as noted earlier,
some scholars and policymakers suggest that this is precisely the situation
where countries should decline to provide patents. The facts of Eli Lilly's
patents further underscore this.
A federal court invalidated Eli Lilly's improvement patent, which
allegedly covered the drug sold as Straterra, because it had an implied
promise to treat ADHD as a chronic condition, but the patent only disclosed
a short-term study and did not demonstrate efficacy for long-term use.1) 1 The
invalidated patent claimed a new use-treating ADHD-for a known
compound, and specifically suggested in the specification that the compound
was effective without disclosing any studies or working examples.
Importantly, Eli Lilly had previously obtained a patent for the broader
"genus" (group) of compounds, as well as a second Eli Lilly patent for
treatment for depression.0 2 Eli Lilly later developed data to establish that the
drug was in fact useful for treating ADHD, but not until long after filing the
patent application. Admittedly, it is difficult for a patent applicant to have
...
granting

99. E.g., NAFTA, supra note 36, art. 1100; see also Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Found.,
Ltd. [2002] 4 S.C.R. 153, para. 66 (Can.).

100. Id. at para. 37.
101. Novopharm Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 2010 FC 915 (Can.).
102. Canada Patent No. 1,051,034 (Filing date Jan 1, 1975); Canada Patent No.
1,181,430 (Filing date Nov. 12, 1981); see also Canada, Statement of Defense, supra note 88,
53.
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clinical data at the time an invention is disclosed. However, the invention at
issue here did not involve a new compound; rather, it was a new use of an
old compound. Moreover, as noted earlier, patent policy dictates that the
public should not be burdened with the social cost of a patent unless, at the
time of filing, the inventor has made an adequate disclosure; otherwise, the
patent becomes a mere hunting license, which imposes substantial costs for
the public while rewarding applicants for making a lucky guess.
Similarly, a different federal court invalidated Eli Lilly's patent claiming
use of the drug sold as Zyprexa to treat schizophrenia because the patent
implied a promise of superiority. In that case, the court found the patent
promised the drug would have fewer side effects than existing antipsychotics
for long-term treatment, but the specification provided inadequate disclosure
to support this promise.103 Importantly, the patent at issue was a "selection"
patent that Eli Lilly sought after obtaining a patent on a broader "genus"
patent for use in the treatment of certain psychotic conditions, including
schizophrenia. 10 4 However, Canadian patent law, consistent with other
countries, generally only permits patents on selections of a previously
patented genus if the narrower claim has an advantage over the previously
disclosed genus. Eli Lilly's invalidated patent attempted to demonstrate such
an advantage; it in fact stated that the invention had "marked superiority and
a better side effects profile than prior known antipsychotic agents."' 05
However, it did not disclose data to support this claim.
Eli Lilly asserts that Canada improperly invalidated its patents based
on an interpretation of the law that did not exist when the patents were
examined. 06 Eli Lilly notes that Canada's law is currently different than that
of other NAFTA parties (the United States and Mexico) but that when
NAFTA was enacted, Canadian law was more similar to other NAFTA
parties, such that the promise doctrine could not have been anticipated. 0
Accordingly, Eli Lilly asserts that Canada was wrong to "re-interpret a core
patentability requirement enshrined in NAFTA in a way that contradicts the
standard accepted by the NAFTA parties at the time the treaty was
negotiated."'0 8

103. Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 2011 FC 1288, para. 218 (Can.).
104. See Canadian Patent No. 1,075,687. A selection patent is a subset of the previously
and more broadly disclosed genus.
105. Canada Patent 2,041,113, p. 5; see also Canada, Statement of Defense, supra note 88,
69 (citing patent specification).
106. Eli L1jf Notice of Arbitration,supra note 2, 69.
107. Id. 28-34.
108. Id. T 68.
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Eli Lilly also suggests that the promise doctrine is inconsistent with
the PCT because the PCT prohibits countries from "imposing 'requirements
as to the form or contents

. .

."

of the original PCT application.0 9 In

particular, it asserts that the promise doctrine "would defeat the single
application objective." 1 0 Eli Lilly seems to make two separate, but both
invalid, claims about the PCT. First, Eli Lilly suggests that the promise
doctrine is inconsistent with the PCT requirement that bars countries from
imposing requirements on the form of the original PCT application."'
Although there is such a rule, it notably only governs the actual PCT
application and not patent standards of individual countries. The PCT
explicitly states that it does not "limit the freedom of each Contracting State
to prescribe such substantive conditions of patentability as it desires." Utility
is in fact a substantive condition of patentability, and the PCT states that
national laws may require the applicant to furnish evidence of any substantive
2
condition of patentability."1
Eli Lilly's claim that the promise doctrine "would defeat the single
application objective" is also flawed. Eli Lilly seems to presume that if one
nation has a patent standard that differs from others it would be impossible
for applicants to comply with this standard in the PCT application, such that
this inconsistent standard would defeat the purpose of the PCT-to provide
a streamlined method of applying for patents in multiple countries. However,
given that the PCT does not govern patentability standards, this claim is
unfounded. This argument seems especially unjustified since there are prior
situations where nations have had different laws that implicate what is
disclosed in the PCT application. For example, the United States is unique in
requiring patent applicants to disclose the "best mode" of using an
invention." 3 Although other countries have not adopted the best mode
requirement, foreign applicants have used PCT applications to seek U.S.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. 45; see also Patent Cooperation Treaty, supra note 51, art. 27(1).
Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2, 45.
Patent Cooperation Treaty, supra note 64, art. 27(5).
Id. art. 27(5)-(6).
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); see also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L
ACADEMIES, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 121 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds.,
2004) ("[O]nly the United States imposes a best mode requirement."); Donald S. Chisum,

Best Mode Concealment and Inequitable Conduct in Patent Procurement:A Nutshell, A Review of Recent
Federal Circuit Cases and a Pleafor Modest Reform, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 277, 279 (1997) (noting the standard is "virtually unique to U.S. law" without
counterparts in European or Japanese law). However, although this requirement still
technically exists for granting of patents, failure to meet this requirement is no longer a basis

for invalidation after the most recent amendments to patent laws. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(3)(A)
(2012).
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patents for years. Admittedly, some suggest that this may be unfair to foreign
applicants who might forget to consider U.S. patent laws when they file a
PCT application. Yet even those that criticize the best mode as unfair to
foreign applicants do not cite any problems with PCT applications." 4 This
criticism differs from Eli Lilly's claim that the promise doctrine is an actual
violation of the PCT or that the doctrine completely defeats the single
application objective. For example, the best mode requirement does not
defeat the single application objective because an applicant's PCT application
can still result in a U.S. patent if the applicant discloses the information
appropriate for complying with U.S. law.
Although Eli Lilly correctly considers a patent to be a possible
investment covered by investor-state agreements, there are multiple
challenges to its claims that this Article will detail in subsequent Parts. First,
although valid intellectual property rights are unquestionably investments, an
intellectual property "right" that is canceled for failing to meet the applicable
standards should not be considered an investment that is within the scope of
such agreements. Eli Lilly obviously contests this issue in making its claims
that invalidating a patent is tantamount to "expropriation" of its investment
and a violation of the requirement that all investments be provided "fair and
equitable treatment."
II.

REVOCATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
SHOULD NOT BE A BREACH OF INVESTMENT
OBLIGATIONS

Eli Lilly's case illustrates why revocation of patent rights should not
constitute a breach of investment obligations. First, this Part explains why
there is no covered "investment" and thus no grounds for an investor-state
dispute. Then, this Part argues that tribunals should not find revoked rights
to be either an expropriation or a violation of fair and equitable treatment.
Although there are strong reasons for rejecting such claims, this analysis also
highlights how a tribunal could nonetheless find otherwise, which
underscores the need for the reforms proposed in Part IV.

114. E.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 113, at 121; Chisum, supra note 113, at
279. In particular, these criticisms focus on the situation where an applicant relies on the
PCT application, but reliance on a previously filed domestic application in the foreign
inventor's home country for obtaining an earlier filing date. See 35 U.S.C. § 119 (2012).
However, those who complain about the unfairness of the best mode for foreign applicants
mostly focused not on PCT applications, but applicants who rely on the date of a patent

application in their own counip. E.g., Lee Petherbridge & Jason A. Rantanen, The PseudoElimination of Best Mode: Worst Possible Choice?, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 170, 171 (2012).
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CANCELED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS SHOULD NOT BE A
COVERED INVESTMENT THAT WOULD ENABLE AN INVESTOR-STATE
DISPUTE

Existing investment agreements should be interpreted to exclude
canceled intellectual property rights as a covered investment. Intellectual
property rights are different than other types of property because they can be
and often are later canceled. The cancellation of the rights means there were
no legitimate rights to begin with, so in these cases there should be no
recognized investment that would trigger the ability to file an investor-state
dispute.

1. Ine//ectua/ Property is Diffrentfom Rea! Property
Intellectual property rights are fundamentally different from real property
rights with respect to their existence; intellectual property may be canceled
and has a different creation process." 5 This is inherently different from real
property, which is never canceled; in the rare case where an action to quiet
title succeeds, the property itself still exists. In addition, unlike most forms of
real property, which exist without state intervention, some types of
intellectual property only exist if granted by the state and states can even
cancel many types that exist without state intervention." 6 For example, a
patent right does not exist without a state agency such as the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office reviewing an application to evaluate whether a patent is
deserved."17 But this determination occurs after only a brief administrative
review, so patents are at most presumptively valid;" 8 they can be and often

115. Although not all intellectual property rights may be canceled, this is definitely true
of patents, as well as trademarks and copyrights. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2012) (trademarks);
37 C.F.R. § 201.7 (2001) (copyright).
116. The only types of intellectual property rights that cannot be canceled are rights of
publicity and trade secrets. However, these are often considered less valuable to companies
than the traditional types of intellectual property that can be canceled, such as patents,
copyrights, and trademarks.
117. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 111, 131 (2012). This is obviously different than other types of
intellectual property rights, such as trademarks, trade secrets, and rights of publicity, which
not only exist, but which a rights holder can enforce without a state determination to grant.
Eg, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012) (permitting enforcement of unregistered trademarks).
Copyrights can also exist without state determination, but U.S. law still requires registration
of a copyright before a rights holder can file suit. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2012).
118. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (presumption of validity); Canada Patent Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. P-4, § 43(2). In India, patents do not enjoy an initial presumption of validity; they
only acquire such a presumption after six years, after the opposition period has elapsed. E.g.,
The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, INDIA CODE § 13.4 (2005) (as amended by The Patents
Act 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005) (patent examination does not "warrant the
validity of any patent"); 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. M/S Venus Safety & Health Pvt Ltd.,
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are canceled or revoked if it is found that the agency should not have issued
the rights in the first instance. 119 In most countries, there are a variety of
cancellation and revocation mechanisms, including proceedings at the patent
office as well as invalidation in a court.120 For example, Canada's patent laws
state that an issued patent is assumed valid in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, thus expressly contemplating that issued patents can be found
invalid.' 2 ' Canada's patent laws also provide that the usual patent right to
exclude is "subject to adjudication" by Canadian courts, which means that
those rights are contingent on a Canadian court determining whether the
patent is valid.2 Accordingly, a patent that is invalidated for failure to satisfy
one of the stated standards should not constitute intangible property
pursuant to an investment agreement since the invalidation means the patent
never should have existed.
Rather, invalidating a patent is more akin to an application for patent
rights, for which there has never been a recognized property right.2 3 In
particular, whereas the owner of a patent can exclude others from use of the
patented invention, the owner of a mere patent application has no such
rights. 1 24 Nonetheless, there is one prior case that is somewhat analogous to

(2014)
(India),
available
at
http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/MAN/judgement/05-062014/MAN30052014S25582013.pdf; see also TABREz AHMAD & INDRANIL GHOSH,
PRESUMPTION OF PATENT VALIDITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN THE LIGHT OF INDIAN

AND
U.S. SITUATIONS
(2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1978918;
Lakshmikumaran & Sridharan, InternationalReport- Delhi High Court Rules on Presumption of
Validijv
Under Indian Patent Law,
IAM
uly
2,
2014)
http://www.iammagazine.com/reports/Detail.aspx?g=2805840f-8901-40ac-b907-e2ef68e69ceb/.
119. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 311, 321 (2012); Canada Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, § 42,
43(2), 60(1).
120. In the United States, patents may be invalidated pursuant to re-examination, inter
partes review, and a relatively new post-grant review for patents filed after March 2013. 35
U.S.C. § 301 (re-examination), 311 (inter partes review), 321 (post-grant review) (2012).
121. Canada Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c P-4, § 43(2).
122. Id. § 42.
123. Although some agreements consider patent applications to be investments, they
notably limit such claims to applications forpatentable inventions, which means that they still
must meet the basic patentability requirements. E.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Jam.,
art. I.1(a)(iv), Feb. 4, 1994, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-35 (1997). However, including an
application as an investment seems questionable based on intellectual property laws because
there are no rights unless and until they are granted. But see Mercurio, supra note 26, at 87880 (arguing that an application for an intellectual property right could be considered an
investment, in part because the European Court of Human Rights held that an application
for a trademark is a property right for purposes of the European Convention on Human
Rights).
124. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (only providing enforcement rights to patent owner).
Although Congress recently amended the Patent Act to provide limited retroactive damages
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the situation of cancelled intellectual property. A recent decision held that an
application to sell a generic drug was not a property right that would qualify
as an investment because, even though the FDA granted tentative approval,
the FDA retained the right to revoke the approval'2 5 Although an application
to sell a drug is obviously different than an application for a patent, in both
situations there is no "right" (whether to sell a drug or exclude others from
making it) unless and until a government agency makes a determination. In
addition, in both cases, a positive government decision is tentative and
subject to reversal. Since a revocable decision that would confer some proper
rights is not an investment, a right that has already been revoked is even less
likely to qualify. Of course, this is only one tribunal decision, and other
decisions need not follow it. However, given that the decision simply further
supports long-standing patent policy, there is a firm foundation for a tribunal
to consider cancelled intellectual property rights not to be a type of covered
investment.
In addition, canceled intellectual property rights, including those canceled
based on a common law modification of long-standing patent criteria should
be considered to never have existed. This highlights yet another difference
between intellectual property law and real property. As noted earlier, real
property is not dependent on state determinations, so what constitutes valid
real property is unlikely to change. This difference is an important nuance for
Eli Lilly's case. Eli Lilly argues that because its patents were consistent with
Canadian law at the time of application, it was improper for a change in the
law after issuance to invalidate its patents. 6 However, contrary to Eli Lilly's
assertion, it is common for case law to modify patent law and retroactively
invalidate previously granted patent rights. In the United States, for example,
the Supreme Court's modification of the obviousness standard to make it

to a patent owner for infringement that occurred while the application was pending, such
rights only issue if a patent is ultimately awarded. See id. § 154(d).
125. Apotex Inc. vs. United States, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
209-10,
222-23 (NAFTA/ UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. June 14, 2013).
126. Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2,
8-9 (asserting that the Canadian
judiciary has "created a new doctrine" to assess utility that is a "dramatic departure from the
standard" prevailing in Canada when its patents were filed and granted). Eli Lilly bases this
statement on the fact that when it applied, the Canadian patent office guidelines used a
different utility standard that considered inventions to satisfy unless the invention is "totally
useless." Id. 8. However, the very guidelines that Eli Lilly uses as its sole source of
authority for this issue in fact state that only courts have authority to interpret patent law.
Manual of Patent Office Practice, Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, Patent Office,
Forward (1977). This is true of all subsequent guidelines. Canada, Statement of Defense,
supra note 88, T 46.
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more difficult to meet impacted the validity of existing patents. 2 More
recently, after the Supreme Court modified what types of genes may be
patentable subject matter, the validity of some previously issued patents is in
question. 128 Moreover, this phenomenon is common to all areas of common
law doctrine that have both prospective and retrospective application. 29 In
addition, there is even a prior tribunal decision rejecting the suggestion that
retroactive application of a domestic law would be inappropriate and
explicitly noting that it is "normally a matter of local courts to determine"
whether to apply new decisional law retrospectively. 30
2.

Cance/edIn/e//ec/ua/ ProperyShou/d Be Excudedfrom Investment
Agreements Based on Poig Grounds

In addition to the criticisms of investor-state arbitration disputes
previously noted, these disputes present unique policy problems when
investors challenge IP rights that are permissible under international
agreements. First, unlike most types of investments subject to investor-state
disputes, international treaties, such as TRIPS, govern intellectual property.
These international agreements represent negotiated norms among states,
and a decision by an investor-state tribunal interpreting these treaties, or even
simply the filing of an action challenging them, would have a chilling effect
on these negotiated norms and could also result in inconsistent decisions.
Second, intellectual property rights are granted to effectuate domestic social
policies, and permitting challenges to domestic decisions canceling
intellectual property rights undermines these policies. Third, intellectual
property is also fundamentally different from traditionally protected
investments in that the traditional rationale for permitting investors to
challenge states does not apply to intellectual property.

127. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007); see also Christopher M.

Holman, Unpredictabilijv in Patent Law and Its Effect on PharmaceuticalInnovation, 76 MO. L. REV.
645, 681-84 (2011).

128. E.g., Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 3d 938 (N.D. Cal.
2013); see also Sherman Kahn, Will Patents Be the Next Wave in Investor-State Arbitration?, 7 N.Y.
Disp. RESOL. LAW. 53, 56 (2014).
129. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, The PuZZling Bounday Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive
Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2156 (1996); see also Donald T. Hornstein, Resilieng,

Adataion, and the Upsides of Ex Post Lawmaking, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1549, 1551 (2011) (noting
that retroactivity is not only tolerated but sometimes celebrated).
130. Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award,
137-38 (Oct. 11, 2002) (rejecting the suggestion that retrospective application of a rule by a
court would constitute violation of NAFTA article 1105 regarding minimum standard of
treatment).
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a) International Agreements Permit Nations to Decide on the Scope
of Intellectual Property Rights; Investment Arbitrations Should
Not Disrupt This Norm
Investment arbitration disputes that affect domestic decisions concerning
intellectual property rights are different than most other investment disputes
because they can undermine the goals of the separate international
agreement, TRIPS; accordingly, investor-state disputes should exclude
domestic intellectual property decisions consistent with TRIPS.'3 ' As noted
earlier, well over one hundred countries, including Canada, must comply with
TRIPS. However, TRIPS sets minimum, but not uniform standards, such
that nations have substantial flexibility to define these standards. 32 In
particular, while patents must be granted on all inventions that satisfy
traditional criteria, including that the invention be useful, TRIPS notably
does not define the term, so countries have discretion to decide the
applicable standard.'33 In addition, TRIPS expressly contemplates that patent
rights can be revoked and simply requires that there be judicial review of any
such decision. 34 As explained below, TRIPS is fundamentally different from
other international agreements implicated in investor-state disputes to date,
which involve more ambiguous criteria and do not create a direct conflict. In
addition, if investor-state disputes could challenge TRIPS-consistent
decisions, there is a risk of decisions inconsistent with the built-in dispute
resolution process of TRIPS. Moreover, considering that TRIPS is already an
encroachment on traditional state sovereignty, permitting investor-state
disputes to challenge TRIPS-consistent actions would seem particularly
unfair and would have a chilling effect on TRIPS-permissible laws that would
promote better access to affordable medicine. Given these issues, investorstate tribunals should not consider TRIPS-consistent domestic decisions as
violations of investor rights.
Although investor-state tribunals have previously addressed conflicts
with other international agreements, those agreements are fundamentally
different than TRIPS. Only in limited situations has another international
agreement been arguably relevant to investment-specific claims.' 35 These
131. Although there are agreements since TRIPS that set even higher standards, this
section will focus only on TRIPS because it has the most extensive membership of any
international agreement concerning intellectual property.
132. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 1(1).
133. Id. art. 27(1); see also supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text (noting that this
proposition is well supported by scholars and policymakers).
134. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 32.
135. This excludes the use of "umbrella" clauses in international agreements that permit
an investor to enforce other commitments or reliance on other international agreements as
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situations involve direct conflicts with another international agreement where
arguably only one agreement can apply,'36 and a situation where an agreement
that generally provides for investor-state arbitration explicitly exempts under
certain environmental treaties. 3 TRIPS, however, is a unique international
agreement because its standards allow for flexibility. An investor-state
tribunal could find that a state has violated the investment-based rights of a
foreign investor when the state is in compliance with TRIPS because TRIPS
only provides a minimum standard of protection. Although this may seem to
suggest there is no conflict, such a finding would undermine the ability of
countries to use flexibilities under TRIPS. As a policy matter, it is
inappropriate to impose liability under an investment chapter on a country
that is complying with a separate international agreement.
In no other prior situations have investor-state disputes had the potential
to create liability for nations that are complying with a separate international
agreement. Indeed, in most cases, there is not a true conflict with a separate
international agreement. The closest situation that has arisen involves the
part of customary international law. See, e.g., Roger Alford, Using Investment Arbitration to
Enforce WTO Commitments, KLUWER A~im. BLOG (Apr. 18, 2014), http://
kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/04/18/using-investment-arbitration-to-enforce-wtocommitments/ (noting that umbrella clauses in BITS could permit enforcement of WTO
and other trade agreement commitments); see also Charles Owen Verrill, Jr., Are WTO
Violations Also Contray to the Fair and Equitable Treatment Obligations in Investor Protection
Agreements?, 11 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 287 (2005); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial
Award,
234, 256 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Nov. 12, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 1408 (2001)
[hereinafter S.D. Myers Partial Award] (suggesting in dicta that minimum standard of
treatment under NAFTA take into account "the letter or spirit of widely, though not
universally accepted international agreements like those in the WTO system").
136. Even when raised, tribunals do not always need to address a possible conflict since
sometimes the competing international agreement is found to have come into force too late
to be relevant. E.g., Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Award (Dec. 11,
2013) (finding no conflict because non-investment agreement was concluded after the
investment agreement). See also Abba Kolo, Transfer of Funds: The Interaction between the IMF
Articles of Agreement and Modern Investment Treaties: A Comparative Law Perspective, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 345, 355 (Steven

Schill ed., 2010) (suggesting that if there is a conflict between a capital transfer provision of
an investment agreement and the IMF, the investment agreement should apply as more
specific under lex specialis).
137. Canada argued that investment claims were inconsistent with its international
environmental obligations under the Basel Convention and the U.S.-Canada Transboundary
Agreement on Hazardous Waste, such that these agreements should prevail over investment
claims. The tribunal found no actual conflict. S.D. Myers Partial Award, supra note 135,
150. This situation is also different in that NAFTA has a specific clause for possible
inconsistency with other environmental agreements and states that those obligations shall
prevail to the extent of inconsistency, but where a party has a choice between equally
effective and reasonably available means, the party must choose the least inconsistent
measure. NAFTA, sztora note 36, art. 104.
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actual or proposed use of other international agreements as defenses where
those agreements are largely aspirational. For example, in the pending suits
concerning plain packaging tobacco laws, there is a WHO framework
convention that supports domestic laws at issue,'38 but legally, no member
countries must apply the guidelines.'39 Similarly, although some
commentators have suggested that states should rely on international human
rights norms as a defense, these norms are notably vague and generally do
not clearly indicate what countries can do.140 For example, although some
have suggested that there is an international right to affordable and equitably
distributed water that could be relevant, no state has attempted to clearly rely
on such rights. 141 This could be because international rights are to citizens,

rather than countries. Moreover, there is no firm requirement; any such right
is based on a General Comment to the UN Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, and the UN agreement actually only requires that states
"take steps" with the caveat that those steps be based on "available
resources."' 42 Accordingly, as human rights treaties simply reflect a general
desire to promote certain activity, they provide no firm criteria, whereas
TRIPS expressly states that countries must provide certain patent standards
while at the same time permitting nations flexibility in interpreting these
standards.
138. E.g., Philip Morris Brands S~rl v. Oriental Republic of Urn., ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/7, Request for Arbitration, 3 (Feb. 19, 2010); Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia,
PCA Case. No. 2012-12, Written Notification of Claim (BIT/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. June
27, 2011).
139. E.g., Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, Plain Packaging and the Inte retation of the TRIPS

Agreement,

J.

1149, 1163 (2013); see also WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
ON TOBACCO
CONTROL
(2004), available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2003/9241591013.pdf
WHO

46 VAND.

FRAMEWORK

TRANSNAT'L L.
CONVENTION

140. E.g., LUKE ERIC PETERSON & KEVIN R. GRAY, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEV., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND IN
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 27-32 (2003) (suggesting that states that are member
to ICESCR and other covenants consider using these as defenses); Ursula Kriebaunm,
Pnvai-yng Human Rights: The Inteface Between InternationalInvestment Protection and Human Rights,
in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 165, 173-77 (A. Reinisch & U. Kriebaum eds.,
2007); Todd Weiler, Balancing Human RKghts and Investor Protection: A New Approach for a
Different Legal Order,27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 429 (2004).
141. Indeed, one commentator has suggested that the vagueness of these obligations is
an explanation for why nations do not suggest a conflict with human rights. James D. Fry,
InternationalHuman Rights Law in Investment Arbitration:Evidence of InternationalLaws Unif, 18
DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 77, 93-96 (2007).
142. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 ("[E]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take
steps, ... with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized."); see also arts. 11-13 (right to water). In addition, the General Comment is itself
nonbinding.
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Investor-state dispute tribunals should also decline to address intellectual
property issues that are consistent with international agreements concerning
intellectual property when these agreements already provide a mechanism for
addressing alleged inconsistencies to prevent inconsistent decisions. For
example, there is a built-in forum for adjudicating alleged TRIPS violations
pursuant to the robust WTO dispute settlement process. If investors were
permitted to usurp this process, it could both result in inconsistent decisions
and undermine the negotiated international norms pursuant to TRIPS.
Notably, the WTO dispute settlement process is intended to be the sole
means to settle violations of its agreements such as TRIPS. Although there is
no language expressly excluding investor-state arbitrations, no such
arbitrations involved intellectual property at the time the WTO and TRIPS
were negotiated, so negotiators likely did not see the need to include such a
provision. However, these agreements do contain language prohibiting
countries from taking unilateral action for violations. 143 Permitting investors
to engage in a form of self-help through investor-state arbitrations seems one
step beyond countries taking unilateral actions. Moreover, there are issues
with having investor-state arbitrations decide TRIPS issues when they lack
familiarity with either intellectual property or WTO agreements. 44 There is a
strong possibility of inconsistent rulings, especially because investor-state
arbitrations have no appellate review.
Beyond interfering with an existing dispute resolution process and
producing potentially inconsistent decisions, permitting investor-state
arbitrations to overrule internationally agreed upon domestic flexibilities
under TRIPS seems particularly unfair to countries since TRIPS already
encroaches on traditional domestic authority in the area of intellectual
property rights. Notably, the TRIPS requirement that all countries provide
some level of patent protection was a monumental change to the prior
international landscape, where countries previously did not have to grant any
intellectual property rights. The idea of global rules requiring patent
protection was the brainchild of multinational pharmaceutical companies.
They successfully lobbied the United States and EU member states to
advocate this in the context of an agreement that would include issues of
interest to developing countries that would otherwise oppose an agreement
143. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art.
23:2 Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33
I.L.M. 1226, 1241.
144. Indeed, some suggest that past tribunals have struggled to properly interpret and

apply WTO law. E.g., jiirgen Kurtz, The Use andAbuse of WTO Law in Investor-State Arbitration:
Competition and its Discontents, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 749 (2009) (focusing on misuse of WTO law
concerning national treatment); Mercurio, supra note 26, at 905.
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focused exclusively on mandating intellectual property rights. 145 Developing

countries may have capitulated to including intellectual property norms
because they were interested in enhancing the ability to market agricultural
146
products to other countries, which membership in the WTO would allow.

In addition, some developing countries may have agreed to TRIPS assuming
that this would forestall unilateral pressure from countries concerning their
intellectual property laws. 4 Accordingly, agreement to TRIPS requirements,
including providing patents on drugs, does not reflect uniform agreement
that patents are desirable as a matter of policy. Given this historical context,
permitting an individual investor to further encroach on the limited domestic
flexibilities under TRIPS seems particularly unfair to developing countries.
Importantly, if tribunals allow cases such as Eli Lilly's, these cases could
have a chilling effect on an important trend where developing countries are
beginning to finally use their full flexibility under TRIPS. Notably, although
TRIPS has always provided states discretion to define the minimum
patentability standards, some nations were initially hesitant to do so and
simply copied the patent standards of countries such as the United States,
even though such laws were not necessarily in their interest. India was the
first country to use its full flexibility under TRIPS to create a unique law that
bars patents on "new" drugs that are in fact only modest variations of old
drugs with no improved benefit to patients. 40 Since India adopted its law in
2005, other countries have either copied India's laws, or are contemplating
doing SO.14 For example, there is a proposal for Brazil to amend its patent
standards to mirror India's 5

145. E.g., SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003).

146.

E.g.,

PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO

OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 10 (2002).

147. E.g., Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369,
372-73 (2006).
148. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, § 3(d), Acts of Parliament, 2005
(India).
149. E.g., Universally Accessible Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act of 2008, Rep. Act
No. 9502, § 1-2 (2008) (Phil.); Divya Rajagopal, EU,Australia, CanadaMap Follow India's
Patent Law, ECON. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2013. In addition, Argentina's patent guidelines impose an
even higher standard-new forms are not patentable even if they have an increase in
efficacy. Joint Resolution Nos. 118/20012, 546/2012 and 107/2012, May 2, 2012, B.O.
08/05/12 (Arg.), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file-id=288443; Park
et al.,
supra note 10, at 43 n.7.
150.

BRAZIL CENTER FOR STRATEGIC

STUDIES AND DEBATES, BRAZIL'S PATENT

114 (2013), available at
http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Brazilian PatentReform.pdf.
In
addition, there is a policy proposal recommending that South Africa either copy India's law
REFORM: INNOVATION TOWARDS NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS
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In light of these negative policy implications, tribunals that end up
evaluating cases such as Eli Lilly's should at a minimum take TRIPSincluding the inherent domestic flexibilities in its implementation-into
account. A recent arbitral decision suggests that a tribunal might be willing to
do so. In Joan Micu/a v. Romania, although the majority of the tribunal rejected
the notion that the investment agreement was in direct conflict with the EU
Agreement, it was willing to consider EU law in evaluating the investment
claims.' 5 ' In addition, even if a tribunal were to consider TRIPS, the outcome
is unclear because TRIPS does not necessarily result in a conflict with any
investment provision. Any possible "conflict" would be more with respect to
whether an investment tribunal interpreted TRIPS provisions differently than
a WTO panel or scholar would. Different interpretations are possible since
companies and even countries have been known to suggest TRIPS violations
where there are none. 52 Indeed, Eli Lilly's claims are one example-Eli Lilly
alleges that Canada's promise doctrine is inconsistent with the utility standard53
because of a supposed "shared understanding" between signatories.
However, this is irrelevant to interpreting international treaties; the final text,
rather than presumed unstated understandings, controls. Eli Lilly ignores this
fact, as well as the fact that utility is undefined in the pertinent treaty,
rendering Canada free to define it.
b)

Domestic Policy Underlying Intellectual Property Supports
Deferring to States

Intellectual property rights are inherently different than most other types
of investments protected by investment chapters. The underlying policy goals
that justify providing intellectual property rights are distinct from the goals
behind other types of property. For example, patents are the primary policy
tool to promote innovation and encourage sharing of inventions, rather than
keeping them secret. However, it is well recognized that desired policy goals
must be balanced against other competing social goals, such as access to
or an even more stringent approach adopted by Argentina. CHAN PARK ET AL., supra note
10, at 46.
151. Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award (Dec. 11, 2013).
152. E.g., infra Subsection IV.A.1 (discussing improper suggestions that India's patent
law fails to comply with TRIPS).
153. Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2, 40; see also id.
7-9 (arguing that
Canada's changed interpretation of utility is inconsistent with NAFTA's utility requirement
without acknowledging that the term is nowhere defined in NAFTA). Technically Eli Lilly
claims that Canada's patent standards are inconsistent with NAFTA, rather than TRIPS, but
the standards are identical. Compare TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 27(1), with NAFTA, supra note
36, art. 1. Indeed, Eli Lilly does not dispute this. Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2,
42.

2015]

SOVEREIGNTY UNDER SIEGE

affordable medicine. Most other property rights do not inherently
compromise these other social goals; indeed, traditional property rights
generally do not result in higher prices for goods. Accordingly, although
TRIPS requires most countries to provide some degree of patent protection
for drugs, it explicitly recognizes the importance of considering public health
and other policies; in addition, member states subsequently reaffirmed this
principle in a WTO Ministerial Declaration referred to as the Doha Public
54
Health Declaration.

Although most countries must provide patents on drugs under TRIPS, it
is especially important to defer to domestic decisions concerning TRIPSconsistent patent laws now. First, patents on drugs inherently limit shortterm access, but nations are no longer at liberty to completely deny such
patent protection even if they value access to low cost medicine more than
promoting possible future innovation. Moreover, the patent policy of
promoting innovation in the drug arena with patent rights should be
considered in light of current business realities. Facing a "crisis" in
pharmaceutical innovation where innovation has been stagnant despite
exponential increases in expenditures on research, drug companies have
developed patent and innovation strategies that aim to extend their profits
with minimal innovation. For example, companies are patenting slight
modifications of existing drugs, such as extended releases, or new uses that
are easier to identify than a brand new compound. 55 In addition, companies
are also obtaining patents on multiple aspects of a drug including not just the
traditionally patented active ingredient, but also the coating of a drug, or the
metabolized version in a patient's stomach. Critics have dubbed both of
these practices "evergreening" because the patent term seems perpetual. 56 In
addition, policymakers in both developing and well-developed countries have
criticized the handling of these patents; for example, Europe issued a
substantial report concerning these patents and recent policy reports suggest
that developing countries should modify their patent laws to deny these types
of questionable innovations. 5 Companies actually recognize that some of

154. TRIPS, supra note 3, arts. 7-8; Doha Declaration on Public Health, supra note 34,

4 (2001).
155. E.g., supra note 10 and accompanying text.
156. E.g., THOMAS, supra note 10.
157. E.g., EC PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY, supra note 10; BRAzIL CTR. FOR
STRATEGIC STUDIES & DEBATES, subra note 150; AUSTL. GOV'T, PHARMACEUTICAL
PATENTS REVIEW: BACKGROUND AND SUGGESTED ISSUES PAPER (2012); see also
DECLARATION ON PATENT PROTECTION AND REGULATORY SOVEREIGNTY UNDER TRIPS
(2014), available at https://www.mpg.de/8132986/Patent-Declaration.pdf (signed by forty
scholars from over twenty-five countries to reinforce TRIPS flexibilities).
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the patents are of dubious validity,'58 but nonetheless seek such patents in
hopes of stemming revenue losses as patents on profitable innovative drugs
of prior years such as Lipitor and Prozac increasingly expire.' 59 Accordingly,
although there could theoretically be a policy justification that patent rights
promote innovation even if this negatively impacts short-term access through
higher prices, that justification seems more theoretical than real in cases
where companies are creating minor improvements. Although companies
often argue that basic market principles make such concerns irrelevant
because consumers would not buy inferior drugs, as noted earlier, the
pharmaceutical market is unique, such that general market principles do not
apply. So, countries should be able to use their discretion under TRIPS to
minimize the social harm of expensive drugs to only those drugs that they
deem are more innovative and thus worth the "cost."
The contested Eli Lilly patents are the very type of patents that
policymakers question. In both cases, Eli Lilly is seeking to obtain additional
patent protection when it had at least one patent already. In the case of the
drug marketed as Strattera for attention deficit disorder, Eli Lilly was already
awarded two different patents before it sought the third patent that Canada
invalidated. 60 The drug marketed as Zyprexa similarly already enjoyed a full
term of patent protection. Both of these instances could be considered
examples of evergreening profitable patents. Indeed, Eli Lilly's two
inventions at issue would likely be invalid in India where, to help address this
very type of problem, there is a complete bar on patents that simply claim a
new utility for a known compound.' Moreover, other countries including
Brazil, Australia, and member states of the European Union similarly

158. E.g., EC PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY, supra note 10, at 192 (noting
companies admitting a strategy to seek patents which "might not be rock solid").
159. Melly Alazraki, The 10 Biggest-Selling Drugs That are About to Lose their Patent, DAILY
FIN. (Feb. 27, 2011), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/02/27/top-selling-drugs-areabout-to-lose-patent-protection-ready/ (noting that companies can lose up to ninety percent
of sales when patents expire). Notably, although Eli Lilly suggests that Canada improperly
invalidated a patent pertaining to Zyprexa, which was one of the top five best selling drugs
in 2011, in most countries, Zyprexa lost patent protection in 2012. Id.; ELI LILLY & CO.,
2012 ANN. REP. 12 (2012), available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/LLY/
3538664350xOx648089/D3A84E25-2AE1-4E41-8E25-A1AE41DA09BB/English.PDF
(noting Zyprexa sales decreased eighty-three percent in the United States and forty-five
percent outside the United States due to loss of patent exclusivity).
160. Canada, Statement of Defense, supra note 88, 53.
161. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, § 3(d), Acts of Parliament, 2005
(India).
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recognize that current patent laws impacting drugs need to be recalibrated
to
16 2

better balance promoting optimal innovation with less social cost.

c) Considering Intellectual Property an Investment Does Not
Foster Traditional Policy Justifying Investor-State Disputes
Intellectual property should be excluded from investor-state arbitration
because providing enhanced protection of IP does not satisfy traditional
justifications for investment arbitrations. Such provisions arose as a means
both to encourage investors to consider countries that they might be hesitant
to invest in, and to provide a remedy to foreign investors who might
otherwise have no recourse if a state took action that reduced the value of
their investments.'6 3 As explained in this Section, neither of these
justifications is relevant to Eli Lilly's case or to intellectual property in
general. First, increased protection of intellectual property through investorstate disputes is unlikely to result in greater investment by owners of
intellectual property rights in these countries. Second, it is also not necessary
to provide adequate recourse. To the contrary, providing such rights would
give foreign investors more recourse than domestic investors.
Permitting intellectual property, including denial of intellectual property
rights pursuant to domestic law, to be a covered investment is unlikely to
encourage companies to invest in particular countries. Multinational
companies do not invest in countries solely based on intellectual property
laws. A number of studies indicate that other factors, such as tax incentives,
infrastructure, and skills are more relevant than intellectual property laws. 64
Indeed, countries known to have weak intellectual property rights, such as
India and China, nonetheless have substantial foreign direct investment. 65 In
addition, scholars have noted that especially for impoverished countries,

162. E.g., EC PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY, supra note 10; BRAZIL, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC STUDIES & DEBATES, supra note 150; AUSTL. GOV'T, sup ra note 157.
163. E.g., Salacuse, supra note 64, at 109-10.
164. E.g., Carsten Fink, Intellectual Propero Rights and U.S. and German International
Transactions in Manufacturing Industries, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 163 (1997); Claudio R.
Frischtak, Harmonizaion Versus Differentiation in Intellectual Properv Right Regimes, in GLOBAL
DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 89,
103-05 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993); Jeong-Yeon Lee & Edwin Mansfield,

Intellectual Propero Protection U.S. Foreign Direct Investment, 78 REV. ECON. & STAT. 181, 181-85
(1996).
165. For example, India had $1 billion in foreign direct investment in three months of
2013 despite controversial patent laws that have been noted as inadequate by many

companies. E.g., India Receives Highest FDI Worth $ 1 billion in Pharma in April-June, ECON.
TIMES (Sept. 1, 2013), http: //articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/ 2013-09-01 /news/
41663407_1-pharmaceuticals-sector-highest-fdi- fdi-poicy/.
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foreign direct investment
is unlikely because of a lack of infrastructure or a
1 66

viable domestic market.

This is particularly true for pharmaceutical companies and patent rights.
Given the extensive infrastructure already present for the development and
manufacture of a drug, local laws are unlikely to encourage investment in a
new country. Generally, multinational companies develop patentable
inventions where they have research labs, primarily in the United States and
Europe, but seek patent rights in all nations where they can market their
inventions, including nations where they may have made no investments.
Although some claim that stronger patent rights may promote foreign
direct investment, there is no robust empirical evidence to support this
claim. 167 A number of scholars have noted that macroeconomic factors such

as infrastructure and skills are more important than intellectual property
protection, ' 68and there are specific studies that note this for patents in
particular. 69 Historical evidence supports this argument. For example, Brazil
and Thailand received substantial foreign direct investment in the 1970s and
1980s despite low levels of intellectual property protection.' 7 0 One scholar
found that foreign direct investment even increased in Korea's
pharmaceutical industry after abolition of protection of drugs.' 7' More
recently, although South Africa increased patent protection to comply with
TRIPS, this reduced foreign direct investment from pharmaceutical

166.

KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

199-205 (2000).
167. E.g., SISULE

F. MUSUNGU,

RETHINKING

INNOVATION,

DEVELOPMENT

AND

WIPO AND BEYOND (2005); Mila Kashcheeva, The
Role of Foreign Direct Investment in the Relation Between Intellectual Proper Rzghts and Growth, 65
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 699 (2013); Rajnish Kumar Rai, Effect of TRIPS-Mandated Intellectual
Propery Rights on Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countres: A Case Study of the Indian
PharmaceuticalIndustry, 11 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 404, 411 (2009).
168. See supra note 164; see also Wolfgang E. Siebeck, Conclusions and Recommendations, in
STRENGTHENING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 89
(Wolfgang E. Sieback ed., 1990); Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, The Impact of TRIPS: Intellectual
Proper0y Protectionin Developing Countres, 31 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 1245 (1994); Carlos A.
Primo Braga, Trade-Related Intellectual Propery Issues: The Urugua Round Agreement and its
Economic Impications, in URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 381 (Will
Martin & L. Alan Winters eds., 1996).
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE UN:

169. E.g., EDWIN MANSFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION, DIRECT
INVESTMENT, AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION,
THE WORLD BANK, DISCUSSION PAPER No. 27 (1994).
170. CARLOS CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND

(2000).
171. Arman S. Kirim, Reconsidering Patents and Economic Development: A Case Study of the
Turkish PharmaceuticalIndusly,13 WORLD DEV. 219, 219-36 (1985).
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companies that instead consolidated their operations.' 72 This is also
consistent with a classic study that showed that stronger patent protection in
73
Italy did not result in increased domestic or foreign direct investment.
Also, some have suggested that even if stronger intellectual property rights
might attract some foreign direct investment, the corresponding loss in jobs
erodes that benefit. Furthermore, stronger intellectual property rights could
create higher local prices that may be cost-prohibitive in developing
countries.'

4

If intellectual property laws will not encourage multinational companies
to invest in a country, providing a remedy when the intellectual property laws
are considered undesirable does not seem appropriate because the remedy
will not result in substantial investments. In addition, it is fundamentally
different than the traditional rationale of protecting induced investments. For
example, even though Eli Lilly claims that it could not have anticipated that
Canada would change its patent laws, those laws did not induce Eli Lilly to
develop the inventions on which it sought Canadian patent protection.
Rather, Eli Lilly was developing those inventions for any country that would
provide protection and does not appear to have made any specific
investments in Canada based on Canadian patent law. Admittedly, an issued
patent could have induced Eli Lilly to begin to market its drug. However,
unlike other investments for which the investor-state dispute challenge is
granted, a granted patent can be legally canceled, so the claim for inducement
is weak. Moreover, the "investment" of marketing a drug does not provide
the same value to a country as the types of investment that the laws initially
contemplated. For example, although marketing a drug may involve some
investment in local advertisement and possibly employment of local citizens,
it would likely pale in comparison to the capital investments that are more
typical with real property such as building structures in a country in response
to incentive programs.
In addition, investor-state arbitrations originally developed to provide
foreign investors an ability to protect assets when they had no other means
to do so. Typically, this was because they could not bring a claim before
172. C. te W. Naud6 & J.M. Luiz, An Industvy Anaysis of PharmaceticalProduction in South
AFR. J. Bus. MGMT. 33 (2013); David Kaplan, Intellectual Propery Rghts and
Innovation in South Africa: A Framework, in THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
SOUTH AFRICA (WORLD INT'L PROP. ORG. ed., 2009).

Africa, 44 S.

173. F.M. Scherer & Sandy Weisburst, Economic Effects ofStrengthening PharmaceuticalPatent
Protection in Italy, 26 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 1009 (1995).

174. E.g., Paul J.Heald, Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion and
Asmmetvy in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN L. REv. 249 (2003); Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual
Property Rghts and Economic Development, 32 CASE W. RES. J.INT'L L. 471, 480-81 (2000).
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domestic courts where the government might be immune from suit or
because court systems were corrupt. However, neither of these situations
apply to Eli Lilly's case. It was already able to directly challenge Canada's
decision to revoke its patents through an appellate process. 17 In addition, Eli
Lilly does not even contest that there was any procedural irregularity with the
manner in which it was able to challenge the undesirable court decisions.
However, Eli Lilly is now simply seeking another bite at the apple that would
be unavailable to a domestic Canadian company. This is not within the
traditional justification of investor-state disputes, which are supposed to
provide a means for foreign investors that are otherwise without recourse. In
fact, Eli Lilly's situation falls within one of the current criticisms of such
disputes-that they unfairly provide more benefits to foreign investors than
are available to domestic investors.
B.

INVALIDATION OF PATENT RIGHTS SHOULD NOT CONSTITUTE
EXPROPRIATION

Assuming that Eli Lilly has a covered investment, this Section explains
why invalidation of Eli Lilly's patent rights should not constitute
"expropriation" under the relevant investment chapter. This Section first
demonstrates how Eli Lilly's case may involve a situation that is exempt from
expropriation analysis. Alternatively, this Section examines how, although the
situation may not be completely exempt based on prior decisions as well as
policy grounds, the arbitration tribunal should not find that Canada has
engaged in either direct or indirect expropriation.
Before addressing the specific legal claims, it is important to first clarify
what expropriation means. All international agreements protecting foreign
investments provide a claim against states that expropriate (take) investments
covered by the agreement; such investments typically include not only
tangible, but also intangible property of economic value. It is roughly
analogous to U.S. takings law in terms of involving state action, but
expropriations may exist in situations that would fail under U.S. takings law.
In general, agreements recognize that there are some situations where
countries should be allowed to expropriate investments, but only if there is a
public purpose, the action is nondiscriminatory, and there is just
compensation.
A foreign investor may have a claim for either direct or indirect
expropriation. Direct expropriation claims involve outright and overt taking
of property by the state, such as by transferring title to the state; the reason
175. In addition, although the Supreme Court of Canada denied Eli Lilly review, that
was within the discretion of the Court.
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for the taking is not important. 176 Indirect expropriation, on the other hand,
can exist even if the investor maintains ownership of the investment, but
because of "unreasonable interference" the investor loses all, or a significant
part, of its investment. 177 Although the two types of expropriation are fairly
straightforward to explain, there are few direct expropriation claims in recent
times17' and indirect expropriation analysis is complicated because tribunals
use several different tests.
1. Canada'sActions May Be Exemptfmm an Expropriation Claim
An initial question is whether there is any need to even address the details
of an expropriation claim. There are two possible ways Canada could avoid
the claim altogether. First, the situation could fall under a specific NAFTA
intellectual property exception that prevents foreign investors from raising a
claim for expropriation. Alternatively, the Canadian decisions may not
constitute the "state action" that is a fundamental prerequisite to
expropriation claims. Although there are arguments for excluding Eli Lilly's
claims under either of these grounds, a tribunal could reasonably find
otherwise, as explained below.
First, Eli Lilly's case is brought pursuant to NAFTA, which expressly
excludes certain issues from consideration as expropriation that might
otherwise qualify.

'7

Article 1110 generally prohibits member states from

expropriating foreign investments. However, paragraph seven states that it
does not apply to "revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property

176. For example, when Venezuela seized oil installations of foreign companies, it
resulted in a series of direct expropriation cases. E.g., P.G., Venezuela and International
Arbitration: Ick-SID, ECONOMIST (an. 20, 2012, 6:03 PM), http://www.economist.com/
blogs /americasview/ 2012/ 01 /venezuela-and-international- arbitration/.
177. E.g., August Reinisch, Expropraion, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 407, 422 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008).
Accordingly, even if the investor continues to own legal title, there still may be indirect
expropriation. E.g., Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/91/1, Award,
103 (Aug. 30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2001) [hereinafter
Metalclad Award].
178. E.g., Anne K. Hoffmann, Indirect Expropriation, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT
PROTECTION 151 (August Reinisch ed., 2008); Reinisch, supra note 177, at 408.
179. In addition, a similar analysis applies to many other existing and pending
agreements that contain similar language about excluding as expropriation denial of
intellectual property rights consistent with TRIPS. E.g., U.S.-Singapore Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-Sing., art. 15.6.5, May 6, 2003; Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,
Wikileaks Investment Chapter art. 11.7(5) (2015) [hereinafter draft TPP investment chapter].
Notably, TRIPS is a different agreement than NAFTA, but both have similar language
concerning patentability requirements. Compare TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 27(1), with NAFTA,
supranote 36, art. 1709(1).
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rights" if consistent with the NAFTA provision on patents. 80 This seems to
preclude expropriation claims of intellectual property, such as patents, that
are revoked in a manner consistent with NAFTA.
In the Eli Lilly case, the issue is whether the revocation provision of
NAFTA prevents countries from revoking patents because the interpretation
of an existing patent law ground, utility, has changed since the patent was
issued. Eli Lilly asserts that such a revocation is impermissible under
NAFTA, which would mean that the paragraph seven exemption does not
apply. However, NAFTA's language does not explicitly support this
conclusion and doing so would be contrary to recognized principles of how
common law operates. There are two NAFTA sections on patents that are
relevant to Eli Lilly's situation. First, the most fundamental patent provision
is article 1709(1), which requires each party to provide patents on inventions
that satisfy the criteria of being new, useful, and non-obvious.' 8' Notably,
NAFTA does not define what it means to be "useful," so member states
such as Canada should be able to define this as they wish, even if different
than the laws of other NAFTA member states. Second, article 1709(8) states
that countries may only revoke a patent when "grounds exist that would have
82
justified a refusal to grant the patent."'
As noted earlier, courts do modify patent law standards and retroactively
apply them. Given this reality, it seems reasonable to interpret the NAFTA
"grounds exist" clause to mean that countries cannot revoke patents on a new
ground that never previously existed, rather than modification of an existing
ground. In Eli Lilly's case, the patents were invalidated for failing to satisfy
the utility doctrine-a long-existing ground for patentability. Although
interpretation of the utility doctrine to incorporate the promise doctrine may
be new, it is simply a modification of the existing ground. Nonetheless, it is
unclear how a tribunal will in fact interpret this NAFTA provision, so it is
not clear whether this exempts Canada's actions from an expropriation claim.
The other issue is whether the Canadian decisions constitute state action,
because state action is a fundamental requirement for expropriation. If
Canada's decisions are not a state action, then Eli Lilly has no expropriation
claim. Unlike most investment arbitration cases where the action in question
is a legislative or regulatory measure, Eli Lilly's case involves solely the
judiciary. Although there are only a handful of arbitration decisions involving
domestic court actions, those decisions uniformly affirm that such actions

180. NAFTA, supra note 36, art. 1110(7).
181. Id. art. 1709(1).
182. Id. art. 1709(8).
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can constitute state action.'83 Notably, even though actions of state courts
may constitute state action, tribunals have stated this is only the case when
the court ruling is clearly incompatible with a rule of international law, when
there is a denial of justice, or when the state is responsible for a judicial
decision "contrary to municipal law."' 184 There are no prior challenges to the
substance of judicial decisions as expropriation. Rather, situations involved
racial discrimination against an investor that a court failed to limit 85 as well
as judicial interference with a contractually permitted arbitration. 86
The only possible basis for considering Canadian court actions against Eli
Lilly to be state action is that those actions violate international law; Eli Lilly
does not allege that the Canadian court decision was a denial of justice or
that that judicial decision was contrary to municipal law. Eli Lilly claims that
the judicial decision violated two separate international agreementsNAFTA and the PCT.
Eli Lilly alleges that the promise doctrine is inconsistent with NAFTA
requirements concerning utility and nondiscrimination. 8 In particular, Eli
Lilly asserts that a "dramatic and unanticipated shift" in Canada's definition
of utility is "significantly out of step" with its NAFTA partners. 88 However,
that is irrelevant because NAFTA does not require member countries to have
identical laws. Although NAFTA does require countries to grant patents that
183. Azinian v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, Award (Nov.
1, 1999), 14 ICSID REv.-FOR. INV. L.J. 538, 567 [hereinafter Azinian Award]; Saipem S.p.A.
v.People's Republic of Bangl., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award,
189-90 (June 30,
2009) [hereinafter Saipem Award]; see also Loewen Grp., Inc. v.United States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Decision on Hearing of Respondent's Objection to Competence and
Jurisdiction, 70 (Jan. 5, 2001) [hereinafter Loewen Decision] ("The modern view is that
conduct of an organ of the State shall be considered as an act of the State under
international law, whether the organ be legislative, executive or judicial."). However, these
assertions are generally made in cases where no expropriation is found, and possibly cases
where state action wasn't even limited to the judiciary, such that they are dicta. E.g., Saipem
Award, supra, 191 (no expropriation found); Azinian Award, supra, 10 (state action was
simply affirmance of city council decision); Loewen Decision, supra, 148, 241 (dismissing
all claims both because claimant was not a qualifying investor and also because the claim was
an attempt to use arbitration in lieu of a domestic appeal).
184. Azinian Award, supra note 183, 98; Loewen Decision, supra note 183, 47.
185. In Loewen, the investor claimed that racial and other inappropriate suggestions
were made against it that resulted in the largest ever state verdict of over $500 million for
contracts worth less than $5 million that when combined with a 125% bond requirement
threatened to bankrupt the company, such that it could not realistically appeal. E.g., Jake A.
Baccari, The Loewen Claim: A Creative Use of NAFTA's Chapter 11, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 465, 468-69 (2003).
186. Saipem Award, supra note 183,
35-37, 39.
187. Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2,
69-70.
188. Id. T9.
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meet the standard of utility, it provides no definition, so nations are
permitted to self-define it.' 89 In addition, NAFTA does not state that
countries are precluded from modifying its definition.
Eli Lilly also asserts that Canada has violated the NAFTA obligation to
grant patents without discrimination as to field of technology. 90 In particular,
Eli Lilly asserts that the promise doctrine has "almost exclusively' impacted
pharmaceutical patents. 19' However, the doctrine applies to all inventions, so
this argument seems questionable. There are many facially neutral patent law
standards that actually apply differently to different areas of technology 92 In
addition, as explained by one WTO panel, a neutrally worded law does not
de facto discriminate against a field of technology because it does not impact
all fields equally. 93 In particular, the WTO panel stated that discrimination
"does not prohibit bona fide exceptions to deal with problems that may only
exist in certain product areas." Such 94action is considered a permissible
diffrentiation, rather than discrimination.
Eli Lilly also alleges that Canada's action is inconsistent with NAFTA
article 1709(8), which states that a country may revoke a patent only when
"grounds exist that would have justified a refusal to grant the patent."
However, as noted earlier, this should be interpreted to mean that a country
cannot revoke a patent on a new patentability requirement, but it should not
bar a country from revoking a patent based on modification of the longstanding patent requirement of utility.
Eli Lilly claims that Canada's modified utility requirement violates the
international PCT rule barring countries from imposing "requirements as to
the form or contents of the international application different from or
additional to" those provided for in the PCT. 195 In particular, Eli Lilly asserts
that the promise doctrine essentially requires certain information be disclosed
in the patent application, and that these applications are a matter of form and
content governed by the PCT for which a nation cannot make additional
requirements.96 However, as noted earlier, the PCT is an international
189.
190.
191.
192.

NAFTA, supra note 36, art. 1709(1).
Id.
Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2, 69.
E.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Poli Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.

1575 (2003).
193. Panel Report, Canada-PatentProtection of PharmaceuticalProducts, WT /DS114 /R,
7.94 (Mar. 17, 2000).
194. Id. 7.92
195. Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2, 45; Patent Cooperation Treaty, supra
note 51, art. 27(1).
196. Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2, 46.
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agreement intended to simplify patent filings on a global basis without
restricting substantive patentability conditions in individual countries, such as
utility. However, even with respect to disclosures in the application, there is
prior precedent for nations requiring additional disclosures beyond what is in
the PCT. For example, the United States requires that patent applicants
disclose best mode in the
patent application, even though that is not a
97
PCT.
the
of
requirement
Accordingly, there are reasonable arguments for considering Canada's
actions as not expropriation. Nonetheless, the explicit exemption from
NAFTA expropriation claims involving "revocation" of intellectual property
rights consistent with the separate NAFTA section on patents is sufficiently
ambiguous, such that it is not clear how a tribunal would rule, even though
this author believes Eli Lilly should be within this exclusion. Similarly, a
tribunal could find for the first time that a domestic court decision modifying
existing common law is a state action based on a violation of international
law, even though this author believes that is incorrect.
2.

Canada Cou/d Be Found to Not Have ExpropriatedEi Lijy's Patents

Although there are legitimate reasons why a tribunal should exclude Eli
Lilly's case from an expropriation analysis as noted in the above section, this
section will consider whether Eli Lilly has expropriation claims based on
traditional expropriation concepts since it is unclear how a tribunal would
rule. Eli Lilly has alleged that Canada directly and indirectly expropriated its
patent rights in an unusual case that is not typical of either claim. As
explained below, a tribunal should find that Canada committed neither type
of expropriation under NAFTA's investment chapter. Although this Section
analyzes both types, there is substantially more to analyze with indirect
expropriation claims because there are several independent tests that
tribunals use.
a) Canada Should Not Be Found to Have Directly Expropriated Eli
Lilly's Patents
The first question is whether Canada directly expropriated Eli Lilly's
investment. Canada did remove Eli Lilly's title to previously granted patents,
which is typical of direct, rather than indirect expropriation claims. However,
unlike in most direct expropriation claims, ownership of those patent rights
were not transferred to Canada or any other party; rather, what was in those
patents is now in the public domain and freely useable by anyone. There is a
possible argument that patent invalidation is tantamount to physical property
197. 35 U.S.C.

112(1) (2012).
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seized by the state in terms of the benefit to the state-even though benefit
is not necessary for direct expropriation. Similar to the situation where direct
expropriation of tangible property would benefit the state, invalidation of Eli
Lilly's property rights arguably benefits all Canadian citizens. For example,
other companies can now make and sell generic versions of Eli Lilly's drugs
in Canada because there is no valid patent to bar them; this obviously
benefits these companies. Moreover, since such companies are likely generic
companies that compete based on price, Canadian citizens benefit from the
lower cost of drugs. Nonetheless, since benefit is not required for direct
expropriation, this argument is weak. The important issue here is that unlike
direct expropriation cases, the titles to Eli Lilly's investments-its patentswere not transferred to the state since no one owns them at all.
b) Canada Should Not Be Found to Have Indirectly Expropriated
Eli Lilly's Patents
The next issue is whether Canada has committed indirect expropriation
through invalidation of Eli Lilly's patents. Usually, indirect expropriation
claims mean that the investor retains title, but there is "unreasonable
interference" as well as "deprivation" of property rights, such that the
investor loses all, or a significant part of its investment."' This theory seems
to better fit Eli Lilly's case. Eli Lilly could assert that while it technically still
owns the patents at issue, they have no economic value because without valid
patents, Eli Lilly cannot charge a premium price because there will be other
competitors. However, as will be shown below, the tribunal should not find
that Canada indirectly expropriated Eli Lilly's investments.
An important issue is how to analyze indirect expropriation. Although
many agreements, including NAFTA do not provide criteria for evaluating
indirect expropriation, there are two basic approaches.'99 First, indirect
expropriation may exist based solely on the effect of the interference with the
investment, such that it is called the "sole effect doctrine." However, many
tribunals and scholars consider this approach unfair and instead weigh
economic impact on an investment against other factors including legitimate
state interest, proportionality between state interest and investor harm, as
well as reasonable expectations.2 0 0 As explained below, Eli Lilly's stronger
198. Reinisch, supra note 177, at 422. Accordingly, even if the investor continues to own
legal title, there still may be indirect expropriation. E.g., Metalclad Award, supra note 177,

103.
199. E.g, NAFTA37, art. 1110; see also SusyH. NIKIEMA, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEV., BEST PRACTICES: INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION 5 (2012).

200. Andrew Newcombe, The Boundaes of Regulatogy Expropriationin InternationalLaw, 20
ICSID REV.-FOR. INV. L.J. 1, 9-11 (2005); NIKIEMA, supra note 199, at 13. In addition, some
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claim is under the sole effect doctrine, but utilizing that doctrine seems
fundamentally unfair.
i)

Sole Effect Doctrine Favors Lilly But Should Not Be
Applied

Under the sole effect doctrine, significant and irreversible damage to
enjoyment of property is the sole criterion for finding indirect
expropriation.20 ' Generally, tribunals speak of damage that is so severe that
there is no longer any economic interest to the investor; for example, one
tribunal stated that rights must be "rendered so useless that they must be
deemed to have been expropriated. 2 0 2 Accordingly, economic activity that is
made more difficult, but not impossible will likely not constitute indirect
expropriation. The state intent or possible benefit is not relevant pursuant to
this doctrine.0 3
If the sole effect test is applied, Eli Lilly seems to have a strong claim.
Invalidation of a patent is an absolute and permanent interference since the
patent owner has no rights after it is invalidated. 4 Indeed, prior
commentators have noted that actions short of invalidation of patents would
meet this standard, such as a compulsory license of a patent in which the
have noted that the sole effect doctrine has been primarily recognized until recently when
wealthy countries have become more subject to investor-state disputes and thus interested in
emphasizing legitimate state interest. E.g., SEBASTIAN LOPEZ ESCARCENA, INDIRECT
EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (2014).

201. E.g., Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6,
Award, 68 (Dec. 22, 2003), 20 ICSID REv.-FOR. INv.L.J. 391 (2005).
202. Starrett Hous. Corp. v. Iran, Interlocutory Award No. ITL 32-24-1, 4 Iran-US Cl.
Trib. Rep. 122, 154 (Dec. 19, 1983); see also Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award,
102 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. June 26, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 258 (2001) (considering whether state
interference is "sufficiently restrictive to support a conclusion that the property has been
taken from the owner"); Metalclad Award, supra note 177, 103 (requiring action that "has
the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-tobe-expected economic benefit of property); T6cnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S. A. v.
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 115 (May 29, 2003), 10
ICSID Rep. 134 (2006) [hereinafter Tecmed Award] ("[R]adically deprived of the
economical use and enjoyment of its investments, as if the rights related thereto .. .had
ceased to exist.").
203. E.g., Newcombe, supra note 200, at 11-12; Metalclad Award, supra note 177, 103
(asserting no need to consider "motivation or intent" of state action because indirect
expropriation can exist "even if not necessarily to the benefit of the host state); see also
Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Eng'rs of Iran, Award No. 141-7-2, 6 Iran-US Cl. Trib.
Rep. 219, 225-26 (June 29, 1984) (government intention is less important than effect of
measure on owner of assets).
204. Once a patent is invalidated, there is no prospect for obtaining a new patent
because the original patent would preclude a subsequent application for the same invention
from satisfying the requirement of being "new." See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
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patent exists, but the ability to exclusively determine how to exploit it is
limited.0 5
However, a number of commentators and tribunals in recent years have
suggested that the sole effect doctrine is unfair and inappropriate. Although
the sole effect test was the primary test applied by tribunals since the 1980s
and even through the early 2000s, more recent tribunals have shifted away
from this doctrine.0 6 In particular, tribunals have shifted toward weighing
harm to the investment against the state interest. In addition, although
typically an element in fair and equitable treatment standards, tribunals are
also increasingly incorporating legitimate expectations of investors into their
analysis of indirect expropriation claims. 2 0 7 Recent agreements as well as

model agreements tend to explicitly enumerate these as factors for
consideration, which notably mirror the factors that the U.S. Supreme Court
utilizes to determine whether there has been a regulatory taking.0 8
Accordingly, analyzing Eli Lilly's claims pursuant to these factors seems to
represent strong policy. As this section will explain, Eli Lilly has a much
weaker claim when these factors are considered.

205. E.g., Christopher Gibson, A Look at the Compulsog License in Investment Arbitration:
The Case of Indirect Expropriauon, 25 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 357, 386 (2010); Tsai-Yu Lin,
Compulsogy Licenses for Access to Medicines, Expropriation and Investor-State Arbitration Under
BilateralInvestment Agreements-Are there Issues Beond the TRIPS Agreement?, 40 IIC: INT'L REV.
INTELL. PROP & COMPETITION L. 152 (2009).
206. E.g., Ursula Kriebaum, Expropriaion,in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 38-41
(Marc Bungenberg et al. eds., 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=2295979.
207. E.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 65, at 115-17; see also 2004 Canadian Model
BIT Annex B 13(1)(b)(ii) (expressly noting the "extent to which the measure or series of
measures interfere with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations" is a factor that
should be considered in whether there is an indirect expropriation).
208. E.g., US Model BIT Annex B, Expropriation; Agreement on the Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, U.S.-Uruguay., Annex B, para 4(a), Nov. 5, 2005,
T.I.A.S. No. 06-1101 (considering economic impact of government action, the extent to
which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable, investment based
expectations, and the character of the government action); 2004 Canadian Model BIT Annex
B13(1)(b); ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement of 2009, Annex 2 (3)
(considering whether a binding written commitment by the government has been breached
and also considering the character of the government action and whether it is
disproportionate to its public purpose). Importantly this specifically rejects the sole effect
doctrine by stating that adverse effect on the economic value of an investment is not on its
own adequate to establish indirect expropriation. Id.
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ii) Legitimate State Interest Should Outweigh Eli Lilly's
Interest
Although all expropriations must be for a public purpose, considering the
purpose behind the state action is nonetheless important for two possible
reasons. Some tribunals consider that when a state action is pursuant to its
regulatory police powers, there should be no compensable expropriation, so
long as the action is done on a nondiscriminatory basis and pursuant to due
process.209 Even for tribunals that do not completely exclude state action
from the scope of compensable expropriation, the type of state interest is
relevant in considering whether the state action is proportional to investor
harm. l0
An important issue is what constitutes a legitimate interest of the state.
Although this is often considered to be synonymous with regulatory police
powers, there is no internationally agreed definition of such powers. 21
Nonetheless, the 2012 US Model BIT explicitly noted that legitimate public
welfare objectives that would usually not constitute indirect expropriation
include public health, safety, and the environment.2 1 2 This is also consistent
with prior tribunal decisions, such as Methanex, in which the tribunal found
that a law barring use of a petrol additive deemed carcinogenic was a bona
fide regulation that served legitimate public interest, such that it was not
compensable. 13
Countries have strong policy interests in limiting the scope of intellectual
property rights to situations where the rights result in more benefits than
harm. As noted earlier, it would be unfair to impose the economic cost of
higher prices attendant with patent protection unless the inventor of the
patent provided an adequate exchange through proper disclosure of the
invention. The promise doctrine that Eli Lilly challenges aims to ensure that
this fundamental patent bargain is satisfied.
209. E.g., Saluka Invs. B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award,
262 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
Mar. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Saluka Partial Award]; Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final
Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, Part IV.D, 7 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL
Arb. Trib. Aug. 3, 2005), 16 ICSID Rep. 40 (2012) [hereinafter Methanex Final Award];
Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 276 (Sept. 5, 2008)
[hereinafter Cont'l Cas. Co. Award]; Feldman v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, 105 (Dec. 16, 2002), 7 ICSID Rep. 341 (2005); S.D. Myers Partial
Award, supra note 135, 281.
210. E.g., Tecmed Award, supra note 202, 122.
211. E.g., Saluka Partial Award, supra note 209, 263 ("[I]nternational law has yet to
identify in a comprehensive and definitive fashion precisely what regulations are considered
...within the police or regulatory power of States.").
212. US Model BIT, Annex B, Expropriation, 4(b).
213. Methanex Final Award, supra note 209, at Section IV.D, 15.
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Although this author thinks there is a clear case for considering the
design of intellectual property rights to be a legitimate state interest, this is
admittedly different than traditionally listed public welfare objectives. The
closest common public welfare objective is the state interest in promoting
public health. Arguably, this is promoted by denying patents on drugs that
would increase the cost of medicine and thereby negatively impact public
health for those could not afford the drugs. However, it is unclear if a
tribunal would agree. Indeed, many would suggest that denying patents on
drugs to reduce the cost of medicine is poor policy since that would reduce
the incentive to create new drugs. Basically, the argument is that expensive
drugs for the short-term are better than no new drugs in the long term. On
the other hand, the proper balance between incentivizing new drugs that are
expensive to consumers and potentially also impede subsequent research is a
thorny question to which there are no uniform answers. This is
fundamentally a policy determination that nations previously were able to
decide based on their domestic preferences for promoting innovation versus
access prior to TRIPS. Importantly, it is not simply an issue of developed
versus developing countries; some developed countries, such as Italy and
Portugal only granted patents on drug patents recently. In addition, before
Canada concluded NAFTA, which has similar patent requirements as TRIPS,
it granted drug patents, but permitted them to be broadly licensed by generic
companies. Although the United State has traditionally provided expansive
scope of patentability with little regard for impacts on access, other countries
bar patents that reduce access to treatment, such as patents on methods of
medical treatment. 14 Given that there is broad disagreement concerning
whether there is a public health interest in reducing the cost of medicine by
denying some patents on drugs, it is unclear how a tribunal would rule.
Assuming that Canada has a legitimate interest in tailoring its patent laws
to best promote access to affordable medicine while consistent with
international law, the next step is to consider whether that interest unduly
harms Eli Lilly's investment. Some tribunals are deferential to self-declared
state interests and find no expropriation so long as the state action is
nondiscriminatory and in accordance with due process. 2 15 However, other
tribunals apply a proportionality test, balancing the public purpose against
the investor's expectations. This can be tricky because although a balancing
test is more reasonable than the sole effect doctrine, it depends on how a
214. E.g., European Patent Convention, supra note 42, art. 53(c); see also TRIPS, supra
note 3, art 27(3) (permitting exclusion of such inventions from the scope of patentability).
215. E.g., Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, Award, 266 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib.
Aug. 2, 2010).
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tribunal applies this standard. For example, in Tecmed, the tribunal found that
even if there is a valid state interest, it cannot outweigh the investor interest
unless the state action is necessary to achieve the intended public interest,
which it defined as the only measure available to achieve the objective, or the
least detrimental among a number of effective solutions. 16 In that case, the
tribunal found that the state's refusal to renew a license for a hazardous
waste treatment plant was indirect expropriation because even though the
license was denied for the legitimate interest of resolving local complaints
concerning health and safety, there were less detrimental solutions possible,
such as relocation of the plant.2 '
Eli Lilly's situation seems somewhat similar to Tecmed's in that its entire
interest (in its patents) was vitiated when there arguably could have been a
less detrimental solution. Just as the Tecmed tribunal suggested that the state
could have taken a different action that would not have entirely terminated
the investor's interest, so too Canada's law may seem unduly severe. In
particular, although the policy reason for Canadian law is well established,
given that Canada is the only country to have this law, a tribunal could find
that it may not be necessary to apply the law in this manner.1 8 However,
some commentators note that although Canada is the only country to
consider patent promises with respect to the utility requirement, other
countries, including Australia and New Zealand have similarly invalidated
patents that fail to achieve what they promise, despite having some basic
219
utility.
iii) Eli Lilly Has No Legitimate Investor Expectations That
Have Been Violated
The best consideration for rejecting Eli Lilly's claim for indirect
expropriation is that it did not have any legitimate expectations that were
violated. Recent agreements specifically note analysis of legitimate
expectations of an investor as a way to assess indirect expropriation, but
tribunals have also considered legitimate expectations pursuant to agreements
that do not explicitly require this method of assessment. In both cases, the
216. Tecmed Award, supra note 202, 122.
217. Id. 51.
218. This is particularly true if the tribunal is sympathetic to Eli Lilly's position, even
though there are competing expert reports about whether Canada's law is in fact unique.
Compare Memorial of Claimant Eli Lilly,
145-60 (citing experts that allege that Canada's
law is unique) with Counter Memorial of Canada,
170-99 (noting lack of international
harmony in standards and functional similarity between US and Canadian law).
219. E.g., Pracdes P0. Ltd. v. Stanifte Electron/cs P0. Ltd. (1995) 35 IPR 259, 273-75

(Austl.); HammarMaskinA.B. v Steelbro N.Z. Ltd. [2010] NZCA 83, T 76 (Austl.).
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focus is on whether the investor had a legitimate expectation that was
violated. The legitimacy of the investor's expectations generally depends on
specific assurances by the state. 220 This is consistent with the interpretation of
legitimate expectations in the context of violation of the standard of "fair and
equitable treatment" from which the concept is derived.2 2 1 The facts of prior
cases may help to put this standard in context.
Metaclad v. United Mexican States provides a helpful example of legitimate
investor expectations to support an indirect expropriation claim. In that case,
there were multiple assurances that were specifically relied upon in making
*
222
investments.
Investor Metalclad obtained a state construction permit for a
hazardous waste landfill and assurances from federal agents that all necessary
permits had been required. 223 However, after construction begun, the local
government ordered construction to stop because Metalclad had not
obtained a municipal construction permit. 224 At that point, federal agents
once again assured Metalclad that if it applied for such a permit, it would be
granted.2 2 5 However, it was not 22 6 and thus Metalclad could not operate the
landfill and the state later declared the land a Natural Area for protection of a
rare cactus thereby terminating any possibility of Metalclad operating its
facilities. 2 The tribunal found that Metalclad had reasonably relied on
assurances by the federal government and had a reasonable expectation to
construct and operate the landfill that was thwarted.228
In contrast, in a more recent decision, a different NAFTA tribunal took a
different approach to indirect expropriations in Methanex v. United States. In
that case, the Canadian methanol producer asserted that a California law
banning a carcinogenic gasoline additive resulted in an indirect expropriation
of its investments in the California and U.S. market and improperly benefited

220. E.g., Reinisch, supra note 177, at 448. This is also consistent with the fair and
equitable treatment standard from which the concept of legitimate expectations are derived.

221. E.g., Katia Yanaca-Small, Fairand Equitable Treatment Standard: Recent Developments, in
STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 111, 126 (Reinisch, ed. 2008) ("legitimate
expectation is assumed more readily if an individual investor receives specific formal
assurances" from the government official that the official should perceive the investor to
reasonably rely upon); CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW
WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES
7.99
(2007).
222. Metalclad Award, supra note 177,
37-44.
223. Id.
224. Id. T 40.
225. Id 41.
226. Id.
45-50.
227. Id.
45, 69.
228. Id. T 104.
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the domestic ethanol industry.2 2 9 Although the tribunal dismissed the case on
other grounds, 30 it made findings that a state measure prohibiting use of a
petrol additive considered carcinogenic was not an indirect expropriation
because it was a bona fide regulation to serve the public interest on a
nondiscriminatory basis and that there were no specific state representations
to induce the investor.2 3' In particular, the tribunal found that the investor
should not have been surprised that environmental and health protection
laws might change and adversely impact its interests. 32
If Eli Lilly's legitimate expectations were considered, there should be no
expropriation because Eli Lilly was given no specific assurance that either the
law would not change, or that its patent would remain forever valid.
Although there is a presumption of validity for issued Canadian patents, the
fact that it is a presumption, rather than an ironclad right, suggests that there
is no reasonable expectation that it will be immune from cancelation 33
Indeed, patent scholars have previously noted that the public should not
expect issued patents to be valid based on the current system which in fact
relies on litigation challenges as a more efficient mechanism to weed out
improper patents, than to have patent offices spend more time preventing
invalid patents from issuing. 34 Although Eli Lilly complains that it was

229. Methanex Final Award, supra note 209, Part IILA, 1, Section IV.D, 2.
230. Id. at Section IV.F, 1.
231. Id. at Section IV.D, 7.
232. Id. at Section IV.D, 10; see also Parkerings-Compagniet A.S. v. Republic of Lith.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8,Final Award, 331-35 (Sept. 11, 2007) [hereinafter Parkerings
Final Award] (affirming that explicit promise or assurance is necessary and without that
investor's assertion that changes to domestic law were unfair did not constitute violation of
fair and equitable treatment, especially given that investor knew that the country was in a
state of transition from being part of the Soviet Union to part of the EU, such that changes
were likely).
233. This is underscored not only by the fact that Canadian patent law permits issued
patents to be challenged (subject to the presumption of validity), but also provides
mechanisms for such patents to be challenged.
234. E.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. (2001).
But see F. Scott Kieff, The Casefor Prefening Patent-Validiy Litigaion Over Second-Window Review
and Gold-Plated Patents: When One Size Doesn't Fit All, How Could Two Do the Trick?, 157 U.
PENN. L. REV. 1937 (2009). In addition, although there have been proposals to more closely
scrutinize certain patent applications where the inventor desires a stronger presumption of
validity, no such proposals have been enacted. E.g., Alan Devlin, Reviiing the Presumption of
Patent Validiy, 37 Sw. U. L. REV. 323 (2008); Mark A Lemley et al., What to Do About Bad
Patents, REG., Winter 2005-06, at 10; Vincent M. De Grandpr6, United States: U.S. Looks at
'Gold-plating' to Enhance Patents MONDAQ,http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/70826/
Patent/ US+Looks +At+GoldPlating+To +Enhance+Patents/ (last updated Dec. 2, 2008)
(noting that President Obama proposed this during his presidential campaign). But see F.
Scott Kieff, supra (arguing against such proposals).
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shocked by Canada's change in the law, this is an inadequate ground for a
claim of legitimate investor expectations given that Canada provided no
specific assurance to Eli Lilly. In addition, although Eli Lilly seems to believe
that an issued patent should be considered an assurance that the patent will
remain valid, Eli Lilly's assumption is fundamentally inconsistent with patent
law in Canada and other countries. As noted earlier, an issued patent is only
presumptively valid, but can be and often is subsequently invalidated if it is
later found not to meet patentability requirements. In addition, the mere
grant of a patent seems very different than the multiple assurances given 2to
35
the investor that the investor then relied upon to its detriment in MetaLcad.
Whereas the investor in Metac/ad expended funds in building a hazardous
landfill in reliance on the multiple investments, there is no claim that Eli Lilly
developed its drugs in reliance on Canadian law. To the contrary, Eli Lilly
developed its drugs as any multinational pharmaceutical company does-to
sell worldwide.
C.

INVALIDATION OF PATENT RIGHTS SHOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A
VIOLATION OF THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD

Assuming that Eli Lilly has an appropriate "investment" under NAFTA,
even if it cannot establish an expropriation claim, it can alternatively recover
compensation if Canada failed to provide "fair and equitable treatment" to
Eli Lilly's investment.2 36 This claim is very important to Eli Lilly and all other
investors since tribunals tend to take a flexible interpretation of what
constitutes "fair and equitable treatment." Claims based on a violation of the
fair and equitable treatment standard are currently the most common 3 7 and
successful type of investment claim,2

38

and often prevail even when there is

235. Metalclad Award, sufra note 177, 4108.
236. NAFTA, supra note 36, art. 1105(1).
237.

UNCTAD, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT: UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN

INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS II, A SEQUEL 10 (2012) [hereinafter
UNCTAD, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT]; Rudolf Dolzer, Fairand Equitable Treatment:
Today's Contours, 12 SANTA CLARAJ. INT'L L. 7, 10 (2013); see also Mercurio, supra note 26, at
INTERNATIONAL

894 (noting that although the standard was traditionally "rarely invoked" and only applicable
where action was "egregious and shocking," it is now commonly invoked due to a
significantly broadened interpretation of the standard since the early 2000s). Most BITs and
trade agreements include such standards, although a few BITs with Asian countries do not.
Katia Yannaca-Small, Fairand Equitable Treatment Standard:Recent Developments, in STANDARDS
OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 110, 113 (August Reinisch ed., 2008).
238. In 2012 alone, six of the twelve published decisions finding state liability did so
based on a violation of fair and equitable treatment. Violation of the fair and equitable
treatment standard was the most common ground for state liability. UNCTAD, RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 15, at 5. A prescient professor noted in 1981 that "the right to
fair and equitable treatment goes much further than the right to most favored-nation and to
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no indirect expropriation.2 3 9 Nonetheless, this section explains why a tribunal
should find that Eli Lilly does not have a valid claim against Canada for
violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard because Eli Lilly had no
legitimate expectations that were violated, which is the crux of this standard.
A key question is what constitutes "fair and equitable treatment."
Technically, there are differences in treaty language governing foreign
investments that use the phrase "fair and equitable treatment." Some, such as
NAFTA, link the phrase to only minimum standards of conduct pursuant to
customary international law, 40 whereas others have no reference for what
constitutes "fair and equitable treatment."2 41 However, in practice, tribunals
seem to treat all claims similarly. 42 Essentially, tribunals as well as scholars
consider whether there is a violation based on a number of factors. 243 These
include (a) defeating investors' legitimate expectations (sometimes in balance
national treatment . . . so general a provision is likely to be almost sufficient to cover all
conceivable cases and it may well be that provisions of the Agreements affording substantive
protection are not more than examples of specific instances of this overriding duty." F. A.
Mann, Note, British Treaiesfor the Promotion and Protectionof Investments, 52 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
241 (1981).
239. E.g., Matthew C. Porterfield, State Practice and the (Pulported) Oblgaion Under

Customau InternationalLaw to Provide Compensationfor Regulatog Expropriaions, 37 N.C. J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 159, 168-70
An Evolving Standard, 10 MAX
Small, supra note 237, at 112.
240. NAFTA, supra note
situations where the action is

(2011); Marcela Klein Bronfman, Fairand Equitable Treatment:
PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 609, 648 (2006); Yannaca36, art. 1105(1). This should technically limit violations to
"shocking, egregious and outrageous." E.g., Jack J. Coe, Fair

and Equitable Treatment Under NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 96 ASIL PROC. 17 (2002).
241. E.g., Free Trade Agreement, China-Switz., art. 4, July 6, 2013, available at
http://www.seco.admin.ch/themen/00513/00515/01330/05115/index.html; Agreement on
the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, BLEU-Taj., art. 3, Feb. 12, 2009,
available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/418;
see also
MAHNAZ MALIK, IISD, BEST PRACTICES SERIES BULLETIN: FAIR AND EQUITABLE
TREATMENT 3 (Sept. 2009); UNCTAD, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT, supra note 237,
at 6-7.
242. Notably, even where tribunals are interpreting the standard pursuant to an
agreement that requires the standard to be linked to customary international law, panels do
not necessarily do so and may instead simply rely on other tribunal decisions that do not
require consideration of international law. E.g., R.R. Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Guad., ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/23, Award,
219 (June 29, 2012); see also UNCTAD, FAIR AND
EQUITABLE TREATMENT, supra note 237, at xv, 11; Matthew C. Porterfield, A Distinction

Without a Difference? The Intepetation of Fairand Equitable Treatment Under Customag International
Law b
Investment Tribunals, INVESTMENT
TREATY NEWS (Mar.
22, 2013),
http:/ /www.iisd.org/itn/2013/03/22/a-distinction-without-a-difference-the-interpretationo f- fair- and-equitable-treatment-under-cus tomary-international-law-by-inves tment-tribunals/.
243. Alternatively, some suggest that there is no stable or fixed content to this standard.
E.g., IOANA TUDOR, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 133 (2008).
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with the host state's right to regulate), (b) denial of justice and due process,
(c) manifest arbitrariness in decision making, (d) undue discrimination, or (e)
outright abusive treatment. 44 Not all of these factors need be present in
every case, but legitimate investor expectations are considered key to
establishing a violation. 45
For that reason, the only relevant factor to consider is whether Eli Lilly
had a legitimate expectation that was defeated. 46 In particular, the issue is
whether Canada unexpectedly changed its law such that Eli Lilly's legitimate
expectations when it made its investment were violated. Obviously, the
critical question is what constitutes "legitimate expectations."

244. E.g., UNCTAD, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT, sup ra note 237, at 62; TUDOR,
supra note 243, at 155; Barnali Choudhury, Evolution or Devolution?."Deftning Fairand Equitable
Treatment in InternationalInvestment Law, 6 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 297, 302-15
(2005); Yannaca-Small, supra note 237, at 129. Alternatively, panels cite a quotation from
Waste Management v. Mexico that addresses similar factors. E.g., GAMI Invs., Inc. v. United
Mexican States, Final Award,
89 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Nov. 15, 2004)
[hereinafter GAMI Final Award]; Methanex Final Award, supra note 209, at Part IV.C, 26;
Siemens A.G. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award,
297 (Feb. 6, 2007);
Azurix Corp. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award,
370 (July 14, 2006);
Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, 98
(Apr. 30, 2004).
245. E.g., Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision
on Jurisdiction, 7.75 (Nov. 30, 2012) ("most important function" of standard is to protect
legitimate expectations); Saluka Partial Award, supra note 209, 302 ("[T]he standard of fair
and equitable treatment is .. .closely tied to the notion of legitimate expectations which is
the dominant element of the standard."); EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/13, Award,
216 ("one of the major components of the [fair and equitable
treatment] standard is the parties' legitimate and reasonable expectations") [hereinafter EDF
(Servs.) Ltd.]; see also Dolzer, supra note 237, at 17 (noting that "protection of legitimate
expectations ... 'is the central pillar' " of the standard).
246. At first glance, "manifest arbitrariness" or "discrimination" may seem relevant to
Eli Lilly's claim that Canada breached its obligation to "refrain from conduct that is
arbitrary, unfair, unjust and discriminatory" in invalidating its two patents. Eli Lilly Notice of
Arbitration, supra note 2, 81. However, this is unlikely since manifest arbitrariness without
direct targeting of a foreign investor requires an act that shocks judicial propriety and cannot
even include a country failing to follow its own laws. Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula
S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S.v. It.), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. 15, 128, (July 20) (requiring conduct that
"shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of juridical propriety"); Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award,
303 (Sept. 18, 2009) (finding manifestly
arbitrary conduct where Mexico imposed an import permit for high fructose corn syrup with
the express intent of damaging U.S. producers of such syrup and where there were no
objective criteria for how to obtain such permits). Similarly, undue discrimination generally
requires treating an investor differently because of impermissible categories such as race and
gender, or at a minimum, treating the investor differently than domestic investors.
UNCTAD, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT, subra note 237, at 82. Eli Lilly has not made
any such argument.
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Although agreements generally do not define "legitimate expectations,"
there are essentially two approaches.2 4 The broadest and most investor
friendly approach is that a state must ensure a stable legal and business
environment.24' The other approach only finds legitimate expectations if
those expectations arise from a specific state representation that the investor
relies on.249 Indeed, one tribunal cautioned against an unduly broad reading
of legitimate expectations that would inappropriately constrain states.5 0
Accordingly, a number of tribunals and scholars suggest not only that there
should be a specific state representation, but also that state interests should
be balanced against investor expectations.2 51 This author believes that the
standard grounded in state representation is preferable as a matter of policy.
Other commentators also endorse this balancing approach, and arguably
tribunals have recently trended toward it. In particular, commentators as well
as some tribunals have noted that it is difficult to find and justify legitimate
expectations solely on the basis of a preexisting legal regime and that this
standard should not serve the same purpose as stabilization clauses. 5 2
Nonetheless, both standards are discussed below to predict how a tribunal

247. Arguably, there are other variations of legitimate expectations, but the two
approaches outlined here represent the extremes.
248. E.g., UNCTAD, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT, supra note 237, at 64; Dolzer,
supra note 237, at 24-25.
249. E.g., UNCTAD, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT, supra note 237, at 67-70;
Dolzer, supra note 237, at 24-25.
250. EDF (Servs.) Ltd., supra note 245,
217 ("The idea that legitimate expectations,
and therefore [fair and equitable treatment], imply the stability of the legal and business
framework, may not be correct if stated in an overly broad and unqualified formulation. The
[fair and equitable treatment] might then mean the virtual freezing of the legal regulation of
economic activities, in contrast with the State's normal regulatory power and the
evolutionary character of economic life.").
251. After all, although agreements aim to protect investments, investors arguably
benefit the host state, such that public policy concerns of the host state should be
considered. E.g., Abhijit P.G. Pandaya & Andy Moody, Legitimate Expectations in Investment
Treao Arbitration:An UnclearFuture, 15 TILBURG L. REV. 93, 96 (2010-11). In addition, some
suggest that in applying this standard, tribunals should be deferential to host states.
252. E.g., CAMPBELL
MCLACHLAN
ET
AL.,
INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 238 (2008); Pandaya & Moody, supra note 251, at
114; EDF (Servs.) Ltd., supra note 245, 218 (fair and equitable treatment should not serve
same function as stabilization clauses); Michele Potest, Legitimate Expectations in Investment
Treav Law: Understanding the Roots and the Limits of a Controversial Concot, 28 ICSID REV. 88,
114 (2013) (noting that it would be "illogical" to permit fair and equitable treatment to
provide the same type of protection as a stabilization clause that an investor bargained for);

Elizabeth Snodgrass, Protecting Investors' Legitimate Expectations: RecogniZing and Delimiting a
General Pdincile, 21 ICSID REv.-FOR. INV. L.J. 1, 35, 56-57 (2006); Yannaca-Small, supra
note 237 at 126.
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might rule in Eli Lilly's case and also to underscore the problems with the
broader standard of a stable legal and business environment.
. Eli ily Has No Legitimate Expectation that Common Law
Intepretations Will Not Change
Eli Lilly should not have a claim for violation of fair and equitable
treatment under even the broadest standard that the state maintain a stable
legal and business environment based on prior cases. A frequently cited
definition of what constitutes a stable legal and business environment is:
[T]he host State [must] act in a consistent manner, free from

ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign
investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and

regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of
the relevant policies and administrative practices or directives,2 53to be
able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations.

This definition has encountered substantial criticism for being impossible
to meet. 54 It will nonetheless be discussed as a standard that could be applied
to establish that even under this overly broad and criticized standard, Eli Lilly
should not have a valid claim for violation of fair and equitable treatment. 55
Although it is true that the common definition seems to prevent a state from
ever changing any laws that may impact a foreign investor without adequate
notice, tribunals citing this definition seem to apply it more narrowly.
Specific cases help to put this in context. For example, in Tecmed v.
Mexico, the tribunal found a violation of fair and equitable treatment because
Mexican authorities failed to renew a necessary landfill permit they had
253. Tecmed Award, supra note 202, 154; Metalclad Award, supra note 177, 99; MTD
Equity Sdn Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Decision on Annulment,
107 (Mar. 21, 2007); Siemens A.G. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award,
297 (Feb. 6, 2007); GAMI Final Award, supra note 244, 91; Occidental Exploration &
Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final Award,
185
(BIT/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. July 1, 2004); see also UNCTAD, FAIR AND EQUITABLE
TREATMENT, supra note 237, at 64 (referring to quoted provision from Tecmed as the
"classic statement" of this investor-friendly approach).
254. E.g., Zachary Douglas, Nothing if Not Citical for Investment Treao Arbitration:
Ocidental,Eureko and Methanex, 22 ARB. INT'L 27, 28 (2006) (staling that this is "actually not a
standard at all," but, rather, "a description of perfect public regulation in a perfect world, to
which all states should aspire but very few (if any) will ever attain); White Indus. Austl. Ltd.
v. Republic of India, Final Award, 10.3.5 (BIT/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Nov. 30, 2011)
(noting that this statement has been subject to "valid criticism"); MTD Equity Sdn Bhd. v.
Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Decision on Annulment,
66-78 (Mar. 21,
2007) (suggesting that this standard is questionable).
255. This is especially true given that Eli Lilly is suing under NAFTA, which links this
standard to customary standards of international law.
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previously promised to renew. 56 In both CMS v.Argentina as well as Enron v.
Argentina, the tribunal found a violation based on this standard where
Argentina dismantled its prior regime of tariff guarantees, without which
foreign companies would not have made investments in Argentina. 5 In
Occidenta! v.Ecuador, the tribunal found a violation of fair and equitable
treatment based on Ecuador's "manifestly wrong" interpretation of a
contract with the investor, as well as Ecuador's inconsistent and unclear
value-added tax laws, which negatively impacted the investor, such that the
business and legal framework were disrupted. 58 In PSEG v. Turke, the
tribunal found that Turkey violated the fair and equitable treatment standard
because Turkey engaged in inconsistent administrative acts that included
ignoring legal rights, as well as a "roller coaster" of continuing legislative
changes that negatively affected the investor's power plant.2 59 The tribunal
found that these changes were the exact opposite of stability since the law as
well as its interpretation and implementation were continuously changing. 60
Although Eli Lilly claims that it was "entitled to rely on the stability,
predictability and consistency of Canada's legal and business framework
existing at each stage of the establishment, expansion, and development of
Lilly's investment" in its drugs,2 61 its claim is far different from prior
situations where tribunals found a violation of fair and equitable treatment.
Eli Lilly's complaint is unlike the prior decisions in which tribunals found
that domestic law specifically induced an investor to make investments in the
country that were then negatively impacted by a change in law. Indeed, Eli
Lilly has made no allegation that Canada's prior law induced Eli Lilly to make
any investments. In addition, Canada's proper application of current law on
utility requiring the promise doctrine to be met is neither a "manifestly
wrong" legal interpretation nor a "roller coaster" of changes. Canadian
courts have not engaged in any manifestly wrong legal interpretations; to the
contrary, courts have consistently and correctly ruled against Eli Lilly based
on prevailing law. In addition, while this doctrine is arguably different than
256. Tecmed Award, supra note 202, 165-66.
257. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award
(May 12, 2005) [hereinafter CMS Gas Award]; Enron Corp. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007) [hereinafter Enron Award]. However, it may have
been relevant in these cases that the tribunal was applying an agreement that specifically
noted that the standard is "desirable in order to maintain a stable framework for investment.
CMS Gas Award, supra, 274; Enron Award, supra,
259-60.
258. Occidental, supra note 253, 184.
259. PSEG Global Inc. v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award,
246-50 (Jan. 19, 2007).
260. Id. 254.
261. Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2, T 82.

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:1

when Eli Lilly first applied for its patents, one modification to the common
law definition of utility is a far cry from the multitude of changes considered
a problem in PSEG. Moreover, in past cases where tribunals have applied
this broad standard, the fact that the relevant agreements specifically
referenced stability as a goal of the treaty may have influenced the
2 62
tribunals.
2. An Issued PatentIs Not a State Representation of Permanent Va/idiy
That Can Be JustifiabjZ Re/ied On andMust Be Balanced againstState
Interests
A number of tribunals reject the broad standard of a stable legal and
business framework as unrealistic 263 and unfair,2 6 4 and instead only recognize
claims based on legitimate investor expectations if those expectations
outweigh state interests. As the tribunal in Sauka v. CZech Repubic stated,
"[n]o investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances prevailing at the
time the investment is made remain totally unchanged ....
[T]he host State's
legitimate right subsequently to regulate domestic matters in the public
interest must be taken into consideration as well." 65 Under such an
approach, tribunals only find a claim if it arises from (a) a state's specific
representations or commitments to an investor which the investor has relied
on, and only after (b) the investor's expectations are balanced against
legitimate regulatory activities of host countries. 66 As this section will
explain, Eli Lilly has no valid claim because there was no specific
representation by Canada that Eli Lilly was justified in relying on, and Canada
had legitimate interests in modifying its patent laws.

262. E.g., Occidental, supra note 253,
183 (referring to the preamble); CMS Gas
Award, supra note 257, 274 (referring to the preamble). In addition, the Argentine cases
involved licenses granted by the government which stated that they could not be modified
without the licensee's consent. These licenses may have also played a role in the tribunal's
finding of a breach of fair and equitable treatment.
263. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 254, at 28; El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Arg. Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award,
352, 371 (Oct. 31, 2011) [hereinafter El Paso
Energy Award] (noting that "[e]conomic and legal life is by nature evolutionary" such that it
is important to consider whether changes to a legal framework are unreasonable or contrary
to a "specific commitment").
264. UNCTAD, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT, supra note 237, at 67. Indeed, one
tribunal stated it would be unconscionable for a country to promise not to change its
legislation as time and needs change. Even where the agreement's preamble noted the
importance of the stability of a legal framework, the tribunal declined to apply this standard.
Cont'l Cas. Co. Award, supra note 209, 258.
265. Saluka Partial Award, supra note 209,
304-08.
266. E.g., Duke Energy Electroquil Partners v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/19, Award, T 340 (Aug. 18, 2008); Cont'l Cas. Co. Award, supra note 209, T 261.
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a) A Patent Is Not a State Representation of Guaranteed Validity
The first question is what constitutes a state representation. The most
typical state representation is a specific state commitment to an investor. As
with expropriation claims, a tribunal may find a state commitment exists if
there is some action attributable to the state, such as a representation from a
government official.2 6 In addition, this state action must be either a specific
commitment to the investor, or a set of general rules put in place with the
intention of inducing foreign investment upon which the investor relied. 68 In
this case, there is no suggestion that prior Canadian law was intended to
induce foreign investment, such that inducement is not discussed. 69
The issue here is whether Canada made a specific commitment to Eli
Lilly. Tribunals and scholars consider a commitment specific if its "precise
27
object was to give a real guarantee of stability to the investor." 0
Accordingly, general statements in treaties or legislation do not suffice. 2 ' On
the other hand, a specific commitment could include a commitment made in
a contract or letter, or an explicit promise or guarantee from the state.' 3
However, although there are heightened expectations from a contract, not
every breach of a contract necessarily violates the fair and equitable treatment
standard;2 74 rather, something more is necessary, although tribunals have not
267. Metalclad Award, supra note 177, 73 (noting that it was unchallenged that state
and local government acts were attributable to the state); see also Stephen Fietta, Expropration
and the 'Fairand Equitable" Standard-The Developing Role of Investors' "Expectaions"in International
Investment Arbitration, 23 J.INT'L ARB. 375 (2006).
268. E.g., Glamis Gold, Ltd. v.United States, Award, 627 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb.
Trib. June 8, 2009) [hereinafter Glamis Gold].
269. E.g., Enron Award, supra note 257,
264-67; LG&E Energy Corp. v. Arg.
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Award,
132-39 (july 25, 2007).
270. El Paso Energy Award, supra note 262, 377 (emphasis removed).
271. E.g., Cont'l Cas. Co. Award, supra note 209, 261; see also El Paso Energy Award,
supra note 259, 394 (noting that this would "immobilize the legal order and prevent any
adaptation to circumstances").
272. E.g., El Paso Energy Award, supra note 262, 376. However, breach of a contract is
not per se a violation of a specific commitment. UNCTAD, FAIR AND EQUITABLE
TREATMENT, supra note 237, at 87.
273. Parkerings Final Award, supra note 232, 331.
274. E.g., Duke Energy Electroquil Partners v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/19, Award,
358 (Aug. 18, 2008); Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v.
Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, Award, 335 (June 18, 2008) [hereinafter
Hamester Award]; Impregilo S.p.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case ARB/07/17, Final Award,
181 (June 21, 2011); see also Parkerings Final Award, supra note 232,
344 ("The
expectation a party to an agreement may have of the regular fulfillment of the obligation by
the other party is not necessarily an expectation protected by international law .... [T]he
party whose contractual expectafions are frustrated should . . .seek redress before a national
tribunal.").
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necessarily been consistent in assessing what additional activity suffices.2 '
One tribunal suggested that there must be a denial of justice or
discrimination
Another tribunal
16
found a violation of this standard not just
based on a simple breach, but the fact that the state took action inconsistent
with the investment agreement for an urban development project by denying
277
relevant permits to complete the project.
Importantly, a mere expectation that the law will not change does not
constitute a specific commitment made by the state that lays the groundwork
for a violation of fair and equitable treatment.2 8 For example, in Methanex,
the tribunal held there was no violation of the standard of fair and equitable
treatment standard when California changed its laws to ban certain
carcinogenic additives to methanol and that change essentially destroyed the
investor's market because there was no representation that regulatory laws
would not change.2 71 Similarly, a tribunal found that Canadian company
Glamis had no legitimate expectation that the United States (through
California) would not pass legislation that would impact Glamis's mining
investment, even when California's action was a significant change from
settled practice, where California made no specific statements to induce
investment.2 10 Also, in ADE v. United States, the tribunal found the investor
had no legitimate expectation that the law would remain unchanged when the
state made no representation and the investor instead simply relied on advice
by private counsel.2 8' More recently, in Tota! v. Argentina, a tribunal held that
the legal regime in force at the time an investment is made is not guaranteed
to remain in force unless the state has explicitly assumed a legal obligation,
such as a stabilization clause. 82 Tribunals have noted that absent unusual
situations, such as a drastic or discriminatory change in laws, there should be

275. E.g., Potest, suptra note 252, at 15-18.
276. Glamis Gold, supra note 268, 620.
277. MTD Equity Sdn Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Decision
on Annulment (Mar. 21, 2007).
278. El Paso Energy Award, supra note 262, 371.
279. Methanex Final Award, supra note 209, at Section IV.D, 7.
280. Glamis Gold, supra note 268,
766-67, 801-02; see also Parkerings Final Award,
supra note 332,
334-38 (finding no violation of legitimate expectations that Lithuania
would not change its laws given that Lithuania was transitioning from being part of the
Soviet Union to becoming a candidate for EU membership).
281. ADF Grp. Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Final Award
(Jan. 9, 2003).
282. Total S.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability,
117, 429 (Dec. 27, 2010).
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no liability under the fair and equitable treatment standard when there is no
stabilization clause. 83
A key question with respect to Eli Lilly's claims is thus whether
Canada made any specific representations to Eli Lilly that Eli Lilly relied on.
The only possible representation stems from Eli Lilly's novel claim that the
issued patents are a contract, such that the patent itself is a representation
that the patent will never be revoked. 84 However, unlike a contract, which
can generally be canceled only in extreme circumstances, issued patents are
only presumptively valid and are often canceled if found to fail to meet one
of the required criteria. 85 Moreover, as noted earlier, even a breached
contract with a state is not necessarily enough to establish a violation of the
fair and equitable treatment standard. Something more is usually necessary. 86
b) There Has Been No Negative Reliance upon a State
Representation
Even if there is a state representation, it is important that there be
reliance on that representation to the investor's detriment due to induced
investments. 7 For example, in Metacad, the investor relied on the
representation of officials that the investor had all necessary federal and state
permits to construct a hazardous waste landfill and expended capital in
constructing the landfill. 88 Thus the denial of the 89
municipal construction
2
permit violated the investor's legitimate expectations.
Eli Lilly has no viable argument that it relied on commitments that
induced it to invest in developing its invention and to apply for a Canadian
patent. Eli Lilly seems to complain that it could not have expected Canada to
modify domestic standards when it applied for a patent. However, there was
no specific representation that Canadian law would not change when Eli Lilly
applied. Moreover, Eli Lilly's expenditure of capital to develop the drug it
sought to patent is not tied to Canadian laws. As mentioned earlier,
multinational pharmaceutical companies develop drugs that they aim to
-

283. E.g., Toto Costruzioni Generai S.p.A. v. Republic of Leb., ICSID Case. No.
ARB/07/12, Award, 244 June 7, 2012).
284. Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 2, 82.
285. Cf NAFTA, supra note 36, art. 1110(7) (expressly recognizing invalidated patent
claims as outside the realm of expropriation, which suggests that there are no legitimate
expectations that a patent will never be invalidated).
286. E.g., Parkerings Final Award, supra note 232, T 344; Hamester Award, supra note

270, T 337.
287.
288.
289.

E.g., El Paso Energy Award, supra note 262, T 376.
Metalclad Award, supra note 177, 77 85-88.
Id.
89-90, 99-101.
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patent in any and all countries that will provide such patents. In addition,
even if Eli Lilly claimed that it was induced to invest in promoting its new
drug, this claim should also fail because an issued patent is not a guarantee
that the patent will remain valid. Given that it is common for issued patents
to be invalidated, the existence of a patent should not induce investment in
promoting a drug.
c) Eli Lilly Has No Legitimate Expectation That Outweighs
Canada's Interests
The final method of determining legitimate expectations requires
balancing investor expectations against state policy. The facts of some past
tribunal cases may help to shed light on how this balance applies. For
example, although the tribunal in Sauka recognized the importance of
considering legitimate regulatory action, the tribunal found that the Czech
Republic had no legitimate reason to protect similarly situated domestic, but
not foreign, banks. 90 In contrast, in EDE v. Romania, the tribunal found that
a statute passed to abolish duty-free operations in Romanian airports was a
reasonable response to the legitimate problem of contraband and did not
disproportionately or discriminatorily impact the claimant's investments since
it applied equally to all operators.2 9' In addition, some tribunals suggest that
there should be a high level of deference to states to regulate matters within
their own borders. 92
Past decisions favor a finding that Canada has a legitimate interest in the
current promise doctrine. First, Canada does have a bona fide interest in
promoting fundamental patent policy that ensures patents are only issued
when there is adequate disclosure to justify the social cost of a patent. 93 In
addition, Canada's law applies equally to all foreign and domestic companies.
Even though all pharmaceutical companies are implicated, the impact on this
single industry is no different than the situation in Sauka where all owners of
duty-free operations were impacted. In Sauka, the tribunal found that
Romania responded reasonably to a contraband problem by enacting a law
that impacted all owners of duty free operations. Here, Canadian courts
appropriately responded to the problem of how to ensure that Canadian
290. Saluka Partial Award, supra note 209,
304-08.
291. Id.
293-94; see also EDF (Servs.) Ltd., supra note 245,
219 (noting that
"[l]egitimate expectations cannot be solely the subjective expectations of the investor" and
that proper consideration of "the host State's power to regulate its economic life in the
public interest" should be taken into account).
292. S.D. Myers Partial Award, supra note 135, 263; GAMI Final Award, supra note
244, 93.
293. See supra Section II.A (explaining the importance of patent disclosures).
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patents serve the traditional purpose of requiring proper disclosure of an
invention before burdening the public with a patent by creating a doctrine
that arguably impacts pharmaceutical innovations more. Although the
expropriation doctrine provides some protection to foreign investors, it is
not intended to provide better protection than that afforded to domestic
investors.
III.

BEYOND ELI LILLY'S CASE: PENDING PROBLEMS AND
HOW TO ADDRESS THEM

This Part goes beyond the Eli Li/jr case to highlight other domestic laws
at the intersection of intellectual property and public health vulnerable to
challenge in investor-state arbitration proceedings. In particular, this Part
explains TRIPS-consistent domestic actions that might nonetheless result in
investor-state claims. After explaining claims that companies (which qualify
as foreign investors) are likely to make in investor-state proceedings, this Part
provides specific proposals that can be incorporated in pending agreements
to minimize these problems.
A.

PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUES IN DANGER OF DISRUPTION

Eli Lilly's suit may portend the beginning of a trend towards investor
challenges to a number of controversial issues concerning the balance of
pharmaceutical interests and public health. These issues include patentability
criteria beyond the one challenged in Ei LA/ , issuance of compulsory
licenses on patents, and domestic regulations concerning protection of
clinical data submitted to obtain approval to sell drugs.
1. PatentabiiyStandards and Compu/soy Licenses
One patent standard that is especially vulnerable to challenge under
investor-state arbitration is a criteria that makes new drugs that are very
similar to existing drugs unpatentable unless they show improved efficacy. 94
Companies and lawyers alike have improperly suggested that section 3(d) of
India's patent law barring patents on drugs that are very similar to existing
drugs without providing increased efficacy is inconsistent with TRIPS. 95 In
294. E.g., The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, § 3(d), Acts of Parliament, 2005
(India) (clarifying that inventions do not include "the mere discovery of a new form of a
known substance which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that
substance or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance or
of the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless such known process
results in a new product or employs at least one new reactant").
295. E.g., JONES DAY, supra note 19, at 19; see also PHRMA, SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION
2014, at 26 (referring to 3(d) as an "additional hurdle"); K. M. Gopakumar, Intellectual Propery
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the eight years since India pioneered this law there have been no challenges
to its TRIPS consistency in the WTO forum. However, while countries tend
to be hesitant to bring WTO disputes due to political considerations and
concern with possibly undesirable precedent, companies do not share these
concerns in seeking investment remedies.2 96 Accordingly, India's and other
similar laws are ripe for challenge by foreign companies to the extent that
there is an applicable investment agreement. Even in the absence of a
specific challenge, Eli Lilly's suit alone could make a country hesitant to
adopt such laws given the potential cost of a challenge, 9 in addition to
potential awards granted as compensation
to foreign investors who establish
2 98
violation of investment claims.

A company could claim that India's section 3(d) patent standard results
in improper expropriation, including a claim that the law is not consistent
with TRIPS in a manner similar to Eli Lilly's case. As noted earlier, most
agreements technically exclude from the definition of expropriation any
domestic denial of intellectual property rights if the denial is consistent with
TRIPS. However, some have suggested India's section 3(d) provision
imposes an additional2 99patentability requirement not permitted by TRIPS, and
thus violates TRIPS.

This is incorrect given that India has not imposed a

Issues Dominate the USITC Public Hearing on India, THIRD

WORLD NETWORK (Feb. 13, 2014),
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/health.info/2014/hi140201.htm (noting PhRMA claim
that 3d adds additional requirements).
296. E.g., Ermias Tekeste Biadgleng, IP Rights under Investment Agreements: The
TRIPS-Plus Implications for Enforcement and Protection of Public Interest, South Centre
Research Paper No. 8, at 30 (2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?
abstract id=943013. Moreover, law firms seem to encourage such action. E.g., JONES DAY,
supra note 19; Nandan S. Nelivigi et al., Indian Patent Office Grants Compulsoy License for Baer's
Nexavar: Implications for Multinational Drug Companies, WHITE & CASE (Apr. 2012),
http://www.whitecase.com /alerts -04022012/.
297. See, e.g., SCOTT SINCLAIR, CAN. CTR. FOR POLICY ALTS., NAFTA CHAPTER 11
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES 24-25 (2010), available at https://www.policyalternatives.ca/
sites /default/ files /uploads /publications /National%200ffice/ 2010/11 /NAFTA%20Disput
e%20Table.pdf (noting that whereas the cost of simply administrating a panel can be $ 1
million or more, legal costs can be substantially higher and even with respect to frivolous
claims that never get a full hearing can still cost several hundred thousand dollars).
298. For example, Mexico was ordered to pay compensation of nearly $170 million (plus
interest) in 2009 for three decisions involving a Mexican tax on high fructose corn syrup.
This exceeded the total annual GDP of the poorest sixteen Mexican states. SINCLAIR, supra
note 297. In 2010, the Philippines spent nearly $60 million to defend two cases against a
German investor. Kim Arveen M. Patria, Stud Investment Provisions Before an FTA Sas
Advocag Group, FOCUS ON THE GLOBAL SOUTH, http://focusweb.org/content/studyinvestment-provisions-fta-says-advocacy-group (last visited Dec. 15, 2014).
299. E.g., supra note 295 and accompanying text; see also In re Natco Pharma. Ltd. &
Bayer Corp., C.L.A. No. 1 of 2011 (Controller of Patents Mar. 9, 2012) (India); Bayer Corp.
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new requirement of patentability; rather, India has simply provided a
different definition of patentability that is permissible and in fact
contemplated by TRIPS. Just as TRIPS permits Canada to define what is
"useful" for Canada's patents laws, TRIPS permits India to define what is an
"invention," as well as what is "new," such that a number of scholars and
policymakers consider India's laws to be consistent with TRIPS.300
Nonetheless, just as Eli Lilly has incorrectly challenged Canada as violating
NAFTA with an investment agreement, companies are similarly likely to
challenge India's TRIPS-consistent standard.
A possibly even bigger problem is that countries that want to copy
India's law may face claims by companies that the companies have been
denied fair and equitable treatment due to an undesirable change in the law.
An unduly broad interpretation of such claims might permit an investor to
recover if a country changed its laws in a way that altered the legal
environment. As noted earlier, there should not be any legitimate expectation
that the law will never change. Nonetheless, companies win the vast majority
of these cases, such that any potential claim including an unsubstantiated
one-could chill pending proposals for reform of patent laws.
2. Compulsoy Licenses
Another likely target for investor-state arbitration is a compulsory license.
A compulsory license is a traditionally recognized, state-mandated license to
use a patented invention in certain instances; the patent is still valid, but the
patent owner cannot exclude the licensee and must accept the government
dictated royalty.301 Although this situation seems inapposite of the patent
right to exclude, one of the reasons compulsory licenses have historically
been granted is to promote public interest on a number of grounds, including
access to medicine.30 2 The ability to issue compulsory licenses is especially
important now to developing countries with limited resources; previously,
they could promote access to low-cost drugs by declining to issue patents,

v. Natco Pharma. Ltd., Order No. 45/2013, 54 (Intellectual Property Appellate Board,
Chennai Mar. 4, 2013).
300. E.g. CYNTHIA M. HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS AND RELATED RIGHTS

95-96 (2011); Amy

Kapczynski, Harmonization and its Discontents: Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India's
PharmaceuticalSector, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 1571, 1597-98 (2009).
301.

E.g.,

JEROME H. REICHMAN

&

CATHERINE

HASENZAHL,

UNITED

NATION

CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. & INT'L CENTRE FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV.,
NON-VOLUNTARY LICENSING OF PATENTED INVENTIONS

302. E.g., id.at 11-12.

6 (2003).
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but now that they must issue some patents under TRIPS, compulsory
licenses are one of the few tools available to promote lower-cost drugs.30 3
Although compulsory licenses are permissible under TRIPS, they are
likely to be challenged by patent owners as expropriation. Notably, public
statements by pharmaceutical companies often talk about compulsory
licenses as either "breaking" their patents, or even expropriating their patent
rights. 30 4 Scholars have been expecting such claims.30 5 This makes sense
because a compulsory license may be a prototypical situation where an
investor believes that it needs and deserves the additional protection of
investor-state arbitration because the investor considers the TRIPS
requirements, as well as domestic laws implementing those requirements,
inadequate.
Although compulsory licenses that are consistent with TRIPS should
technically be exempt from indirect expropriation claims in most cases ,306 an

303. See TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 27(1). Although nations can impose heightened
patentability requirements, it is highly unlikely that this will result in the pre-TRIPS situation
of zero patents on any drugs. Indeed, although India has been at the forefront of imposing
new restrictions on patentability, the vast majority of pharmaceutical patents have in fact
been granted. E.g., C.H. Unnikrishnan, Foreign Drug Makers Won 770 of All Patents in Last 3

Years,
LIVE
MINT
(Sept.
15,
2014),
http://www.livemint.com/Industry/
HOZID9XSP78ESv1MAUuZZN /Foreign-drug-makers -won-77-of-all-patents -granted-inlast-3.html; Broo Baker, PharmaceuticalPatents Granted b Indian Patent Office (IPO), TECH CORP
LEGAL
LLP,
http:/ /techcorplegal.com/ Indian Law-Firm/ foreign -pharmaceuticalcompanies-granted-pharmaceutical-patents-by-indian-patent-office-ipo/
(indicating that over
two thirds of pharmaceutical patent applications were granted). The most up to date list of
granted and pending applications since July 2012, is available from the Indian patent office at
http://164.100.176.38/tk/ (select "pharmaceutical" from dropdown menu).
304. E.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing Patent Perspectives, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1047,
1069-70 (2009); see also Merck & Co., Inc. Statement on Brazjlian Governments Decision to Issue
Compulsory License for STOCRIN, BUSINESS WIRE (May 4, 2007, 12:11 PM),
http: //www.businesswire.com/news /home /20070504005566 /en/Merck- StatementBrazilian -Governments -Decision-Issue- Compulsory/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2014) (referring
to compulsory license as expropriation); see also JONES DAY, sulpra note 18 (referring to
compulsory license as expropriation).
305. E.g., Peter B. Rutledge, TRIPS and BITs: An Essa on Compulsogy Licenses,
Epropration, and InternationalArbitration, 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 149, 161 (2012),
available at http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/facartchop/827/; Gibson, supra note 205, at
359.
306. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 36, art. 1110(7) (excluding compulsory licenses granted
consistent with NAFTA, which has provisions similar to TRIPS); U.S.-Singapore Free Trade
Agreement, supra note 179, art. 15.6.5 (excluding compulsory licenses granted consistent with
TRIPS); Dominican Republic-Central America-U.S. Free Trade Agreement art. 10.7.5, Aug.
5, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514 (2004) [hereinafter CAFTA] (excluding compulsory licenses
consistent with TRIPS); see also HOWARD MANN ET AL., IISD MODEL INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT

ON

INVESTMENT

FOR

SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT

art.

8(G) (2005)
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investor-state dispute would likely still be initiated to assess whether the
license in fact complies with TRIPS because TRIPS requirements for
compulsory licenses are highly controversial and contested. Part of the
problem is that determining whether the licenses comply with TRIPS
requires an interpretation of undefined, yet key, terms. For example, TRIPS
permits compulsory licenses when a state provides "adequate remuneration,"
without any definition of what would be "adequate." In addition, although
TRIPS provides many procedural requirements a state must follow to issue
an appropriate license, there is some controversy concerning the ground for
issuing a license in the first instance.30
Companies are likely to challenge royalty rates of compulsory licenses as
not TRIPS compliant because TRIPS does not clearly define what
compensation is "adequate" and companies believe that any compulsory
license fails to provide adequate compensation. This is aptly illustrated in the
recent case concerning India's compulsory license on Bayer's cancer drug
sold as Nexavar. Bayer sought a royalty rate of fifteen percent of net sales
whereas the court granted a royalty of six percent. Although a subsequent
appeal raised the royalty to seven percent, that rate is still less than half of
what the patent owner sought. 30 8 Even though Bayer strongly contested the
royalty rate, that rate was completely within the guidelines issued by the
World Health Organization and the United Nations Development
Programme.30 9
One law firm suggested that the six percent royalty rate constituted
indirect expropriation that failed to provide adequate compensation to Bayer
pursuant to a typical investment agreement that requires compensation
Ccequivalent to the value of the expropriated .. . investment immediately
before the date on which such expropriation ... became publicly known."310
Although some might suggest that there is no conflict between this
expropriation standard and the ambiguous TRIPS requirement of "adequate"

(excluding from expropriation compulsory licenses granted consistent with "applicable
international agreements on intellectual property").
307. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 31.
308. In re Natco Pharma. Ltd. & Bayer Corp., C.L.A. No. 1 of 2011 (Controller of
Patents Mar. 9, 2012) (India); Bayer Corp. v. Natco Pharma. Ltd., Order No. 45/2013, 54
(Intellectual Property Appellate Board, Chennai Mar. 4, 2013).
309. See JAMES LOVE, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, REMUNERATION GUIDELINES
FOR NON-VOLUNTARY USE OF A PATENT ON MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES (Robert Weissman
ed., 2005).
310. JONES DAY, supra note 19, at 3.
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compensation, scholars generally believe that "adequate" compensation
under TRIPS is not intended to be market rate.31'
Another TRIPS-consistent aspect of compulsory licenses that foreign
investors could challenge is the grounds for issuing a compulsory license in
the first instance. TRIPS permits countries to decide the basis for issuing
compulsory licenses and only governs procedural aspects of compulsory
licensing. However, there have been many misstatements concerning
permissible grounds for issuing compulsory licenses made not only by
companies, but also by scholars and government officials.312 Contrary to the
common claim by companies that compulsory licenses are only appropriate
in case of an emergency or if the patent owner cannot provide adequate
supply of the needed drug,313 countries have complete discretion to decide
the grounds for issuing compulsory licenses. 314 This is very important for
countries like India that have unusual legal criteria for issuing a compulsory
license, such as a drug not being available at a "reasonably affordable price"
from the patent owner.315

Notably, even if an arbitration tribunal were to properly find that the
above two issues were consistent with TRIPS, and thus not indirect
expropriation, a tribunal might still find a violation of fair and equitable
treatment. There is no intellectual property exception to fair and equitable
treatment claims for even TRIPS-consistent measures in any existing
agreement. A company might argue that it applied for a patent to its
detriment because it did not expect that a country would issue a compulsory
license that demolished the value of its patent. A tribunal that took a broad
311. E.g., HO, supra note 300, at 138; Tsai-Yu Lin, Compulsory Licenses for Access to

Medicines, ExJpropaion and Investor-State Arbitration Under Bilateral Invesmel,' AgreementsAre
There Issues Beyond the TRIPS Agreement?, 40 IIC: INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION
L. 152, 163-64 (2009); Antony Taubman, Rethinking TRIPS: 'Adequae Remu'eraio'for NonVolun'ta Patent Licensing, 11 JJ.INT'L ECON. L. 927, 951-55, 957 (2008) (explaining that this is
not necessarily equivalent to full market value); Biadgleng, supra note 296, at 18; see also
Gibson, supra note 205, at 415 (suggesting that it is unclear whether a TRIPS consistent
license would consitute expropriation under an investment agreement).

312. E.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Patent Breaking or Balaciug?: Separating Strands of Fact From
Fiction under TRIPS, 34 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 371 (2009); see also James Love, USPTO
"Clafies" June 27, 2012 Testimnony on Biologics Exclusivij and India Comulsog License,
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L, (July 3, 2012), available at http://www.keionline.org/
node/1452.
313. E.g., JONES DAY, sup~ra note 19, at 3.
314. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 31; Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 34, 5(b)
("Each member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the
grounds upon which such licenses are granted."); see also HO, supra note 300, at 128-29.
315. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, § 84, Acts of Parliament, 2005
(India).
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view of the fair and equitable treatment standard to demand a stable legal
environment might be sympathetic to such a claim. Even if there is no
technical change in domestic laws, if a country had simply not previously
issued compulsory licenses, or rarely issued such licenses, a company might
nonetheless complain that an unexpected issuance of a compulsory license
was inconsistent with fair and equitable treatment. Given that such claims are
unpredictable and highly successful for claimants, there is a serious risk that
tribunals deciding investor-state claims would nonetheless find that a TRIPSconsistent license is an expropriation or a violation of fair and equitable
treatment.
3. Domestic Regulation of C/iica!Data
In addition, nations may be subject to investment claims concerning
domestic regulations governing clinical data relating to new drugs. There are
two related issues that could be subject to challenge. First, companies may
bring challenges against countries that permit generic applicants to
immediately rely on clinical data without providing a period of "data
exclusivity" for the initial drugmaker. Second, companies may challenge
domestic laws requiring that all clinical trials of approved drugs be made
publicly available. Although both potential challenges relate to the same data,
they will be discussed separately because they involve separate issues (reliance
versus disclosure), as well as different issues of interpretation under TRIPS.
a) Countries That Do Not Provide "Data Exclusivity' Will Likely
Be Challenged
To best understand the data exclusivity issue, some background
concerning the regulatory drug approval process is necessary. Unlike most
other patented items, patented drugs need regulatory approval by a domestic
agency such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration before the drugs can
be sold. Most countries grant such approval when a company can establish
that the proposed new drug is safe and effective for its proposed use based
on clinical data. 316 It can take many years and millions of dollars to compile
the requisite data for regulatory review. 3'
In contrast, manufacturers of proposed generics can gain approval with a
more limited set of clinical data. Most countries will approve generic versions

316. E.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) (U.S.
standard); Food and Drug Regulations, C.R.C., c. 870, § C.08.0002(2) (Can.) (Canadian
standard).
317. E.g., Salomeh Keyhani et al.,
Are Development Times for Pharmaceuticals Increasing or

Decreasing?, 25

HEALTH AFF.

461, 463 (2006).
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based solely on clinical studies that show "bioequivalence" to a previously
approved drug; the proposed generic is then presumed to be just as safe and
effective as the previously approved drug.318 The time and investment needed
to establish clinical data of bioequivalence is a mere fraction of the time and
investment required to produce data for the earlier drug's regulatory approval
process.319 This is an intentional policy decision. After all, a company that is a
second or later entrant to the market with no possible patent protection
cannot charge high prices to recoup an expensive investment. Moreover, if
generic companies are not provided a less costly regulatory approval process,
original companies can continue to sell their drugs at premium prices long
after a patent has expired due to lack of competition.3 0
The issue with data exclusivity is when generic companies can rely on
clinical data of the drug they are copying. In a country that provides data
exclusivity, the generic manufacturer is barred from relying on that data for a
certain period, ranging from five to ten years from approval of the prior
drug.32 ' Data exclusivity, when available, is completely separate from patent
protection and can provide substantial commercial advantage for even
unpatentable products. In contrast, a country that does not recognize data
exclusivity will permit other companies to immediately rely on this data. This
means that as soon as a patented drug is approved for sale, a generic
manufacturer can apply to sell a lower-cost equivalent. Importantly, this does
not mean that the patent is not valid. However, it does permit the
manufacturer of a generic to enter the market while simultaneously
challenging the patent. Although this may seem like a formidable challenge,
the vast majority of challenged drug patents are in fact found invalid or not
2
infringed.

2

318. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(F) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 314.92(a)(1) (2010); Notice: Release of

the Health Canada Draft Guidance Document: Qualiy (Chemistu and Manufacturing): New Drug
Submissions (NDSs) and Abbreviated New Drug Submissions (ANDSs), HEALTH CANADA (Jan.
24, 2014), http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt-formats/pdf/consultation/drug-medic/
qual nds ands-draft-pdnpadn ebauche -eng.pd f.

319. E.g., Henry G. Grabowski et al., Enty and Competition in Generic Biologics, 28
& DECISION ECON. 439, 443 (2007).
320. Indeed, this was the situation in the United States before laws were amended to
permit generic drug approvals based on the abbreviated process. See, e.g., Gerald 3.
MANAGERIAL

Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (1999).
321. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 314.108 (2012) (five-year exclusivity); Council Directive
2004/27/EC. Amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community Code Relating to
Medicinal Products for Human Use, 2004 O.J. (L 136) 34, 39 art. 10.1 (ten-year maximum

exclusivity).
322. E.g., EC PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY, supra note 10, para. 501 (finding that
in over half of cases where patent was challenged by a generic company, the patent was
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A patent-owning company such as Eli Lilly may assert that in a country
without data exclusivity, its right to prevent other companies from using its
data was indirectly expropriated. Clinical data that is expensive to develop
seems to easily fall within the definition of an investment. The expropriation
issue is whether permitting generic companies to rely on clinical data results
is a substantial and unreasonable interference with this investment. A
company would likely believe that this is the case if it cannot completely
exclude competitors from using its proprietary data. This seems somewhat
analogous to a compulsory license of a patent in that, although the company
can still use its data (or patent), lack of exclusivity results in a substantial
interference with the expected value. A developing country should have a
strong policy argument for denying data exclusivity to permit generic
companies to more quickly rely on this data and promote faster entry of low
cost drugs. However, it is unclear how a tribunal would balance interests or
whether it would instead use the "sole effect" test, which would clearly favor
only corporate interests. Accordingly, an important issue is whether a
domestic decision to reject data exclusivity could be exempt from
consideration as an expropriation claim.
An initial question is whether such a claim could be excluded under
clauses that exempt certain intellectual property issues from indirect
expropriation claims. 32 3 The issue is whether lack of data exclusivity should

be considered a "limitation" of "intellectual property rights" pursuant to
agreements that exclude such limitations of intellectual property rights from
the scope of expropriation. Although data exclusivity is not a traditional
intellectual property right, many companies as well as countries consider it to
be one in contexts beyond investor-state disputes.32 4 However, the phrase

invalidated); FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 20 (2002) (finding that generic companies win in seventy-three

percent of challenges, with twenty-eight percent of patents found invalid, thirty-five percent
of the cases finding lack of infringement, and ten percent of cases abandoned by the patent
owner before a judicial finding); see also Wullianallur Raghupathi, PharmaceuticalPatent Validi:
An EmpircalStudy of the Recent Decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (20082011), 18-19 (Fordham Univ., Working Paper), available at http://ghimc.org/pdf/
patent enforcement.pdf (finding that during the period 2005-2006 about half of patents
challenged by generics were held invalid).
323. Arguably, another reason the expropriation claim should be excluded is that lack of
implementation of a desired law may not constitute state action that is fundamental to an
expropriation claim. Generally, expropriation claims are based on an affirmative act, rather
than an omission. However, as Eli Lilly's case shows, companies are not afraid to make new
claims in the area of investment arbitrations.
324. Indeed, there are some free trade agreements that require countries to provide data
exclusivity under intellectual property chapters. See, e.g., U.S.-Singapore Free Trade
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"limitations of intellectual property" suggests that there must be a recognized
intellectual property right that can be limited, such that a country that
completely denied a right might not fall under this language. Nonetheless, it
is at least conceivable that data exclusivity or lack of data exclusivity would
be covered as intellectual property.
Even if data exclusivity is considered a type of intellectual property right
that falls within the intellectual property exception to expropriation, it is not
necessarily immune to challenge. In particular, this exception only applies to
intellectual property rights consistent with TRIPS and there is significant
controversy concerning what TRIPS requires. In particular, although some
companies and countries believe that TRIPS requires data exclusivity, a
proper interpretation of TRIPS pursuant to the customary rules of
interpretation of international agreements establishes that this view is
incorrect. 325 TRIPS requires that countries "protect" data submitted to
government for approval of pharmaceuticals from "unfair commercial use"
without specifying what this means. 326 Although companies suggest that it is
unfair to allow other companies to rely on their data, negotiators rejected
language that specifically stated that there could be no reliance on the data.32
The rejection of this earlier language means that it is not the current
standard-contrary to what some companies have suggested. 328 Accordingly,
a number of scholars and policymakers consider that the provision does not
329
require data exclusivity.
Lack of data exclusivity could also be challenged as a violation of the fair
and equitable treatment standard. Although this is recognized as the broadest
and most frequently successful claim in investment disputes, it is unlikely to
be successful against a country like India. Since India has never recognized

Agreement, supra note 179, art. 16.8; Australia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-AustI., art.
17.10, May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248 (2004) [hereinafter AUSFTA].
325. E.g., Ho, supra note 314, at 76-80.
326. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 39(3).
327. Brussels Draft, 4A, reprinted in DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:
DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 421 (3d ed., 2008); see also Bayer Inc. v. Canada (Att'y
Gen.) (1998), [1999] 1 F.C. 553 (Can.).
328. See generaly ORG. OF PHARM. PRODUCERS OF INDIA, OPPI POSITION PAPER:
REGULATORY DATA PROTECTION A BUILDING BLOCK FOR PHARMACEUTICAL R&D
(2008).
329. E.g., CARLOS CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 383-92 (2007); JEROME REICHMAN,
UNDISCLOSED CLINICAL TEST DATA UNDER THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND ITS PROGENY:
A BROADER PERSPECTIVE 10 (2004); Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid:
Taming Data Exclusiviy and Patent/Regstraion Linkage, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303, 315-16
(2008).
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protection for data exclusivity, there would be no legitimate expectation for it
to do so even under the broadest standard of maintaining a stable legal and
business environment. After all, a stable environment would be the same
legal environment.
However, the bigger issue is that the threat of investor-state arbitration
could prevent countries from abandoning data exclusivity laws in favor of
India's approach, even if a country believes that India's approach is better
policy in promoting access to lower-cost drugs. Although tribunals have
repeatedly noted that investors should not expect that laws will be frozen in
time, a company could claim that they did not expect an existing protection
to be dismantled. Some claims could be cabined if tribunals use the more
robust standard that only finds violations when an investor relies on a
specific state representation since it is unlikely that any country would
promise to keep data exclusivity laws. However, that possibility may be too
large a risk to take for a developing country with limited funds.
b) Domestic Data Transparency Requirements Are Vulnerable to
Challenge
Companies are also likely to challenge domestic regulations concerning
disclosure of clinical data supporting approved drugs. The European Union
is at the forefront of requiring what is referred to as data "transparency," but
if it is challenged, other countries may be hesitant to enact laws that public
health scholars uniformly applaud as desirable.330 In particular, a new EU
regulation requires that all clinical data for drugs approved by the European
Union be made publicly available.33' Companies strongly oppose disclosing
clinical data, claiming that they are entitled to keep such data as a trade
secret.332 Although the regulation is not yet in full effect, companies are likely
to contest it once it is.
Before addressing possible claims, it is important to explain the rationale
for transparency laws in the context of the regulatory structure for approval
of new drugs. As noted earlier, a new drug will be approved for sale based on
clinical data that it is safe and effective. Notably, such data is developed not
by an independent organization, but by the very company seeking approval.
330. See generalj Gardiner Harris, Diabetes Drug Maker Hid Test Data,Files Indicate, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 2010, at Al (describing problems when drug companies are not required to

publicly disclose all relevant data).
331. Regulation 536/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Medicinal
Products for Human Use, and Repealing Directive, 2001/20/EC, 2014 0J. (L 158).

332. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Confidentiali Laws and Secrecy in Medical

Research: Improving Pubc Access to Data on Drug Safeo, 26
e.g., infra note 333 (noting AbbView objection).
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In addition, although the company must submit the data to the government,
the public is not entitled to access it. There are a few cases where
independent researchers obtained access to the data either because a country
had a policy for doing so in limited circumstances333 or because a company
responded to public pressure.3 34 However, without mandatory transparency,
not only doctors and patients, but also governments must rely on industry
claims concerning the value of new drugs. Because companies have an
interest in selectively publishing positive results,

335

they are more likely to

conclude that their drugs are safe and effective than independent
researchers. 336 They also overestimate benefits while minimizing risks in
published studies.33 As a result, there may be unnecessary expenditures on
expensive new drugs based on questionable data338 that can also result in
negative public health outcomes that could have been avoided. 339 There are a
number of examples where new drugs were later found by independent

333. For example, the European Medicines Agency previously granted access to clinical
data concerning Abbvie's drug Humira and Intermune's drug Esbriet based on a 2010 policy
that such data be provided upon request. European Medicines Agency, European Medicines
Agency Policy on Access to Documents (Related to Medicinal Products for Human and
Veterinary Use), EMA/110196/2006 (2010). The companies subsequently challenged this
decision. Case T-44/13, AbbVie, Inc. v. European Meds. Agency (July 17, 2014),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text =&docid =155902&doclang=en;
Case T-73/13R, InterMune UK Ltd v. European Meds. Agency (Apr. 25, 2013),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text =&docid =137242&doclang=en;
see also Trudo Lemmens, EMA's Proposed Data Release Policy: Promoting Transparey or
Ecpanding Pharma Control Over Data?, PLOS BLOGS (May 30, 2014), http://blogs.plos.org/
speakingo fmedicine /2014/ 05 /30 /emas -new-data-releas e-policy-promoting-transparencyexpanding-pharma-control-data/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2014).
334. E.g., Editorial, Full Disclosure Neededfor Clinical Drug Data, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2013,
at A16.
335. E.g., Trudo Lemmens & Candice Telfer, Access to Information and the Right to Health:
The Human Rights Case for Clinical Tials Transparency, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 63, 93-94 (2012);
Nicholas Bakalar, Review Finds Drug Makers Issue More Positive Studies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,
2007, at F7.
336. E.g., Fujian Song et al., Dissemination and Publication of Research Findings: An Updated
Review of Related Biases, 14 HEALTH TECH. ASSESSMENT (2010).
337. E.g., Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in
Biomedical Research, 289 J.AM. MED. ASSoC. 454 (2003); Joel Lexchin et al., Pharmaceutical
Industry Sponsorship and Research Outcome and Qualit: Systematic Review, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 1167

(2003).
338. Governments stockpiled the antiviral drug to treat influenza sold as Tamiflu based
on unverified effectiveness claims by the company that independent researchers only
recently determined to be unsubstantiated. E.g., Ben Goldacre, What the Tamiflu Saga Tells Us
About Drug Trials and Big Pharma,GUARDIAN (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/
business /2014/apr/10/tamiflu-saga-drug-trials-big-pharma/.
339. E.g., HAIEUROPE, supranote 31.
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research to result in harmful health risks.340 Even though independent
researchers can ultimately discover issues, it is expensive, inefficient, and
poor public policy to bar them from considering existing data that could
result in better public outcomes.
There is a serious concern that transparency requirements would
constitute an expropriation. Mandatory disclosure of data would seem to
constitute a substantial interference with the expectation that a company's
data will not be accessed by a competitor. In addition, the current exceptions
of expropriation do not seem to cabin such claims.
A nation should have the right to decide whether to recognize protected
data as an intellectual property right. But there is an open issue concerning
whether TRIPS requires this data to be protected. In particular, there is a
currently untested exception to the TRIPS requirement to protect data from
unfair commercial use; TRIPS explicitly states: "Members shall protect such
data against disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public, or
unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair
commercial use." 34 ' In other words, TRIPS seems to contemplate that there

are in fact some situations where members may not need to protect data
against disclosure if necessary to protect the public. Although the European
Union may believe that it falls within the TRIPS exception that permits
disclosure for public interest, a company would likely believe otherwise.
If a tribunal does not extend the traditional definition of intellectual
property to include data exclusivity, such claims could be exempt from a
claim for indirect expropriation. This exemption could be based on the
language of certain agreements that does not provide a complete exception
to expropriation claims, but rather suggests that regulation for public welfare
be treated differently. For example, a number of agreements suggest that
nondiscriminatory regulatory measures "designed and applied to protect
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health" do not generally
342
constitute indirect expropriation "except in rare circumstances."
In addition, an investor that believes it is entitled to compensation when
a country fails to provide data exclusivity raises unique challenges even when
public health is involved. Most cases involving public welfare have been
340. E.g., Ho, supra note 13, at 501-05.
341. TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 39(3).
342. E.g., AUSFTA, supra note 324, Annex 11-B, art. 4(b); U.S.-Chile Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-Chile, Annex 10-D, June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026; CAFTA, supra note 306,
Annex 10-C; Draft, CETA Investment Text, EU-Can., Annex X11(3): Expropriation,

ht://www.tradustdce.ca/

content! uoeads/20 13/08/EU CanadaeTA NegotiationsInvestment

chapter 4-April-2014 _clean.pdf [hereinaferDraf CE TA Investment Text.
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cases that directly impact public health or the environment, such as a
regulation that aims to protect sea turtles, or a regulation that aims to reduce
carcinogens.343 In contrast, the public health interest protected in countries
that decline to impose data exclusivity is more attenuated. Some consider it
obvious that there is not only a universal right to health, but also a right to
access to affordable medicine.3 44 However, there is no universally recognized
right to access to affordable medicine; indeed, this is the crux of frequent
international tension between companies that want strong patent protection
and those that want less patent protection to promote access to affordable
drugs.345

343. E.g., supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing how the Califonia ban of an
arguable carcinogen should be considered lawful regulation and not expropriation in
Methanex); KYLA TIENHAARA, THE EXPROPRIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE:
PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTORS AT THE EXPENSE OF PUBLIC POLICY 239-43 (2009);
Benjamin W. Jenkins, The Next Generation of Chilling Uncertainoy: Indirect Expropriation Under
CAFTA and Its Potential Impact on Environmental Protection, 12 OCEAN &: COASTAL L.J. 269
(2007). Notably, such claims of public welfare do not always succeed in thwarting a claim for
expropriation. For example, Mexico was found to have indirectly expropriated Metalclad's
investment, and Costa Rica was required to pay $ 4 million for expropriating land to protect
sea turtles. E.g., Metalclad Award, supra note 177; Joyce Gomez, Expropriation to Protect Turtles
Costs Government $4 Million, COSTA RICA NEWS, http://www.costaricanewssite.com/
expropriation-to-protect-turtles-costs-government-4-million/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2014).
344. E.g., Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (S. Aft.)
(right to affordable HIV drugs); Further Initiatives for Social Development, G.A. Res. S24/2, 101, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-24/2 (July 1, 2000); Commission on Human Rights, Res.
2001/33, Access to Medication in the Context of Pandemics Such as HIV/AIDS (Apr. 23,
2001) (asserting right to ARV treatment as part of the right to enjoy the "highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health"); High Commissioner of the Comm'n on Human
Rights, The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights on Human Rights, Comm'n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13,
10-15, 27-58 (Oune 27, 2001); Joanne Csete, Severalfor the Price of One: Right to AIDS
Treatment as Link to Other Human Rights, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 263, 265 (2002); Lisa Forman,
From TRIPS-Plus to Rights-Plus? Exploring Right to Health Impact Assessment of Trade-Related
Intellectual Propery Rights Through the Thai Experience, 7 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 347 (2012); Melissa McClellan, "Tools for Success": The TRIPS Agreement and the Human
Right to Essential Medicines, 12 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 153 (2005); Simon
Walker, A Human Rights Approach to the WTO's TRIPS Agreement, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 171, 176 (Frederick M.
Abbott et al. eds., 2006) ("The right to health ... includes a right to affordable, essential
drugs, as set out in the WHO's essential drug list."); Alicia Ely Yamin, Not Just a Tragedy:
Access to Medicaions as a Right Under InternationalLaw, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 325 (2003).
345. E.g., Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 34, para. 4 (recognizing that
nations should have the ability to promote access to medicine, but without creating a
complete exception to patent rights); Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and
the New Politics of Intellectual Proper>, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 852-53 (2008) (describing the use of
"frameworks of international rights discourse and corporate malfeasance" for access to
medicine, which necessarly suggests that no such universal right currently exists). Although
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Countries may face even more problems with a claim for fair and
equitable treatment. This standard is often read broadly, and a country that
imposes transparency requirements could be considered to be making a
substantial change to the legal and business environment. Notably, the EU
regulation is not a complete surprise. The European Union has been
engaging in increased transparency over the years. As with all such claims,
the European Union's interests are better protected under the standard that
only recognizes claims based on legitimate expectations due to specific
reliance. It is doubtful that the European Union would ever represent that it
would not change its laws. However, considering that past cases have broadly
interpreted this standard, the EU regulations could still be vulnerable.
B.

PROPOSALS TO PRESERVE FLEXIBILITY UNDER

TRIPS

This Section provides concrete proposals to address the unique policy
issues raised by permitting investors to challenge domestic decisions
concerning the proper scope-if any-of intellectual property rights when
those decisions are arguably permissible under international agreements such
as TRIPS.3 46 In particular, this Section advocates ideally excluding such issues
from international agreements governing investments, or limiting challenges
in the dispute settlement system. If this is not possible, this Section suggests
specific proposals to cabin expropriation and fair and equitable treatment
claims that would otherwise interfere with internationally permissible
regulation of intellectual property rights.

the WHO and UN have urged nations to try to expand access to drugs, this remains an

issue. See U.N. Secretary General, Review of the Problem of Human Immunodeficieng
Virus/Acquired Immunodeficeeny Sndrome in All Its Aspects, 101, U.N. Doc. A/55/779 (Feb.
16, 2001) (urging states to use compulsory licenses and other means to expand access to
lower cost generics). Even those that suggest that corporations be more sensitive to drug
prices as a matter of human rights are often cautious to only suggest access for life-saving
drugs, and not all drugs. E.g., Chuan-Feng Wu, TransnationalPharmaceuticalCotporations'Legal

andMoral Human Rights Responsibilities in Relation to Access to Medicnes, 7 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 77 (2012).
346. Although this Section focuses on proposals that stem from the policy issues raised
here, there is one issue raised by the Eli Lilly case that impacts all cases: whether
procedurally proper decisions of domestic courts should ever be challenged in investor-state
disputes. As explained in Part III, there is no precedent or policy reason for enabling
investors to obtain compensation using either expropriation or fair and equitable treatment
claims when they simply disagree with substantive domestic law. The proposals to limit
claims that attempt to challenge substantive law regarding intellectual property equally apply
to all other areas.
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1. Excude Inte/lectua/ Property mm Investor-State Diputes
The simplest way to avoid above-noted problems is by narrowing the
scope of what constitutes a covered investment. Alternatively, an exception
to investor-state disputes could be created to avoid policy problems. In
considering these solutions, this Article considers intellectual property to be
broadly defined to include not only patents but also any regulatory protection
of drugs, such as data exclusivity, since companies themselves consider both
to be intellectual property.
There are several approaches to modifying the definition of investment.
The most efficient way to eliminate noted problems is to modify the
definition of what constitutes an "investment" to explicitly exclude
intellectual property rights in their entirety. Not surprisingly, some have
suggested doing this. 3 47 It is not adequate for an agreement to simply not
mention intellectual property as covered since most agreements cover
intangible investments. Even those who oppose Eli Lilly's claim would need
to concede that intellectual property rights are generally considered intangible
investments. 48 Accordingly, there needs to be an explicit statement that
intangible investments do not include intellectual property rights.
Alternatively, if intellectual property rights are included as an investment,
there should be a clarification that such rights do not include those that have
been canceled pursuant to domestic law. Moreover, it may be wise to clarify
that domestic law includes common law modifications to the law. This would
thus obviate Eli Lilly's objection that Canada was unjustified in modifying
and retroactively applying this standard.
Another possibility is to maintain the scope of covered investments,
and instead change the scope of investor-state disputes. In particular, claims
that require adjudication of rights under another international agreement,
such as TRIPS, could be excluded entirely. Agreements have previously
excluded some subject matter, such as national security and tax measures,
347. E.g., Brook K. Baker, Coporate Power Unbound: Investor-State Arbitration of JP
Monopolies on Medicnes-Eli Lily and the TPP, PJIP RESEARCH PAPER SERIES PAPER 36, at 13
(2013). Although this is obviously a current issue, some countries astutely noted this
problem earlier and tried unsuccessfully to eliminate IP from the definition of investments.
E.g. OECD, REPORT TO THE NEGOTIATING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
NEGOTIATING GROUP ON THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT (MAI) 4
(1997), available at http://wwwl.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng9732e.pdf (noting that some
experts recommend excluding intellectual property rights entirely from the definition of
"investment").
348. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (patents have attributes of personal property); see also
Mercurio, supra note 26, at 878 (noting that it is "beyond doubt" that granted intellectual
property rights are investments).
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from the scope of the treaty.349 Alternatively, agreements could include

language that states "[n]othing in this agreement shall affect the rights and
obligations of any party to TRIPS or any other international intellectual
property agreement; no party may bring an issue requiring adjudication of a
TRIPS provision unless it has been previously determined to be in violation
of TRIPs pursuant to the WTO." This would be somewhat similar to
existing exceptions in some agreements concerning either tax or
environmental agreements.350 However, unlike these clauses, which are
primarily conflict of law principles that state which agreement should prevail
in the event of inconsistency, this proposal goes further to ensure that
tribunals do not unnecessarily decide whether there is an inconsistency in the
first instance. This is necessary to prevent commercial arbitrators from
usurping the process for determining TRIPS compliance, which could lead to
inconsistent judgments.35'
The above suggestions are strongly preferable to the draft text to
address situations where there are competing agreements under CETA that is
being used as a basis for the pending Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership ("TTIP"). In particular, the CETA draft states that if there is a
potential for "overlapping compensation" or the other claim could have a
"significant impact" on the arbitration claim, the tribunal shall "stay its
proceedings," or otherwise, the tribunal can continue the proceedings and
simply take a separate proceeding "into account in its decision, order or
award., 352 However, this approach still not only gives a tribunal too much
authority to impinge on another international agreement, but it also does not
address the situation raised by Eli Lilly where no other proceeding has
previously been initiated. This may often be the case with TRIPS claims
because only governments can bring WTO disputes and governments seem
circumspect in doing so. Moreover, WTO claims would not result in
overlapping compensation both because investors have no standing to assert
such claims, and because WTO proceedings are only intended to force
349. E.g., NAFTA, supra note 36, arts. 2102, 2103.
350. Id. arts. 103, 2103; Korea-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Kor.-Chile, art. 20.3(3),
Feb. 15, 2003, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/Chi-SKorea e/ChiKoreaind-

e.asp; see also Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment
Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 390 (2003); Jennifer A. Heindl,
Toward a Histoy of NAFTA's ChapterEleven, 24 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 672 (2006).
351. E.g, Brooks E. Allen & Tommaso Soave, Jursdictional Overlap in WTO Dispute
Settlement and Investment Arbitration, 30 ARB. INT'L 1, 7 (2014).
352. Draft CETA Investment Text, supra note 342, art. x-23; EUR. COMM'N TRADE,
PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON MODALITIES FOR INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND ISDS IN
TIIP, Question 7 (Mar. 2014) (citing CETA art. x-23), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2014/march/tradoc_152280.pdf.
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353
countries to comply with WTO rles, but do not result in compensation.
Accordingly, investment chapters should exclude from the scope of
arbitrations any claims that challenge internationally agreed upon standards
for state action.

2. Limit the Scope ofInvestment C/aims Based on InternationaZAgreements
Such as TRIPS
If intellectual property issues cannot be entirely excluded from
investment arbitration disputes, the next best alternative is to cabin the most
likely claims-expropriation and fair and equitable treatment claims. This
section explains how to limit such claims and why existing proposals thus far
are inadequate.
a)

Limit Expropriation Claims

The optimal method of limiting challenges to domestic laws consistent
with international intellectual property standards is to explicitly bar
expropriation claims in this area. Technically, this is already recognized in
existing agreements, including NAFTA. However, as the Eli Lilly case
illustrates, that language is inadequate since parties may disagree on whether
certain conduct is permissible under an international intellectual property
agreement.
Canada has proposed that there is no indirect expropriation in the case of
a decision by a court, administrative tribunal, or other governmental
intellectual property authority limiting or creating an intellectual property
right, except where "the decision amounts to a denial of justice or an abuse
of right., 35 4 This would at first glance seem to easily bar claims like Eli Lilly's
without needing to evaluate whether there is a violation of a separate
international agreement. However, a company, such as Eli Lilly, could claim a
denial of justice or abuse of right. Although no prior tribunal has found
similar facts to fit these circumstances, past expansive rulings suggest this is a
possibility. Accordingly, any exception to expropriation for intellectual
property rights should clarify that there is no denial of justice or abuse of
right if there is a common law modification of laws that are retroactively
applied. This would not only prevent the Eli Lilly situation, but would also
make expropriation more in line with domestic taking law that does not

353. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art.
3.7 Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33
I.L.M. 1226, 1241 (providing that compensation should only be awarded as a matter of last
resort), available athttp: //www.wto.org/ english/ docse /legale /28-dsu.pdf.
354. Draft CETA Investment Text, supra note 342, art. X.11(5).
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recognize a taking when courts simply apply slightly modified common law
doctrine.355 Of course, there is no requirement that international
expropriation must be consistent with domestic taking law. However, given
that expropriation is a remedy only available to foreign investors, unless there
is a sound policy reason to provide a broader scope of expropriation to only
foreign investors, closer alignment in treatment of all investors seems most
appropriate.
Another possibility is to bar expropriation claims based on intellectual
property rights in a manner similar to expropriation claims based on taxation.
For example, NAFTA states that tax measures may in some cases constitute
expropriation, but imposes unique procedural requirements for asserting
such a claim.356 In particular, before a claim can be adjudicated, both the
country accused of expropriation as well as the investor's own country must
decide whether there is an expropriation claim that is permitted to go
forward.3 57 The idea of cabining expropriation claims based on domestic
revocation of intellectual property rights is a sound one. To prevent potential
inconsistent decisions, expropriation claims based on state action that is
arguably inconsistent with TRIPS should be barred unless there is a finding
of TRIPS inconsistency by a WTO panel. This would obviate inconsistent
decisions and also allow TRIPS issues to be decided by arbitrators with
expertise in WTO agreements, including TRIPS.
These proposals would be a significant improvement over the Eurpoean
Union's proposed language to clarify what types of regulatory action should
not constitute indirect expropriation. Although the European Union shares a
desire with many others to "avoid claims against legitimate public policy
measures," its proposed clarification is no better than language in existing
treaties.358 In particular it notes that in "rare circumstances,"
nondiscriminatory measures to protect "legitimate public welfare objectives
such as health" can nonetheless constitute indirect expropriation if the
impact of the measure "is so severe in light of its purpose that it appears
manifestly excessive. 35' This proposal introduces new language in need of
interpretation, such as what would be "manifestly excessive" or "severe in
light of its purpose." In addition, although it may seem fair to have a balance
355. E.g., Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fith Amendment? NAFTA's

Investment Protections and the MisguidedQuestfor an International "Regulatog Takings" Doctrine, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 80-82 (2003).
356. NAFTA, supra note 36, art. 2103(6).
357. Id.
358. EU Comm'n, Public Consultation on Modalities for Investment Protection and
ISDS in TTIP, at 6-7 (Mar. 2014).
359. Draft CETA Investment Text, supra note 342, Annex X.11: Expropriation 3.
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of interests, a tribunal of private arbitrators does the balancing, and in doing
so the arbitrators are essentially second guessing the balance already
determined by a nation.
b) Limit Fair and Equitable Treatment Claims
The best approach to cabining fair and equitable treatment claims would
be to eliminate them altogether in cases where the agreement is solely
between countries with strong legal systems. Although it may seem radical to
jettison a traditional component of investment chapters, there are some
existing chapters where tribunals have no authority to litigate such claims.
These claims have posed the most significant intrusions into domestic
regulatory authority and have resulted in inconsistent rulings. Moreover, this
standard was initially intended to provide a remedy as a back up to the nondiscrimination provision in the exceptional situation where the host country's
political and legal systems disintegrate to the extent that investors cannot be
adequately protected. There seems to be no need for this claim at all where
domestic remedies exist. In addition, this would avoid the problem of unduly
expansive rulings concerning fair and equitable treatment that the United
States has tried, but failed to cabin in NAFTA.360
If fair and equitable treatment claims must remain within the scope of
investment arbitrations, adding clear exceptions would be the next best
alternative. For example, just as intellectual property rights denied or
canceled under domestic law should never be considered expropriation, a
similar clause could exist for fair and equitable treatment claims. In addition,
as noted earlier with expropriation claims, it may be better to exclude any fair
and equitable treatment claim based on state law denying or canceling an
intellectual property right on substantive grounds unless that state law is
found by a WTO panel to be inconsistent with TRIPS. Even if there were a
TRIPS violation, there should not necessarily be a fair and equitable
treatment claim. Many existing and pending agreements state that breach of a
separate international agreement-including TRIPS-does not establish a

360. For example, after some broad interpretations of this standard under NAFTA, the
NAFTA Free Trade Commission issued an interpretation that aimed to clarify that the
standard be linked to customary international law to cabin rulings. NAFTA Free Trade
Comm'n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions,
B (July 31, 2001).
However, this was of little utility since tribunals simply interpreted customary international
law broadly. E.g., Patrick Dumberry, The Emegence of a Consistent Case Law: How NAFTA
Tribunals Have Intepreted the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Oct.

30,
2013),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/10/30/the-emergence-of-aconsis tent-cas e-law-how-nafta-tribunals -have-interpreted-the- fair- and-equitable-treatmentstandard/.
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violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard.36 ' Notably, this clause
also does not state that compliance with another international agreement will
immunize state action from being subject to such claims. Thus, additional
language is necessary.
This could be accomplished by including language defining what qualifies
as fair and equitable treatment. Although some agreements limit the term to
the minimum standard pursuant to customary international law, such limits
have clearly been inadequate in cabining intrusive claims. Accordingly the
term could be stated to never exist simply because the legal or business
environment has changed. This would importantly be helpful not only for
the intellectual property issues that this Article focuses on, but also for all
investor-state claims that have resulted in undue encroachment on domestic
regulatory authority. In addition, an investment chapter could mandate that
fair and equitable treatment claims must be based on whether a party made a
specific representation to induce investment that created a legitimate
expectation. Furthermore, it could mandate that there is never a legitimate
expectation that laws will remain frozen in time. This would go farther than
the current EU proposal that suggests that tribunals may consider whether a
country made a specific representation relied upon by the investor.3 62 In
addition to requiring-rather than permitting-tribunals to consider specific
representation, it may be important to define what constitutes such a
representation. For example, Eli Lilly incorrectly believes that an intellectual
property right granted by the state is a representation that the right can never
be invalidated. Accordingly, it could be helpful to clarify that intellectual
property rights issued by a nation are not representations of permanent
validity.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Eli Lilly's case against Canada exposes important policy problems with
permitting investors to use investor-state arbitrations to challenge domestic
intellectual property decisions. Although a tribunal should deny Eli Lilly's
claims, investor-state tribunals often make broad and unpredictable rulings.
Moreover, even if a panel rules properly, public health may still be
compromised if other companies follow Eli Lilly's lead in challenging other
domestic decisions concerning intellectual property rights. Although some
are wisely beginning to question the wisdom of creating more opportunities

361. Draft, TPP, Investment chapter, supra note 179, art. 11.6: Minimum Standard of
Treatment.
362. See EU COMM'N TRADE, supra note 352, ques. 3.
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through additional agreements, this Article hopes to provide a roadmap for
how to combat likely claims in the thousands of existing agreements, as well
as how to cabin claims in any future agreements.

